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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Jack Santucci on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Jack Santucci on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Jack Santucci on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Proportional representation in New York City did not “boost” the Left]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/3streams/proportional-representation-in-new-york-city-did-not-boost-the-left-7369d94f484b?source=rss-70a52ad91c3d------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[ranked-choice-voting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[socialism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[proportional-voting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[new-york-city]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jack Santucci]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 13 Feb 2025 01:46:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-02-13T20:19:27.805Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>ELECTIONS</h4><h4>And it wasn’t a system of proportional representation, anyway</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3vmG6WaXFmKDQfCpvQEZYA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Campaign pin for city elections, 1937, advertising Fiorello H. LaGuardia for Mayor (Republican, American Labor, Fusion, Progressive) and Baruch Charney Vladeck (American Labor) for City Council. Source: <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:La_Guardia_Vladeck_Greenberg_ALP_Button_1937.jpg">Wikimedia</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>Having spent time with data on the use of proportional ranked-choice voting in New York City, I read a recent <a href="https://jacobin.com/2025/01/new-york-proportional-representation-socialism">commentary</a> in <em>Jacobin</em> with some surprise. This piece asserts that the system “boosted” groups like the Communist and American Labor parties in the 1930s and 1940s.</p><p>The main thing this system aimed to boost was Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia’s majority in council — and it even failed at that. The reasons, respectively, are two. First, electoral reforms do not just fall out of the sky. Second, proportional ranked choice is not the same as proportional representation (PR).</p><p>One typically introduces PR by noting that, under such electoral systems, parties mechanically get seat shares that more or less match their vote shares. I say “more or less” because PR presumes legislative districts with multiple seats each. The more seats there are in a district, the easier it becomes to win one. Implicit in this perspective is that voters will be voting for parties.</p><p>In practice, many reformers take a much more radical view of PR.</p><p>They often are dissatisfied with parties, generally, and want to break them up. This impulse leads to hasty thinking about what qualifies as PR and how it might get adopted.</p><p>The system used in New York City was (and is) known as the single transferable vote. It long has been championed as a way to scramble parties, period. Its popularity goes back to J.S. Mill — a British political theorist who <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/5669/pg5669-images.html">proposed</a> having voters rank all candidates in a single nationwide district. Nothing says those rankings have to follow party lines, and that’s the point.</p><p>When New York City adopted the system in 1936, it was not out of benevolent desire to “boost” the seat share of the Left. Rather, LaGuardia had been sparring with a Tammany-dominated council and <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1949699">needed</a> some way to reproduce his own coalition therein. That coalition included Republicans, Laborites, and pretty much anyone else opposed to the faltering Democratic <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/P/bo5921610.html">machine</a>.</p><p>Because reformers had been wedded to proportional ranked choice, the respective charter commission did not consider PR as it gets taught in college — party seat share matches vote share. This immediately came back to bite the reform coalition.</p><p>The first elections (1937) returned a council divided 50/50 between Tammany and reform forces. This deadlock resolved in favor of Tammany on the return of one of its deputies from a wedding in Ireland. The next four elections returned decisive Tammany majorities. LaGuardia’s coalition thus had to bargain the whole time with Tammany.</p><p>In an <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4924655">extension</a> of research from my 2022 book, <a href="https://tinyurl.com/moreparties"><em>More Parties or No Parties</em></a>, I ask what would have happened if the electoral rules had been based on actual PR (i.e., what gets taught in college). This exercise uses voters’ first-place rankings as single votes in an open-list system. You can read more about such systems <a href="https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/70/avoiding-the-pr-mistakes-of-the-past/">here</a>.</p><p>The simulation results are stark.</p><p>In the first two elections under real PR, the anti-Tammany “coalition” (as it was known) wins comfortable seat majorities. In the first, it wins nearly 2/3 of seats. Further, these results would have aligned partisan control of all three lawmaking offices existing at the time: council, Gracie Mansion, and the erstwhile Board of Estimate.</p><p>Is it reasonable to assume these first-choice votes would have been the same in list PR?</p><p>I looked at what voters might have been doing with their second and lower rankings. There is little evidence of strategic thinking. Rather, the data suggest they were not using lower rankings very much, or they were just giving them to incumbents (i.e., Tammany).</p><p>Many Americans today are unhappy with the parties as currently constituted. This disaffection probably intensifies as one enters city politics. There, tangible policy problems (housing, public safety, etc) are propelling interest in electoral reform.</p><p>For now, many are <a href="https://thefulcrum.us/electoral-reforms/ranked-choice-voting-reforms">committed</a> to solutions based on ranked-choice ballots. Such readers are not likely to view this article as helpful. Yet, if the goal is to reform governance, not just bust up parties, New York City’s old proportional-ranked system could be a shortsighted model.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7369d94f484b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/3streams/proportional-representation-in-new-york-city-did-not-boost-the-left-7369d94f484b">Proportional representation in New York City did not “boost” the Left</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/3streams">3Streams</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Racial representation and electoral-system reform in U.S. cities]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/3streams/racial-representation-and-electoral-system-reform-in-u-s-cities-6ce3faa4d6ca?source=rss-70a52ad91c3d------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[representation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ranked-choice-voting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[equity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[race]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jack Santucci]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 19 Oct 2024 11:22:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-10-19T21:56:38.413Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>POLITICAL EQUITY</h4><h4>Points worth sharing from some work-in-progress</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/356/1*h70prtqmX2j6K6yJ2sl7Sw@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>Next month, Portland (OR) will announce the winners of its first elections under the single transferable vote (STV), AKA proportional ranked-choice voting. The effort to adopt this reform was, in part, an effort to make city council as diverse as the population it serves.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*BiaonZXI-t_kQCK4" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@zackspear?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Zack Spear</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Will it? Or are other reforms the way to go? Time will tell, but here are some observations in the interim.</p><p>I’ve been working on two papers that might help us get perspective on how these reforms compare to other possibilities.</p><p>One paper, whose <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/political-reform/reports/multi-seat-districts-and-larger-assemblies-produce-more-diverse-racial-representation/">first draft</a> was completed in late 2021, explicitly models the effects of electoral systems on descriptive representation in a convenience sample of U.S. and other cities. We show that the important factors are assembly size and the number of seats per district. The logic here is straightforward: <em>as the product of these factors rises, so does the ability of a local assembly to include diverse voices.</em></p><p>The other <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4924655">working paper</a> looks at differences between sets of winners under STV and simulated party-list proportional representation. Data come from two historic cases, Cincinnati (1925–55) and New York City (1937–45), famous partly for having produced a <a href="https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/latest-news-and-research/publications/a-short-history-of-stv-in-the-us/">belief</a> that ‘proportional RCV’ was a boon to representation — and got repealed for that reason. To simulate list PR, I follow Gosnell (1939) in treating first-choice votes as single votes in <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/list-system-with-single-candidate-preference/198306A8919BF7D79675D35BEB48D7BB">“a list system with single candidate preference”</a> — AKA open-list PR (OLPR).</p><p>How do candidates of color fare in the simulations?</p><p>So far, I’ve collected data on candidate race for Cincinnati. Some of this is available in books and journal articles. The rest comes from reading the <em>Cincinnati Enquirer</em> from the few weeks in advance of each of its 16 elections.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ZjO_hdOpEMpocjUI" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@rafikwahba?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Rafik Wahba</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>The table below shows that candidates of color do slightly better under list PR. The top row gives the number of such candidates at each election. The second says how many were party-endorsed. This is important for gauging the relative merits of STV (which is widely thought to benefit independents) and OLPR (which is thought to do the opposite). The next two rows give the numbers of winners under STV and simulated OLPR, respectively.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/606/1*RdrrHrCFsoH_FlsCsti0aA@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>Here is what to note.</p><p>First, neither major party in this city slated candidates of color until 1931. (No party did, in fact.) Second, no such independent candidate wins (including in 1947, when the famed <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ted_Berry">Ted Berry</a> entered electoral politics as such). Second, two elections saw one or the other party do so and see these people lose under STV but not OLPR. (This resulted in two all-white councils in the middle of the Great Depression.) Third, a string of elections from 1949–53 saw both parties run Black candidates, and the electoral system does not change how many win.</p><p>The patterns above are consistent with recent <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1078087419831074?journalCode=uarb">experimental</a> <a href="https://experts.syr.edu/en/publications/ranking-candidates-in-local-elections-neither-panacea-nor-catastr">work</a> in American politics on voters’ penalization of diverse candidates, when those voters are asked to make choices <em>within</em> a party. With STV, the voter must rank such candidates for a vote to flow their way. This is not so in OLPR, due to a property known as “<a href="https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/70/avoiding-the-pr-mistakes-of-the-past/">pooling</a>” (your vote counts for the list as a whole whether you want it to or not). The patterns also are consistent with a widely held <a href="https://apsanet.org/publications/reports/task-force-on-political-science-electoral-rules-and-democratic-governance/">view</a> in comparative politics that party-list systems do better on this metric. Finally, they speak to recent experimental <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102381">work</a>, brought about by a referendum on STV in British Columbia, on women’s representation under proportional systems (like STV and OLPR) that let voters vote for candidates, not parties.</p><p>Portland’s STV adoption is the second in recent years to have been framed as a way to improve descriptive racial representation on a city council. The first was in Eastpointe (MI), and readers interested in this topic also might care to follow developments there.</p><p>I want to stress that both pieces of research discussed above are still in progress. But so is the <a href="https://www.nationalcivicleague.org/2024-healthy-democracy/">search</a> for the 21st century’s urban electoral-reform model.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6ce3faa4d6ca" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/3streams/racial-representation-and-electoral-system-reform-in-u-s-cities-6ce3faa4d6ca">Racial representation and electoral-system reform in U.S. cities</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/3streams">3Streams</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Politics might already be factional, which calls for a different reform approach]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/3streams/politics-might-already-be-factional-which-calls-for-a-different-reform-approach-80cedebd4723?source=rss-70a52ad91c3d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/80cedebd4723</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[factionalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[electoral-systems]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democratic-party]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[republican-party]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[electoral-reform]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jack Santucci]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Sep 2024 11:47:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-09-11T21:18:41.792Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>POLITICS</h4><h4>A reflection on the <em>Boston Review’s</em> “We Need More Parties” forum</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*voIg32jN6sRAII2lEkb5fQ.png" /><figcaption>Source: the author, September 9, 2024.</figcaption></figure><p>As a student of how electoral-system change happens, I read the <em>Boston Review’s</em> recent essay <a href="https://www.bostonreview.net/issue/summer-2024/">collection</a>, “We Need More Parties,” with great interest.</p><p>It weighs the merits of several responses to a widely held view that the party system is out of step with the preferences of most Americans. These responses include: proceeding with reforms in the vein of <a href="https://medium.com/3streams/principles-of-democratic-reform-on-the-ballot-in-2020-1c496f86fc7d">nonpartisan ranked-choice</a> (Danielle Allen), embracing <a href="https://centerforballotfreedom.org/">ballot fusion</a> instead (Lee Drutman, Tabatha Abu El-Haj), using <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/political-reform/policy-papers/can-proportional-representation-lead-to-better-governance/">proportional representation</a> federally to break the major parties into factions that might recombine in ‘better’ ways (Lee Drutman, Grant Tudor &amp; Cerin Lindgrensavage), twinning fusion with community organizing (Deepak Bhargava &amp; Arianna Jiménez, Maurice Mitchell &amp; Doran Schrantz), twinning it with stronger unions (Bob Master), uniting behind one of the major parties (Daniel Schlozman &amp; Sam Rosenfeld), sidestepping parties with reforms to promote citizen <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217221137444">deliberation</a> (Josh Lerner), prioritizing policies that might rebuild civil society (Joel Rogers), and having congressional leaders nominate candidates (Ian Shapiro). I will focus on the electoral-system reforms.</p><p>And, I argue that reforms most likely to help are least likely to get adopted, those less likely to help are more likely to get adopted, and these conjectures flow from an underappreciated possibility: the <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/breaking-the-two-party-doom-loop-9780190913854">doom loop</a> already has broken. Making this argument involves acknowledging that candidates want to win — <a href="https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780199756223/obo-9780199756223-0238.xml">they are ambitious</a> — and that can be at odds with with a policy-based coalition’s interest in winning control of government.</p><p><strong>Doom loop already broken?</strong></p><p>The essays focused on electoral reform proceed from an assumption that polarization is too high. What this means is that — at least among elites — liberals can no longer be found among Republicans, and conservatives can no longer be found among Democrats. A slightly different view, also reflected in the volume, is that the parties have sorted on matters of ‘social identity’ while converging on ‘neoliberal’ economic positions. In either case, and as others have said in many ways, non-economic issues have come to do as much if not more than economic ones in structuring national-level party politics.</p><p>I am not so sure that polarization or even social-issues realignment has calcified the parties. Late in 2017, I began using the Voter Study Group dataset to examine what was happening inside the party coalitions. <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17457289.2020.1794884">One</a> of the resulting research notes probed whether the 2016 election met criteria implied by a popular theory of realignment.</p><p>My answer was <a href="https://medium.com/3streams/there-are-at-least-two-lefts-and-two-rights-359eca47264d">yes</a>.</p><p>Social issues had gone up in salience since 2012, economic ones had gone down, people who switched vote choice tended not to have changed their views on the survey items I analyzed, and the party coalitions were more internally divided on economics as a result. So far, all of this is consistent with either form of polarization above.</p><p>Not consistent with a polarization story is a set of plots in the paper’s appendix, one of which appears below. These seemed to show two different party systems existing alongside each other. Most voters did not switch the party whose presidential candidate they chose, and so for that group, the overall battle line reflected the same mix of social and economic positions that divided it in 2012. What about those who did switch? Their battle line was more social in content than it had been four years earlier.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*S41iqa5jderZvplybZqusQ.png" /><figcaption>From 2012–16, those who switched which party they voted for were making decisions in a different party system from those who did not (loyalists above). Source: <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17457289.2020.1794884">Santucci (2020, appendix)</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>In other words, vote switching might have given us a <em>new</em> “four-party system,” borrowing a phrase from Lee <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/36918">Drutman (2020)</a>. This observation is consistent with <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0261379418302907">results</a> from Jon Green that a group of voters was “floating” between the parties and could go either way depending on how those parties presented themselves with respect to salient issues. If the factions must be named, we might call them: liberals, conservatives, fiscally conservative social liberals, and fiscally liberal social conservatives. This naming scheme is an oversimplification but helps to make the point.</p><p>Another short <a href="https://academic.oup.com/poq/article/86/2/381/6575715">paper</a> I did with Joshua J. Dyck basically <a href="https://medium.com/3streams/was-there-really-a-populist-quadrant-in-american-politics-8c83dc4cd444">confirmed</a> the existence and electoral import of four factions. We added questions on attitudes toward ‘elites’ and government’s responsiveness to ‘everyday’ people. Doing this produced a space with two dimensions: liberal-conservative and pro/anti-institutional. (I use the word “institutional” because it is becoming the conventional label for this issue dimension.) Those who say they supported Trump or Sanders in the 2016 primaries tended to show up in the anti-institutional part of the graph, then on right or left as appropriate to the primary in which they voted. Later <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ajps.12854">work</a> by Rachel Porter and Sarah A. Treul is consistent with the idea that ‘populist’ factions have been fielding candidates to Congress at greater rates in recent years.</p><p><strong>Electoral reform in the new “four-party system”</strong></p><p>When one surveys the <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2021/06/29/more-u-s-locations-experimenting-with-alternative-voting-systems/">landscape</a> of where reforms are happening in practice, the picture that emerges is one of specifically<strong> local responses to already-factional politics — </strong>not a <em>coordinated</em> effort to break up the national parties. For example, <a href="https://www.alaskapublic.org/2020/09/28/an-initiative-proposes-to-overhaul-alaskas-elections-but-not-everyone-thinks-theyre-broken/">Alaska</a> has adopted no-nominations ranked-choice voting (RCV) mainly to hold together a preexisting coalition of Democrats and old-line Republicans in the face of MAGA insurgency. <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2021/07/22/ranked-choice-voting-in-new-york-city-will-not-upset-the-two-party-system-but-it-is-raising-questions-about-political-parties/">New York City’s</a> version preserves the nominating primary and eschews RCV for the general election.</p><p>This can be interpreted as an effort to hold together an increasingly fractious Democratic Party, facing both quasi-socialist insurgency and calls for <a href="https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2023/01/andrew-yang-political-outsiders-want-get-rid-partisan-primaries-nyc/381753/">further reforms</a> to facilitate electoral coalitions that straddle major-party lines. Other adoptions, such as one that recently occurred in Portland (OR), <a href="https://www.oregonlive.com/politics/2024/08/portland-enters-uncharted-territory-with-first-in-nation-city-council-election-system.html">flow</a> from a desire among political newcomers for literal seats at the table. The point is that prominent electoral reforms seem more a response to than a cause of multi-faction politics.</p><p>If the goal of reform, broadly speaking, is to <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2585577">manage rather than induce</a> multi-faction politics, it makes sense to ask which reforms are more or less likely to work. By “work” I mean: generates a majority winner in a single-seat election.</p><p>In sorting through the reforms on offer, I find it helpful to ask the following question: <strong>does this electoral system put candidate ambition at odds or in concert with the interest of a latent majority coalition in securing control of government?</strong> Another way to ask the question is: would this reform reliably generate majorities if all four factions were fielding their own candidates?</p><p>Although I see value in fusion as a <a href="https://protectdemocracy.org/work/toward-a-different-kind-of-party-government/">complement</a> to PR for executive offices (and U.S. Senate), I am <a href="https://www.voteguy.com/2023/09/30/for-me-voting-system-implies-the-wrong-question/">skeptical</a> of any single-seat reform’s ability to square the ambition problem. The 800-lb. gorilla in ranked-choice-voting land is not ranking choices, possibly at the behest of candidates who think they can win with small vote shares in divided fields. (Hence, perhaps, why some candidates are <a href="https://alaskapublic.org/2024/09/04/why-candidates-are-withdrawing-from-alaskas-general-election/">backing out</a> in Alaska.) Approval voting presents the same <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00493.x">issue</a> and does not give the option to register what RCV supporters call a “backup choice.” Fusion’s solution to ambition is to try to squelch it: multiple parties get behind a single candidate. Even here, however, ambitious lone wolves still might run (e.g., as independents), putting us back into a world where ‘too many’ people contest just one seat.</p><p>I know less about deliberative democracy, but it <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/D/bo194847654.html">does not seem</a> to contain a mechanism for managing the ambition of people who want political careers.</p><p><strong>Reform that might work but without much chance of passage</strong></p><p>So far, I have argued that we may already be in a situation of multi-factional politics — an <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-age-of-political-fragmentation/">“age of fragmentation”</a> to borrow from legal scholar Rick Pildes. I also have suggested that fragmentation is propelling electoral reform, not the other way around. And I have suggested that the ‘single-seat’ reforms on offer might not be as effective as we hope in managing the factionalism. What now?</p><p>One way forward would be to create incentives for ambition and factionalism alike to find expression via parties. These could be the major parties, existing minor parties, or maybe even new parties (consistent with several essays in the forum) . Part of such an exercise would be signaling to factional candidates that there <em>is</em> room for them in government: <a href="https://fruitsandvotes.wordpress.com/category/electoral-rules/cube-root-law/">assembly-size expansion</a>. Another part would find reforms that are less sensitive to large numbers of candidates: <a href="https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/70/avoiding-the-pr-mistakes-of-the-past/">party-list elections</a>. Without going into too much detail, party-list systems ensure that a vote for a candidate also is a vote for the party as a whole. This mechanism, known among political scientists as “vote pooling,” represents one way to square candidate ambition with an underlying coalition’s interest in getting control of government — AKA not spoiling itself. Pooling lets a party run as many candidates as it wants.</p><p>So, I have argued once again for list proportional representation, and I have derived a case for larger legislatures. Can these things ever happen? Elsewhere I have <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/43846/chapter-abstract/370310461">argued</a> that American addiction to nonpartisan elections closes off list PR, at least for adoption via initiative and referendum. <a href="https://www.sightline.org/2018/02/01/my-big-bold-ranked-choice-voting-proposal/">Few want</a> to vote for a measure that can be painted as “good for parties” — <a href="https://www.raineycenter.org/policy-brief/counties-and-representation-in-the-wyoming-legislature">maybe</a>. As for adoption by incumbents, “strengthens parties” is <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0010414018762369">less of a problem</a>. Here, the bigger issue could be disagreement about what mix of issues should define the party system that comes next. That disagreement makes people squeamish about two things: expanding representation and committing to one or another political party.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=80cedebd4723" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/3streams/politics-might-already-be-factional-which-calls-for-a-different-reform-approach-80cedebd4723">Politics might already be factional, which calls for a different reform approach</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/3streams">3Streams</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Was there really a ‘populist quadrant’ in American politics?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/3streams/was-there-really-a-populist-quadrant-in-american-politics-8c83dc4cd444?source=rss-70a52ad91c3d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8c83dc4cd444</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[political-discontent]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[populism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rfk-jr]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nolabels]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[2016-election]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jack Santucci]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 01 Apr 2024 18:00:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-04-01T23:58:37.635Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>POLITICS</h4><h4>Different methods paint a different picture of its conservatism</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*9nWMb1Lg-OAg7J3z" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@jshblntn?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Josh Blanton</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>You may have seen this plot a few times over the past eight years. It pointed to the existence of a ‘populist quadrant’ (top left) that was liberal on economics and conservative on social issues. One might have called it the Sanders/Trump quadrant.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/450/1*QQBp0fkeg66Ga4_BzwIu7g@2x.jpeg" /><figcaption>Source: Voter Study Group (<a href="https://www.voterstudygroup.org/publication/political-divisions-in-2016-and-beyond">June 2017</a>).</figcaption></figure><p>Today, some <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/28/opinions/rfk-jr-third-party-chaos-factor-election-drutman/index.html">speculate</a> that RFK, Jr. now calls it home.</p><p>I write to share three points:</p><ol><li>There is a ‘populist bottom’ and not a ‘quadrant.’</li><li>The social conservatism of its occupants may be overstated.</li><li>We might use this perspective to think about third-party runs ‘from the top’ as well as those like RFK’s, which might be understood as ‘from the bottom.’</li></ol><p>When the graph came out, I wanted to see if a neutral algorithm would produce the same basic picture. Like my colleague Lee Drutman, I was interested in what was happening to the party system and what it might mean for electoral reform. That’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197630655.003.0002">because</a> many electoral reforms have been about containing ‘populism.’</p><p>I also had just read a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/866">book</a> by Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser on ‘populism’ and integrated it into my model of politics as follows. Populist attitudes are anti-establishment and can pick up elements of socialist or nationalist ideology. For me, this theory implied a Cartesian ‘space’ with two dimensions: one capturing ‘traditional’ left/right issues, then a second capturing attitudes toward the political system as such.</p><p>Did the ‘populist bottom’ exist? In 2022, Josh Dyck and I published some results in <em>Public Opinion Quarterly</em> (<a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfac009">open access</a>). Here is what we did:</p><ol><li>We used survey items that also had been appearing in the emerging ‘populist attitudes’ literature. One group came from the ‘<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/stealth-democracy/8A2599BA85952540DDCDCC911F4B613B">stealth democracy</a>’ tradition and included items on “compromise” and “successful business people,” etc. The other group came from the ‘political discontent’ tradition and included items on ‘external efficacy’ — “people like me have no say,” “elites don’t understand,” “elections don’t matter.”</li><li>We used other survey items on ‘social’ and a range of liberal-conservative issues. These included the famous items on ‘racial resentment.’ One of our analyses also used some items from a newer racism <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/fear-institutionalized-racism-and-empathy-the-underlying-dimensions-of-whites-racial-attitudes/F6205AFDA74F11AAAA518DA240AC7995">index</a>.</li><li>We used a non-metric scaling <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-018-0540-6">procedure</a> to see how items and respondents were configured in the ‘space’ of politics. (Hare, Highton, and Jones have just published <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/726961">something</a> interesting with similar methods.)</li></ol><p>Here is what we found:</p><ol><li>American politics in 2016 reflected <strong>more of a ‘populist half’ than a ‘quadrant.’</strong> This was very clear for certain items (see below). Others looked more like they had folded into the liberal-conservative divide. That was the case for items that, 20–30 years earlier, had been correlated with support for Ross Perot (see paper).</li><li>As an added test of populism theory’s spatial implications, we asked if respondents ‘toward the bottom’ tended to have voted for Bernie Sanders or Donald Trump in their respective primaries. They had.</li><li>The north-south axis used to be about social issues. In 2016, it was more about ‘the system.’</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ijWQvBdqyENQtmQCLlzdNw.png" /><figcaption>Figure 2 from “The Structure of American Political Discontent” (<a href="https://academic.oup.com/poq/article/86/2/381/6575715">Santucci &amp; Dyck 2022</a>). D = Clinton vote, R = Trump vote, O = other vote. Dashed lines estimated from respondent coordinates via probit. Solid lines and coordinates generated by ordered optimal classification.</figcaption></figure><p>Looking back at the paper two years later, I also notice something interesting about ‘conservative’ responses to the classic racial-resentment items. <em>To the extent</em> that the vertical dimension picks these up, <strong>people who agreed were closer to the top of the space than to its bottom.</strong> This is the opposite of what one might conclude from the viral graph.</p><p>The original graph was right in that it showed an ideologically heterogeneous grouping in its ‘populist quadrant.’ That appears in ours as the range of opinion across the bottom. Either therefore can be used to understand RFK, Jr’s blend of appeals — some of which sound like Bernie, others more like Trump.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FF2_1x1yeZaY%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DF2_1x1yeZaY&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FF2_1x1yeZaY%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/340a81e265352887ce02dbcd46b9556c/href">https://medium.com/media/340a81e265352887ce02dbcd46b9556c/href</a></iframe><p>But the graph that emerges with the algorithm also might help us understand periodic threats of candidacy ‘from the top.’ I am thinking here about No Labels and the sometimes-overlapping push for nonpartisan elections (i.e., reform).</p><p>One more point is worth note. Voters struggle with multi-candidate elections to single-seat offices. If both dimensions end up active in November — as arguably <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1924_United_States_presidential_election">happened</a> in 1924 as well — the whole idea of choosing becomes interesting. Do voters <em>first</em> need to figure out what politics itself is about? If so, do they get confused and just not vote? Could the going flavors of electoral reform bring order to the situation? (Many formal modelers have said <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem#Left-right_spectrum">no</a>.)</p><p>I look forward to extending the ‘populist bottom’ project and will report accordingly.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8c83dc4cd444" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/3streams/was-there-really-a-populist-quadrant-in-american-politics-8c83dc4cd444">Was there really a ‘populist quadrant’ in American politics?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/3streams">3Streams</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A busy person’s introduction to ranked-choice voting]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/3streams/a-busy-persons-introduction-to-ranked-choice-voting-81c6fcd723f2?source=rss-70a52ad91c3d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/81c6fcd723f2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[preferential-voting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[election-day]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ranked-choice-voting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[voting]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jack Santucci]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Nov 2023 13:02:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-11-06T18:45:04.485Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>ELECTION DAY</h4><h4>One election reform, lots of choices</h4><p>This post describes the basic forms of ranked-choice voting (RCV). I wrote it because I often find myself directing journalists and others to <a href="https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i2.3955">this paper</a> published in 2021 at the journal, <em>Politics and Governance</em>, and it is too long and complex for most purposes. If you’re in a hurry, this post may help to understand the differences below before making judgments about RCV writ large.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*HutEv453aEdvPdyu" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@rebaspike?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Reba Spike</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>I find it helpful to analyze RCV along two dimensions. One concerns how votes turn into winners. The other is how it alters (or not) the rules for choosing nominees.</p><p>First, RCV can be used to try to get any of three outcomes: one majority winner in a single-seat district, majority and minority seats in a multi-seat district, or one majority slate with all seats in a multi-seat district.</p><p>The table below lays out some RCV forms based on <a href="https://archive.org/details/politicalconsequ0000raed">classic categories</a> in political science. Those categories are: district magnitude (number of seats), ballot type (all ranked in this case), and allocation rule (how the votes are processed). The table is from <a href="https://jacksantucci.com/docs/slides/04_ranked-choice-voting.pdf">this set</a> of slides.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/564/1*NfHbnZAF-YsQkrcKk3f7Yg@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>Two forms do not map well onto the ‘three big goals’ I described above. These are bottom-up and AV (Alternative Vote) with numbered posts (not included above). I do not know where bottom-up originated. It carries less risk than the <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2020/01/23/utahs-new-kind-of-ranked-choice-voting-could-hurt-political-minorities-and-sometimes-even-the-majority/">block-preferential system</a> of cutting off numerical-minority representation. (A coauthor once suggested it behaves like the single non-transferable vote, but that is a topic for another day.) AV with numbered posts basically aims for a single-slate delegation. It is more or less a residue of the commission form of local government, which involved citywide elections to a series of functional offices (parks commissioner, water commissioner, etc).</p><p>The second thing to keep track of is how RCV might change nomination rules.</p><p>For example, Alaska, Maine, and New York City all use what’s called AV above. But Alaska uses it to obviate nominations, whereas the other two places use it <em>in</em> nominating primaries. Maine also uses it in congressional general elections.</p><p><a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2021/07/22/ranked-choice-voting-in-new-york-city-will-not-upset-the-two-party-system-but-it-is-raising-questions-about-political-parties/">One way</a> to think about this aspect is: choice among parties (Maine congressional generals), choice within parties (Maine or NYC primaries), and choice without regard to parties (Alaska).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=81c6fcd723f2" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/3streams/a-busy-persons-introduction-to-ranked-choice-voting-81c6fcd723f2">A busy person’s introduction to ranked-choice voting</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/3streams">3Streams</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Some key points from “More Parties or No Parties”]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/jacksantucci/some-key-points-from-more-parties-or-no-parties-2fe6122f2b38?source=rss-70a52ad91c3d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2fe6122f2b38</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jack Santucci]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 16 Dec 2022 02:38:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-12-20T19:58:28.463Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/284/1*jt5nbOAlZgSR-kCPf-PwgQ@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>Photo by </em><a href="https://drphilipjhowe.weebly.com"><em>Phil Howe</em></a><em>. Book available for </em><a href="https://bit.ly/mponp"><em>purchase</em></a><em> and in </em><a href="https://tinyurl.com/moreparties"><em>Oxford Scholarship Online</em></a><em>.</em></p><p>The space of politics is multidimensional. What we call “left” and “right” are negotiated positions.</p><p>Interest groups (broadly understood) do the negotiating. They are assumed to want control of government. They form coalitions to get it.</p><p>Every democracy has some coalition structure, even if it does not track party division.</p><p>‘Shifting coalitions’ lead to electoral reform: incumbent groups seeking <strong>insulation</strong>, out-of-power groups seeking <strong>realignment</strong>, or opposing groups seeking to discipline noncommittal players (a <strong>polarizing</strong> mode).</p><p>Electoral reform is change in any of five electoral-system components: assembly size, district magnitude, ballot type, allocation rules, and rules about nominations.</p><p>Two-party politics makes it tempting to cater to factions, not parties, when proposing and designing reforms. Witness the current emphasis on ballot type and nominations (ranked-choice, approval voting, nonpartisan primaries). Witness the unpopularity (outside political science) of allocation rules that presume party grouping (such as party-list proportional representation, including mixed-member).</p><p>In the past, reformers promoted single transferable vote (STV) and ranking generally in order to cater to factions, not parties.</p><p>In other countries, multiparty politics facilitates use of ranked-choice: giving voters understandable entities to rank, instructing voters on how to rank (<strong>vote management</strong>), regulating candidate entry (<strong>vote management</strong>), and generating political will to administer a complex system.</p><p>In the United States, ranked-choice reforms tended to last as long as the coalitions that imposed them.</p><p>Vote management was imperfect and slow to emerge. It usually involved a bipartisan coalition that sold itself in “good government” terms.</p><p>Due to vote management, STV produces winners who usually would be the same under open-list proportional representation (OLPR).</p><p>An exception is when the coalition structure shifts, such that some voters do not rank candidates in the way that party (or interest-group) leaders might want. Said voters are part of a coalition structure that is different from the prevailing one.</p><p>If the alternative coalition deprives “left” and “right” of control of government, they may join in blaming the electoral system. This can lead to a polarizing repeal episode.</p><p>Reasons for abandonment of majoritarian ranked-ballot rules are not yet well-understood. One theme in the literature is ranking truncation. Another is the production of surprise results. These may have reinforced each other: many voters not ranking very many choices, determined candidates capitalizing on this.</p><p>The repeal of early ranked-choice systems left in place features that had been needed to pass ranked-choice. These include nonpartisan ballots, numbered-post elections, and single-digit assemblies.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2fe6122f2b38" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/jacksantucci/some-key-points-from-more-parties-or-no-parties-2fe6122f2b38">Some key points from “More Parties or No Parties”</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/jacksantucci">jacksantucci</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Alaska’s special election illustrates an unpredictable system]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/3streams/alaskas-special-election-illustrates-an-unpredictable-system-a00624b4c190?source=rss-70a52ad91c3d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a00624b4c190</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[alaska]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ranked-choice-voting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democracy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[republican-party]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democratic-party]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jack Santucci]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 02 Sep 2022 00:00:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-09-02T13:43:47.400Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>ELECTIONS</h4><h4>Right and Left alike are rushing to conclusions about partisan advantage of Ranked Choice Voting</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ymu_X3fwtCgbE4r7nxOwVw.png" /><figcaption>A pair of dice purchased for me at the Mirage Hotel and Casino, circa 1991.</figcaption></figure><p>Democrat Mary Peltola has <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/08/31/1120327126/palin-peltola-begich-alaska-special-house-election-results">defeated</a> Sarah Palin (R) and Mark Begich (R) in the second round of a special election to replace the late Congressman Don Young (R). She did so in the second-round count of a ranked-choice-voting (RCV) tabulation.</p><p>Republican opinion leaders are <a href="https://twitter.com/TomCottonAR/status/1565139540834222080">projecting</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/tylerbowyer/status/1564459685909970944">fury</a>.</p><h3>Tom Cotton on Twitter: &quot;Ranked-choice voting is a scam to rig elections. / Twitter&quot;</h3><p>Ranked-choice voting is a scam to rig elections.</p><p>Left-leaning commentators are <a href="https://twitter.com/RachelBitecofer/status/1565161503191613440">urging wider adoption</a>.</p><h3>Rachel Bitecofer 📈🔭🇺🇲🇺🇦 on Twitter: &quot;If you are an elected in a Dem trifecta state, run, don&#39;t walk, your system to rank choice. If Oregon had, we wouldn&#39;t be in this mess. https://t.co/iAvTPTjgIe / Twitter&quot;</h3><p>If you are an elected in a Dem trifecta state, run, don&#39;t walk, your system to rank choice. If Oregon had, we wouldn&#39;t be in this mess. https://t.co/iAvTPTjgIe</p><p>Such assessments are premature. Systems like the one in Alaska are inherently unpredictable.</p><p><strong>Alaska RCV is not the ‘moderating’ version from Australia</strong></p><p>RCV proponents often point to Australia, where the electoral system has been stable for 104 years. There, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2018.1457827">we hear</a>, the system has a ‘moderating effect.’</p><p>Three features of Australian politics make RCV — and the environment in which it operates — fundamentally different from how it works in Alaska. First, the voter <a href="https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i2.3889">must rank all candidates</a> for their ballot to be <a href="https://www.aec.gov.au/Voting/Informal_Voting/summary.htm">valid</a>. Second, the country has a system of <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=tDDiBAAAQBAJ&amp;lpg=PA206&amp;ots=tbNzSDgHvl&amp;dq=sharman%20miragliotta&amp;lr&amp;pg=PA206#v=onepage&amp;q&amp;f=false">multiple parties</a> that <a href="https://aec.gov.au/Elections/candidates/files/nomination-guide-candidates.pdf">control use of their labels</a>. Third, as a consequence, parties can <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0261-3794(01)00012-9">cut deals</a> that make voting behavior <a href="https://aec.gov.au/Elections/Federal_Elections/tpp-results.htm">predictable</a>.</p><p>Turn now to Alaska, which has become the poster child for Final Five (Four) Voting. A ‘jungle primary’ sends four candidates to the RCV round. Simple registration with a party <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Ballot_access_requirements_for_political_candidates_in_Alaska">confers</a> the right to use its label. There is no requirement that the voter rank all candidates. (As you might expect, such requirements <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/oklahoma/supreme-court/1926/53555.html">raise constitutional questions</a>.)</p><p>Further, multiparty politics in Alaska have evaporated.</p><p>The trend below gives the percent of votes polled by minor parties — Green, Libertarian, and Alaskan Independent — in the at-large U.S. House district since 1958. (Notably, the 2000 spike preceded an <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Alaska_Automatic_Runoff_Voting_Initiative,_Measure_1_(August_2002)">unsuccessful RCV referendum</a> in 2002.)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-L-Y-wFvKfICkzLMxGqVvA.png" /><figcaption>Data: Clerk of the U.S. House <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alaska%27s_at-large_congressional_district#Electoral_History">via Wikipedia</a>.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Begich voters held the balance</strong></p><p>The screenshot below shows what happened to ballots on which Begich was first choice. Because no candidate won a majority in the first-round count, the last-placed candidate (Begich) was eliminated. Begich ballots — 28.8% of them — got Peltola to 51.5% and a seat in Congress. Hence the claim among Republicans that reform is bad. Hence, also, the claim among some Democrats that more places should reform themselves.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sbfOxs3vGE-kfR1wykNLvw.png" /><figcaption>Results are <a href="https://www.elections.alaska.gov/results/22SSPG/RcvDetailedReport.pdf">from</a> the Alaska Division of Elections.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>But they were not a monolithic bloc…</strong></p><p>Yet, 50.3% of Begich ballots went for Palin. If we exclude exhausted ballots from the calculation (more below), Begich ballots favored Palin over Peltola 2:1.</p><p>Is that a lot? Maybe.</p><p>Is it enough to say that the outcome was <em>due to a deal</em> in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1532673X18759643">either direction</a>? I leave the answer to the reader.</p><p><strong>…and an appreciable number of them didn’t rank choices.</strong></p><p>Another thing to note is that Begich’s number of exhausted ballots (11,222) exceeds the final-round difference between Peltola and Palin (5,219). We don’t know why these voters didn’t rank the other candidates. Surely, surveys and precinct-level analyses will give us some ideas. This is a <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-019-00723-2">consequential</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2014.11.006">underappreciated</a> <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i2.3913">area of inquiry</a>.</p><p>None of the above should be surprising. Anyone who followed news today has seen all sorts of speculation.</p><p>What we haven’t heard much about are the sorts of RCV ‘add-ons’ that reduce uncertainty. Nor have we heard much about a world — <a href="https://medium.com/3streams/ranked-choice-voting-didnt-solve-our-problems-in-the-last-century-and-it-won-t-today-5bda00988a0c">why would we?</a> — in which <em>parties make the deals that </em><a href="https://samwang.substack.com/p/lessons-from-alaska"><em>voters</em></a><em> </em><a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/12/politics/ranked-choice-voting-ctzn/index.html"><em>are being asked</em></a><em> to make.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a00624b4c190" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/3streams/alaskas-special-election-illustrates-an-unpredictable-system-a00624b4c190">Alaska’s special election illustrates an unpredictable system</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/3streams">3Streams</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Ranked-choice voting has a troubled history in the United States]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/3streams/ranked-choice-voting-didnt-solve-our-problems-in-the-last-century-and-it-won-t-today-5bda00988a0c?source=rss-70a52ad91c3d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5bda00988a0c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[electoral-reform]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[open-primaries]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[andrew-yang]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ranked-choice-voting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[proportional-voting]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jack Santucci]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 29 Jul 2022 18:54:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-03-15T13:25:24.628Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>POLITICS</h4><h4>New book explains why anti-party reformers are repeating Progressive Era mistakes</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/362/1*4ofjAEGmPbVUIwYZZ0f4Gw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Andrew Yang has issued <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/07/27/forward-party-new-centrist-third/">yet another call</a> for <a href="https://medium.com/3streams/principles-of-democratic-reform-on-the-ballot-in-2020-1c496f86fc7d">ranked-choice voting without party nominations</a>. In this, <a href="https://democracysos.substack.com/p/whither-and-whether-proportional-0b4">some see a step</a> toward multiparty politics — and a form of proportional representation that <a href="https://archive.org/details/dli.ernet.505802/page/111/mode/2up">purports</a> to work without parties. They are well-meaning, but wrong.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8fxc1IEfKYlDjQvgC_pNvw.png" /><figcaption>Alaska’s ranked-choice election next month pits two Republicans against one Democrat. The race is for one seat. Source: <a href="https://www.elections.alaska.gov/election/2022/prim/HD1.pdf">Division of Elections</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>The catch is that we tried this during the Progressive Era. The result was at least 88 RCV adoptions, only two of which survived into the present. Unless the United States plans to spawn a multiparty system, reformers should revisit a <a href="https://www.inquirer.com/opinion/commentary/ranked-choice-voting-philadelphia-20211006.html">sensible alternative</a> — and their agreement to disagree on whether party systems matter. My new book, <a href="https://bit.ly/mponp"><em>More Parties or No Parties</em></a>, explains why.</p><p><strong>Reform against the machine</strong></p><p>Every other country with RCV already had more than two parties when the respective version was adopted. American reformers do not have that luxury. The need to appeal to factions, not parties, makes it tempting to pit reform against parties writ large.</p><p>So, from 1907 onward, reformers began to marry their cause with that of nonpartisan elections. They settled on ranked-choice voting, rejecting alternatives that institutionalize parties. Then they <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1011423">sold</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/ncr.4110030316">it</a> as they do today: an attack on <a href="https://represent.us/anticorruption-act/">corruption</a> and <a href="https://fairvotemn.org/why/">control of nominations</a>.</p><p>RCV came in three main flavors. One was similar to ‘instant runoff,’ used to find majority winners in <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42879396">11 states’ nominating primaries</a>. Adoptions ran 1907–25, from Alabama to Washington State. Then, by 1937, only Maryland still used this. As far as we can tell, the goal was to manage tensions within the major parties.</p><p>Far more popular was ‘instant runoff’ applied to a multi-seat district. This combined with a form of local government <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Progressive_Cities/wbSuBAAAQBAJ?hl=en&amp;gbpv=1&amp;dq=commission%20form%20of%20government&amp;pg=PR3&amp;printsec=frontcover">designed</a> to mimic a corporate board of directors. Its main effect was to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351849825_Variants_of_Ranked-Choice_Voting_from_a_Strategic_Perspective">deliver <em>every seat </em>to the majority faction</a>. This was used in <a href="https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.469764/page/n451/mode/2up">at least 55 cities</a> and spread rapidly in the wake of the ‘spoiled’ <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1912_United_States_presidential_election">1912 presidential election</a>.</p><p>Then there was the single transferable vote (STV), recently rebranded as ‘proportional RCV.’ This is the form preferred by fans of <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/breaking-the-two-party-doom-loop-9780190913854">multiparty government</a> and <a href="https://phys.org/news/2021-09-choice-multimember-districts-blunts-gerrymandering.html">anti-gerrymandering.</a> Rather than need a majority to win, as under instant runoff, candidates instead compete for <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Droop_quota">quotas of a multi-seat district’s total vote</a>. (You can watch a party-free explainer <a href="https://youtu.be/l8XOZJkozfI">here</a>.)</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2Fl8XOZJkozfI%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3Dl8XOZJkozfI&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2Fl8XOZJkozfI%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/f02a82a41ad18f6e4fd9a30907720742/href">https://medium.com/media/f02a82a41ad18f6e4fd9a30907720742/href</a></iframe><p>Reformers won STV in 23 cities, 1915–47, through an <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/ncr.4110050107">alliance</a> with the movement to <a href="https://www.nationalcivicleague.org/ncr-article/revising-the-model-city-charter-the-case-for-change/">make government more businesslike</a>. (One more, New York City, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/ncr.4110250913">rejected</a> that type of charter in favor of the Board of Estimate and separately elected Mayor.) The referendum strategy was to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/ncr.4110131101">rail against “party responsibility.”</a></p><p>“Astonishing…,” <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/ncr.4110020306">wrote</a> one reformer, “that our whole host of municipal reformers… have been swept off their feet with the so called non-partisan idea.”</p><p><strong>Party-free RCV tended to produce surprise results</strong></p><p>Then, by 1962, all but two RCV systems were repealed: STV in Cambridge (MA) and a Delaware village called Arden. Why?</p><p>The common thread was a tendency to produce <a href="https://portlandphoenix.me/how-did-this-happen-portland-charter-commission-election-raises-questions-about-ranked-choice-voting/">widely unexpected</a> results. I say “widely” because, for many, RCV <em>did not</em> take parties out of politics. Most voters, politicians, and interest groups continued to form expectations in view of the local (and national) <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/political-parties-and-democratic-linkage-9780199599356?cc=us&amp;lang=en&amp;#"><em>party system</em></a><em>.</em></p><p>According to our <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42879396">best account</a> of the state-level primaries, voters eventually stopped ranking choices at the direction of party leadership. That’s because party leaders saw the system “as a complicated device and one the results of which could not be easily anticipated.”</p><p>The problems were similar under local ‘instant runoff.’ According to the <a href="https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.469764/page/n449/mode/2up">leading study</a> (1934), voters again stopped ranking choices at the direction of party leaders. In turn, the lower rankings of voters who had not could produce surprise results. The <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/1943890">example</a> that got headlines was in Cleveland, 1921, where five independents ganged up on the major-party nominees. One of them became mayor.</p><p>What about STV, a.k.a., proportional RCV?</p><p>Conventional wisdom is that the election of Black officials and Communists gave politicians the <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1950618">excuse they needed</a> to end a system they disliked. No doubt, these outcomes <a href="https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/latest-news-and-research/publications/a-short-history-of-stv-in-the-us/">made repeal attractive</a> to certain kinds of people <a href="https://rankthevote.us/rcv-history-racial-resentments-and-the-red-scare-stymie-early-pr-reforms/">in Cold War America</a>.</p><p>But the deeper problem was the reform’s party-blindness. In 1930, the National Municipal League commissioned a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/ncr.4110191402">study</a> of reformed cities to date. STV had issues: voters’ rejection of the ballot, fractious council majorities, and risk to the pro-business charters in which it was embedded. The proposed solution was to form “good government” <em>parties </em>— to recruit candidates, get voters to <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/ncr.4110190708">rank them</a>, and set legislative agendas.</p><p>Even those “good government” parties eventually <a href="https://bit.ly/mponp">fell apart</a>. New issues challenged ‘anti-corruption’ in organizing local <em>party systems.</em> Voters began ranking choices across the major-party divide. Neither the reformer parties nor their oppositions could say with straight faces that they controlled government. Politicians started <a href="https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.$b715337&amp;view=1up&amp;seq=35&amp;q1=lottery">calling</a> STV “a lottery.” Repeal forces <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Proportional_Representation_and_Election/gl-NAAAAMAAJ">frequently included</a> “good government” partisans themselves. Some in the political science establishment turned on STV.</p><p><strong>Multiparty politics makes RCV ‘work’ in other countries</strong></p><p>Reform sympathizers often say that RCV systems ‘work’ in other countries. What about Australia’s rules that <a href="https://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/research/files/sbps-atl-and-btl-voting.pdf">discourage</a> ticket-splitting and <a href="https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/ben-reilly.pdf">force</a> voters to rank choices? What about the rule, in Northern Ireland, that the two largest parties are <a href="https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/northern-ireland-government-formation">guaranteed</a> to form the government? What about the rule in Malta that the party with the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00344899608522982">most first-choice votes</a> gets a seat majority? What about the fact, in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068807075944">Ireland</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2012.742456">Scotland</a>, that voters have <em>multiple parties to array from left to right</em>?</p><p>RCV systems ‘work’ in other countries because multiparty politics has <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3998/mpub.16507">shaped them</a>. It gives structure to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1532673X18759643">voting behavior</a> and has prompted revision of the rules.</p><p>RCV in the US might not lead to more parties — either because backers don’t want them, or because, at the end of the day, American politics <a href="https://fruitsandvotes.wordpress.com/2020/11/09/if-the-usa-had-direct-plurality-election-of-the-president-what-effect-on-the-party-system/">turns on winning the Electoral College</a>. And then we might have <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/invalid-ballots-under-the-hare-system-of-proportional-representation/848F0C4D1D2FC440140A1E92C2B58367">made</a> <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0261379414001395">voting</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i2.3938">harder</a>, greased its adoption with <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/ncr.4110191402">regrettable compromises</a>, and seen RCV repealed all over again. Most of the old RCV systems also came with at-large elections to small councils, which the voting-rights community has been <a href="https://www.nonprofitvote.org/the-bias-of-at-large-elections-how-it-works/">fighting</a> for years.</p><p><strong>Reformers should revisit an alternative that, unfortunately, assumes parties</strong></p><p>Recently, some experts have <a href="https://fruitsandvotes.wordpress.com/2021/01/19/emergency-electoral-reform-olpr-for-the-us-house/">proposed</a> an alternative: open-list proportional representation. It <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1949496">works the way that STV does</a> <a href="https://bit.ly/mponp">when the latter isn’t getting repealed</a>. It allocates seats to parties in proportion to their vote shares. It does not <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3787548">ask voters</a> to <a href="https://doi.org/10.5070/P2cjpp7125443">research candidates</a> to arrive at preference orderings. It just asks them to do what they are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F20531680211062668">used to</a>: choose their favorite candidate. In turn, that vote helps to elect the candidate <em>and their party</em>. (Yes, it <a href="https://www.aei.org/politics-and-public-opinion/what-is-the-one-vote-system-a-qa-with-jack-santucci/">works</a> for single-seat elections and does not preclude independent runs.)</p><p>Open-list is not a new idea. Reformers in the 1890s considered and <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Proportional_Representation_Review/T9g9AQAAMAAJ?hl=en&amp;gbpv=1&amp;dq=proportional representation review&amp;pg=RA1-PA47&amp;printsec=frontcover">rejected</a> it: “it gives the least power to the voter and the greatest to the party.” In 1913, the Socialists and Progressives <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/ncr.4110020306">tried</a> to pass it in Los Angeles. The local paper <a href="https://bit.ly/mponp">opposed</a> it on the grounds that “it provides for a government by parties.” Two political scientists chimed in after studying STV results: one <a href="https://www.voteguy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/lien1925_ocr.pdf">in 1925</a>, a second <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1949496">in 1939</a>. Nobody listened.</p><p>Why hasn’t open-list caught on?</p><p>Unlike in STV, parties would need to <em>list</em> their candidates in advance of elections. Independents would not be able to seek transfers from major-party candidates. Nor would major-party candidates be able to seek transfers from independents. Above all, candidates on one side of politics would not be able to seek transfers from members of the opposition.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*dEiKCbCcCkgCkEg1" /><figcaption>Sample open-list ballot. Source: <a href="https://www.fairvote.org/how_proportional_representation_elections_work">FairVote</a>, with credit to <a href="https://twitter.com/JGodStorm">Jim Godowic</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>In other words, open-list precludes the very behavior that makes RCV attractive— and got much of it repealed: <a href="https://ivn.us/2018/06/22/opinion-periodic-come-behind-win-ranked-choice-voting-whole-point/">generating winners</a> who <a href="https://store.hbr.org/product/the-politics-industry-how-political-innovation-can-break-partisan-gridlock-and-save-our-democracy/10367">buck the party system</a>, <a href="https://ivn.us/posts/why-california-should-learn-from-maine-and-not-alaska-on-electoral-reform">regardless of how many parties it contains</a>.</p><p><strong>Back to the future with ranked-choice voting</strong></p><p>So we are slowly <a href="https://www.uniteamerica.org/news-article/history-repeats-progressive-era">repeating</a> the Progressive Era: treating <a href="https://www.arnoldventures.org/grants/utah-ranked-choice-voting">every</a> <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2020/01/23/utahs-new-kind-of-ranked-choice-voting-could-hurt-political-minorities-and-sometimes-even-the-majority/">form</a> of RCV as a <a href="https://www.kansas.com/opinion/guest-commentary/article231828108.html">step in the right direction</a>, and <a href="https://www.sightline.org/2018/02/01/my-big-bold-ranked-choice-voting-proposal/">catering</a> to the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354068817737996">myth</a> that party systems are opt-out. It could be a <a href="https://bit.ly/mponp">recipe for disappointment</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5bda00988a0c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/3streams/ranked-choice-voting-didnt-solve-our-problems-in-the-last-century-and-it-won-t-today-5bda00988a0c">Ranked-choice voting has a troubled history in the United States</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/3streams">3Streams</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Fight Over Ranked-Choice Voting in New York City]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/3streams/the-fight-over-ranked-choice-voting-in-new-york-city-939bda14093d?source=rss-70a52ad91c3d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/939bda14093d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-parties]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ranked-choice-voting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[new-york]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jack Santucci]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Jun 2021 21:16:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-18T21:16:39.214Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Election Reform and New York City</h4><p>Making sense of the rollout in the nation’s largest metropolis.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*e8Jl6gRPqdMVnopqkO14NA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Counting ranked-choice ballots, 1950. Source: Robert Burnham, <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/571656">“Women and Reform in Cincinnati,”</a> Ohio Valley History (2013).</figcaption></figure><p>The largest ranked-ballot rollout <a href="https://www.voteguy.com/2021/06/10/new-york-city-is-the-largest-rollout-of-ranked-ballots-in-human-history/">ever</a> will occur on June 22, when New York City’s registered Democrats use ranked-choice voting (RCV) in their nominating primaries. (Note: early voting has been underway since June 12, and some special elections already have been RCV.) Eyes are on the mayoral race, and nobody can say who will win. That’s because the field is <a href="https://emersonpolling.reportablenews.com/pr/nyc-mayor-2021-adams-stays-ahead-but-rank-choice-voting-closes-gap-for-wiley-and-garcia">fragmented</a>, and voters’ <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/18/opinion/nyc-mayoral-election-ballot.amp.html">lower rankings</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/mcpli/status/1405184517988667392?s=21">remain</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/mattgrossmann/status/1404631921125203968?s=21">unpredictable</a>. One thing can be predicted, however: a three-way fight over what the outcome means.</p><p>Nothing said here is meant to hurt feelings. <a href="https://www.rcvresources.org">Good</a> <a href="https://www.wearedemocracyrising.org">people</a> are working hard to make sure voters understand the system. Beyond that, <a href="https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=XDeiovnCv1o">all the world is a stage, and everyone has their part.</a></p><p><strong>Reformers will downplay a plurality winner</strong></p><p>For a true believer, the goal is more jurisdictions with ranked ballots. That means showing that the system worked, which means a majority winner in this case.</p><p>RCV critics will hop onto the fact that the winner did not have a majority of total ballots cast. My back-of-envelope calculation, based on a now-dated cross-tab, suggested we might see a third of ballots not continue to the final-round count. (I haven’t looked at <a href="https://emersonpolling.reportablenews.com">Emerson’s</a> latest data, so do not hang your hat on that. But kudos to them for making such analyses possible.) While there is nothing inherently wrong with such an outcome, critics believe this line of attack pulls the rug from under RCV.</p><p>Reformers will respond in several ways. One is to note that voters were limited to ranking just five candidates. (Critics will respond that many voters didn’t use all five.) Another is to say that candidates and voters need time to adapt. We also may hear about low first-round turnout under the old two-round primary system, then how RCV obviates that differential.</p><p>These points aren’t necessarily wrong. It’s just that they’re predictable.</p><p><strong>Mainstream Democrats will attack ranked ballots</strong></p><p>It’s no secret that party operatives are hostile to RCV. They fear what it might to do their “invisible primary,” a period of elite coordination in advance of voters’ voting.</p><p>As just noted, we’ll hear about ballot exhaustion. We’ll also hear about voter error — skipped rankings, duplicate rankings, and so on. There probably won’t be a lot of this (please skim the <a href="https://www.voteguy.com/rcv-academic/">literature</a>), but there will be efforts to correlate it with precinct-level demographics. We’ll hear that older voters, on average, were more likely to be perplexed.</p><p>Again, none of these points are necessarily wrong. It’s just that they’re predictable — especially, perhaps, if a <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/05/working-families-party-endorses-wiley-and-morales-for-mayor.html">Working Families candidate</a> wins the nomination.</p><p><strong>Conservatives will pitch nonpartisan elections</strong></p><p>Republicans support RCV insofar as it greases the wheels for various “top-X” systems. They seem to have <a href="https://www.city-journal.org/how-republicans-can-become-viable-in-american-cities">two goals</a>. One is to put distance between ‘moderates’ and the party brand (which is Trump). Another is to <a href="https://www.niskanencenter.org/a-time-for-choosing-a-debate-on-the-center-rights-three-options-for-saving-american-democracy/">influence</a> Democratic nominations, especially in places that are heavily Democratic (e.g., the Big Apple).</p><p>We will hear that Republicans and unaffiliated voters were “disenfranchised” by the closed primary. We will hear about the #PrimaryProblem, that primary voters are extremists, etc. There will be calls to switch to the ‘Alaska model,’ which eliminates nominations entirely (but uses RCV after a plurality winnowing round).</p><p>All of this may be <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/media/new-york-post-eric-adams-police">more likely</a> if <a href="https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/nyc-elections-2021/ny-nyc-mayoral-race-eric-adams-gop-20210511-obuc5womvfg4jizztfq6v4rv4a-story.html">Eric Adams</a> loses to a <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/political-reform/reports/ranked-choice-voting-runoff-and-democracy/">come-from-behind</a> victor.</p><p><strong>In short…</strong></p><p>…there are interesting things happening. Many of them may be down-ballot and are not covered here.</p><p>But one really interesting thing will be the meaning that gets made of New York City ranked-choice voting.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=939bda14093d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/3streams/the-fight-over-ranked-choice-voting-in-new-york-city-939bda14093d">The Fight Over Ranked-Choice Voting in New York City</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/3streams">3Streams</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Nonpartisan elections don’t reduce polarization]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/3streams/nonpartisan-elections-dont-reduce-polarization-3e9846cdeb2a?source=rss-70a52ad91c3d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3e9846cdeb2a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[political-parties]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[polarization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[state-legislature]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[final-five-voting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[open-primaries]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jack Santucci]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 11 Feb 2021 21:53:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-02-11T21:53:23.238Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>POLITICS</h4><h4>State-legislative edition</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*PnO5bJ5EW6JELB-p" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@element5digital?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Element5 Digital</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>One big story coming out of 2020 has been the <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/11/alaska-voters-approve-two-major-election-reforms.html">fusion</a> of two movements: one for multiparty government, another for less of a gap between the major parties (polarization). The former promotes ballot reforms to ease third-party voting. The latter aims to get rid of partisan nominations. Its signature reform is the <em>nonpartisan two-round electoral system</em>, or NPTRS. Recent adoptions include Alaska, where NPTRS combines with instant-runoff voting, and St. Louis, where NPTRS comes with approval balloting. NPTRS itself has longer history.</p><p>Does it reduce polarization, as proponents <a href="https://thefulcrum.us/voting/katherine-gehl">claim</a> it will?</p><p>My answer is “no,” based on the <a href="https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/AP54NE">latest data</a> from political scientists Boris Shor and Nolan McCarty. Their data capture state-legislative polarization, 1993–2018, using a procedure similar to NOMINATE.</p><p>I won’t wade into the voluminous literature on “top-two,” primary systems, etc., much of which finds no effect on polarization. I do want to acknowledge that Christian Grose has <a href="http://schwarzeneggerinstitute.com/images/files/Grose_JPIPE_June_2020_Preprint_Official_Article.pdf">results</a> consistent with a ‘moderating’ effect in Congress. Those results are interesting.</p><p>But if NPTRS have no effect, at least two constituencies should care. First are those investing in reforms — with dollars and/or sweat — to loosen political gridlock. Second are those who care about the long-run consequences of party-weakening reforms. Such reforms (e.g., direct primaries) tend to outlast the purposes for which they were enacted (e.g., throwing various bums out). It is <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-inevitable-party-9780190220846?cc=us&amp;lang=en&amp;">possible</a> that, over the long haul, they just give “special interests” an even greater role in politics.</p><p><strong>What is NPTRS, and how might it reduce polarization?</strong></p><p>Such systems do not permit a party to advance a single candidate (or slate) to the decisive round of an electoral cycle. Examples include “top-two” elections in California and Washington, Nebraska’s fully nonpartisan system (no party labels on ballots), and Louisiana’s so-called “jungle primary.”</p><p>NPTRS are distinct from ‘open primaries,’ which let voters choose which party’s nomination process in which to participate. NPTRS are also distinct from ‘blanket primaries,’ which let voters do the same on an office-by-office basis.</p><p>In other words, NPTRS creates a general election in which voters may be choosing among multiple candidates from the same party.</p><p>I have noted <a href="https://medium.com/3streams/principles-of-democratic-reform-on-the-ballot-in-2020-1c496f86fc7d">elsewhere</a> that NPTRS were common in Western Europe of the late 1800s, just before the emergence of disciplined parties. From this perspective, NPTRS attempts to roll back the clock. The theory is that, by weakening parties as agents of nomination, legislators will be free to cross the aisle more often. In turn, we should see less polarization in the roll-call record.</p><p>An alternative theory is that NPTRS do nothing — at least with respect to aggregated measures based on legislative voting— because legislatures tend to generate stable coalitions.</p><p><strong>Have NPTRS reduced polarization?</strong></p><p>The Shor-McCarty data include two measures of polarization. One is the <a href="https://www.voteview.com/articles/party_polarization">familiar</a> distance between the median Democrat and median Republican in each state-legislative chamber. Another is the average of all pairwise differences in a given chamber.</p><p>The first measure can be thought of as “two-party polarization.” I call the second “coalition polarization,” as the coalition in control of a legislative chamber may not follow party lines. An example is the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2018/04/04/the-end-of-new-yorks-independent-democrats-explained/">erstwhile deal</a> in New York between Republicans and the Independent Democratic Caucus. “Coalition polarization” is not a perfect measure, but it does try to capture such deals.</p><p>Following the lead of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1532440014564984">Seth Masket and Boris Shor (2015)</a>, I plot the polarization trend for all 50 states. Four states are highlighted: California, Louisiana, Nebraska, Washington. Two of these adopted NPTRS during the period covered (see dots).</p><p>Focusing first on state upper chambers, we see no long-run moderating effect from NPTRS. No trend is downward-sloping. This holds for both measures.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yHdwRSnMDozqnJraEmmMrA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JfQXjET_jprKP3lhk8jIHw.png" /></figure><p>Turning to state lower chambers, we again see no long-run moderating effect. (Nebraska is omitted from these plots because Shor and McCarty group its “Unicam” with state senates, above.)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7rd2WI9MTcyDHFbC-RTGfw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gXitF-upKd0dyWgUoKeHxg.png" /></figure><p>Overall, there is no long-run effect of NPTRS on legislative polarization.</p><p>Some may point to brief reductions (e.g., CA Senate, two-party measure; WA House, both measures), but the “depolarization” does not last. Recall the alternative hypothesis: <em>legislatures tend to generate stable coalitions.</em></p><p>Also, some states adopt NPTRS during ‘local lows’ for polarization (e.g., CA House, coalition measure; WA Senate, both measures). This is consistent with the experience of direct primaries —widely adopted during the de-polarization of the Progressive Era and New Deal, then followed (as we all know) by decades of re-polarization.</p><p>None of this is surprising. <em>Legislatures tend to generate stable coalitions.</em></p><p>Yet few would deny that ‘things aren’t right’ in the wider party system. People probably disagree about exactly what’s not right. Let’s have that conversation. Let’s stop pretending that our problems — whatever they are — will go away by fighting a tenacious summary statistic. And let’s stop wasting energy trying to get parties out of politics.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3e9846cdeb2a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/3streams/nonpartisan-elections-dont-reduce-polarization-3e9846cdeb2a">Nonpartisan elections don’t reduce polarization</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/3streams">3Streams</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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