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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Quinsight on Medium]]></title>
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            <title>Stories by Quinsight on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Building a Better Pitcher: Jace’s Six-Week Development at Driveline]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Quinsight/jace-abe-b9fb61f102f7?source=rss-2827923a3e18------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[mlb]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[minor-league-baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pitching]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[major-league-baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[baseball]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Quinsight]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 05:02:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-11T05:03:53.244Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zIlXjSxWvRfGBmY4grKowQ.png" /></figure><p>Jace is a 15-year-old high school player who completed an assessment at Driveline on 9/18. During his assessment, his fastball averaged 80.6 mph, topping out at 82.7 mph. He already displayed pretty good mechanics overall, earning a 59 OVR, shown down below. His mechanics were allowing him to throw nearly 3 mph harder than his expected velocity based on his strength assessment. Take a look below at his mechanical composite score sheet, which grades solely his pitching mechanics, followed by his strength assessment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Qw9LNa2VacHQUk8DH_PPNg.png" /><figcaption>Jace’s Composite Score Sheet from his first assessment on 9/18</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rsBy5NI0ZDR4qxse-B23ZA.png" /><figcaption>Jace’s Strength Assessment on 9/18</figcaption></figure><p>With cases like this, the main message during the athlete meeting tends to focus on letting the player know that he needs to gain strength. When it came to Jace’s pitching mechanics, there wasn’t necessarily one clear phase of the throwing delivery where he struggled. As mentioned earlier, he was throwing 3 mph harder than what his strength assessment projected. However, there were a couple of things that stood out to me on his pitching report that I believed could help increase his fastball velocity. Here were our focuses during his first six-week block.</p><p><strong>1. CoG Vertical Displacement (PKH)</strong></p><p>During the leg lift phase, this was Jace’s lowest-hanging fruit. Take a look.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*R7LdN0kkkhXxMM_x7xQafw.png" /></figure><p>It had a -0.10 mph impact on his overall velocity. However, I believe it was actually taking more away than that, as it wasn’t allowing him to generate as much power to use throughout his delivery. For a lot of pitchers, it’s important to stay as tall as possible into peak knee height (PKH). This allows them to put more force into the ground during their drop phase. I like attacking things early in the delivery because I feel like improvements made early on will carry over into the rest of the delivery and potentially help clean things up in later phases. This was one area of focus for us. I prescribed him the Kikuchi Drill, which forces the pitcher to stay tall on their back leg before creating a distinct drop phase after PKH.2. Lead Leg Block.</p><p>One of the most important things a pitcher can do to properly transfer energy up through the kinetic chain is establish a good lead leg block. Jace already had a decent one, as you can see below. His Lead Knee Extension in the Lower Rotation phase had a score of 45, having a positive impact on his overall velocity. During his Launch phase, his Lead Knee Extension Velocity (BR) was having a solid impact as well. His Peak Lead Knee Velocity was scored at 32, having a slight negative impact.</p><p>However, as I mentioned, having a good lead leg block is crucial for properly transferring energy up the kinetic chain, so this became a major focus for us. I added Roll-Ins along with the Rocker Drill, both with the intention of helping him establish a more effective lead leg block.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*n_e34stGIfMUAZZmJv-GAQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7SbzkwODItXJnwg5s35j9A.png" /></figure><p>These were our two main focuses during his initial six-week block. Outside of mechanics, we also focused on adding a few more pitches to his repertoire, as Jace gets a lot of movement on multiple different pitches. He’s capable of developing a diverse pitch profile, which I’ll dive into later in this article.</p><p>Regardless, when it came time for his retest six weeks later, Jace’s velocity jumped. He went from averaging 80.6 mph to averaging 83.7 mph. His max velocity went from 82.7 mph to 84.2 mph. (During a mound blend day in his fourth week, he actually hit 85.4 mph.) His pitching mechanics improved as well, along with his strength numbers (shoutout to the great weight room staff at Driveline).</p><p>Take a look.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rUqwNvVtHukCokubDeJDSg.png" /><figcaption>Jace’s Mechanical Composite Score Sheet from his retest on 10/27</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TyBBTADxB5pu66qwRI15bg.png" /><figcaption>Jace’s Athlete Scores from his Strength Assessment retest on 10/27</figcaption></figure><p>Nearly everything improved in his pitching mechanics. His Leg Lift, Buildup, and Launch phases all saw significant jumps, while both rotational scores experienced minor decreases. Regardless, his overall mechanics OVR went from 59 to 71.</p><p>He also got much stronger in the weight room, pushing his expected velocity to 79.4 mph, up from 77.1 mph during his initial strength assessment. The two areas we focused on throughout his six-week block saw considerable improvement.</p><p>Take a look at how much his CoG Vertical Displacement improved, along with his lead leg block.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8A4MYBuwKXqAAJtIUaaV4w.png" /><figcaption>CoG Vertical Displacement (PKH) went from 34-&gt;67</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GWFPfNWaqiRA1_NQo0-EOw.png" /><figcaption>Lead Knee Extension Velo (BR) went from 53-&gt; 71. Peak Lead Knee Extension Velo went from 32-&gt; 46</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*S6cyC9aeTJ1jo8cYRxrE8Q.png" /><figcaption>His Lead Knee Extension (FP to BR) went up 5 scores</figcaption></figure><p>Everything we focused on got considerably better. His OVR now stands at 71, which is extremely good for a 15-year-old high school player. He’s now sitting 4.3 mph higher than what his strength assessment predicts he’s capable of throwing. I’m really impressed with these jumps.</p><p>His CoG Vertical Displacement saw the largest improvement. Below is an image of his updated skeleton. As you can see, there’s still a slight bend in his back leg, but it’s a significant improvement from where he was before. This allows him to put even more power into the ground during his drop phase. His CoG Vertical Displacement is now having a positive impact on his overall velocity.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PGu7vC1bofKwmmLiZx6o9w.png" /><figcaption>Jace During his initial assessment on 9/18</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*g4eCnqjAMgXbQ_nhee2W8g.png" /><figcaption>Jace During his retest on 10/27</figcaption></figure><p>Outside of pitching mechanics, Jace and I also did some work in the Pitch Design Lab. During his initial assessment, he threw three pitches: a fastball, changeup, and curveball. Take a look at his pitch shapes from that assessment on 9/18.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*a8tIN3DiXubpuPt34WrRLQ.png" /></figure><p>Jace initially had good shape on his fastball (red dots), averaging 5.4 inches of horizontal break (HB) and 20.6 inches of induced vertical break (IVB). His changeup (green dots) had good shape but lacked consistency, while the three curveballs (blue dots) he threw all behaved like different pitches.</p><p>After multiple sessions in the Pitch Design Lab, we added two new pitches to his repertoire: a slider (yellow) and a two-seam fastball (orange).</p><p>Below is a look at how his pitch shapes performed during his last three mound blends, including his retest.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sO5y4M8_Ax6DcYRseg3nQw.png" /></figure><p>As his velocity has increased, so has the IVB on his fastball (5.0 HB / 23.6 IVB on average). His curveball has developed into a much more consistent shape (-12.3 HB / -5.3 IVB), and his changeup continues to get even better (16.9 HB / 8.1 IVB).</p><p>The slider and two-seam have become solid pitch offerings as well, although both still have room to grow. Specifically, he’s throwing his slider at nearly the same velocity as his curveball (68.8 mph average velo on the SL, 68.6 mph average velo on the CU). Ideally, I’d like to see him start throwing the slider harder, but the shape is solid.</p><p>He generates a really good amount of IVB on his fastball, which should help his other pitch offerings play off of it nicely. It’s been really enjoyable working with Jace so far, and I’m excited to see where his progress stands during his next retest.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b9fb61f102f7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Six Weeks, Four MPH, And A Curveball That Drops Off The Table]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Quinsight/six-weeks-four-mph-and-a-curveball-that-drops-off-the-table-3faca22f9b06?source=rss-2827923a3e18------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3faca22f9b06</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[pitching]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[self-improvement]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[major-league-baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mlb]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Quinsight]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 08 Nov 2026 07:54:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-08T07:54:11.543Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aznyfLICkQa5fTgZPOzwGA.png" /></figure><p>Charlie is an 18-year-old pitcher who came into Driveline before starting his freshman season at a JUCO, and he’s one of the players I’ve had the pleasure of working with during my time here.</p><p>In just six weeks, Charlie went from averaging 81.0 mph on his fastball, and topping out at 83.5 mph, to averaging 85.3 mph, and topping 86.3 mph. Here’s how he did it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OWd1mLPa61nXqyGCgaHiJg.jpeg" /></figure><p>This is what his mechanics looked like during his initial assessment. The 62 OVR ranks solely his pitching mechanics against every pitcher who has ever come into Driveline and assessed, from 10-year-olds to high schoolers, all the way to Major League pitchers. The overall score is broken down into the 6 stages of the pitching delivery:</p><ul><li><strong>Leg Lift</strong> (everything that happens from when the pitcher lifts his foot until he reaches peak knee height (PKH))</li><li><strong>Buildup</strong> (PKH to when the front foot lands)</li><li><strong>Landing</strong> (when the pitcher reaches foot plant (FP))</li><li><strong>Lower Rotation</strong> (pelvis rotation)</li><li><strong>Upper Rotation</strong> (torso rotation)</li><li><strong>Launch</strong> (everything that happens while the pitcher is releasing the ball)</li></ul><p>62 (out of 100) is a very solid score, but a few things stuck out to me that he could improve on. Here are 3 of them.</p><ol><li><strong>Hip-Shoulder Separation:</strong> His hip-shoulder separation at foot plant was 14.5°. Typically we see around 25–35° from our high-level throwers (90 mph or higher).</li><li><strong>Max Torso Counter Rotation:</strong> During the buildup phase, he had a score of 24, and our report stated it was having a -0.10 mph impact on his velocity. That doesn’t sound like a huge impact, but I believed it caused him to open his torso too early at foot plant and took away from the hip-shoulder separation he could’ve been getting.</li><li><strong>Max Shoulder ER:</strong> Otherwise known as layback, he was getting a maximum of about 171°. From high-level throwers, we typically look for 180° or higher. I believe a big reason he wasn’t getting great layback was that his torso was opening so early that his arm didn’t have as much time to lay back as it would if he kept his upper half closed longer.</li></ol><p>These were our three main points of emphasis during his initial meeting and first 6-week training block. For context, a lot of my pitchers at Driveline, like Charlie, will usually have 5–6 drills they do on their higher-intent days (Monday, Wednesday, Friday), throwing plyo balls (or weighted balls) against a wall before they ever pick up a baseball. After their plyo ball drills, they head to the throwing cage to get in around 30–40 long-toss throws before they call it a day. Depending on the pitcher, I’ll replace a small portion of those long-toss throws with athletic throws, or throwing drills specifically tailored to the pitcher’s inefficiencies.</p><p>On his higher-intent days, Charlie had 6 drills he would do with plyo balls (or weighted balls). 3 of those drills are a part of nearly every Driveline athlete’s programming (Reverse Throws, Pivot Pickoffs, and Walking Windups), while I added 3 more drills that I believed could help fix his specific inefficiencies. The Roll-In drill was prescribed to target his hip-shoulder separation, while Janitors and Seated Throws were added to help him get the feeling of delaying and counter-rotating his torso. Janitors are typically prescribed to guys who have a hard time opening their pelvis at foot plant. Charlie did not have this problem, but I had him use the specific cue of firing the hips first while delaying the torso rotation. Seated Throws take the lower half out completely, so the player can get a good feel for how he is using his upper half. After 3 weeks, I replaced the Roll-In drill with Tall-Kneeling Throws, which serve a similar purpose to the Seated Throws.</p><p>I should add that we still throw on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays. Those days, however, are recovery days. On recovery days we trim the intensity down severely (only about 50% effort) and limit the drills they do on the plyo wall (usually around 2–3 drills). Recovery days are extremely important. Not only do they serve as adequate recovery, but they still give you a chance to work on your mechanics and delivery.</p><p>Over the course of Charlie’s first 6 weeks, we continued to ramp up the intensity, and the results were fantastic. Take a look at his Mechanical Composite Score Sheet from his retest 6 weeks later.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pltlck3iIdhhxfgahu5PxA.jpeg" /></figure><p>A 4.3 mph increase in average velocity in a 6-week timespan is awesome. And although not everything improved dramatically, we saw great results. His Max Torso Counter Rotation went from a score of 24 to 36. His Max Shoulder ER (layback) improved to 175° (about a +4° increase). His hip-shoulder separation improved dramatically, going from 14.5° to 22.6° (a +8.1° increase). He also improved his overall arm speed, which has a strong correlation with throwing velocity.</p><p>Outside of the things we were directly targeting, some things he already did well got even better. For example, during his initial assessment he had a very strong lead leg block (likely due to his overall strength and his ability to open up his pelvis). His lead knee extension (from FP to BR) had a very solid score of 77 (+0.18 mph velocity impact). He also had a score of 89 on his lead knee extension velocity at ball release (+0.65 mph velocity impact), and a score of 77 on his peak lead knee extension velocity (+0.17 mph velocity impact).</p><p>During his retest, all 3 of these got better.</p><p>His lead knee extension (from FP to BR) went from 77 -&gt; 90, his lead knee extension velocity (at BR) went from 89 -&gt; 92, and his peak lead knee extension velocity went from 77 -&gt; 92. A good lead leg block is a crucial component of maximizing your velocity, so it was impressive to see his get even better.</p><p>I do want to mention that having poor lead knee extension doesn’t always mean a pitcher has a bad lead leg block. Sometimes a pitcher blocks really well and just doesn’t get full lead knee extension. Regardless, most of the time when a pitcher gets good lead knee extension from foot plant to ball release, it likely means he has a strong lead leg block. With Charlie, this is very much the case. Take a look at his pitching mechanics below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*82msGFB1qPtwcDtiF78BHA.gif" /><figcaption>Charlie pitching during his retest on 11/5</figcaption></figure><p>Improving his pitching mechanics and velocity was half the story; making his stuff play was the other half.</p><p>Outside of pitching mechanics, we also took some time to focus on his pitch repertoire. When Charlie assessed, he threw 3 pitches: a fastball, a changeup, and a slider. Take a look at his Trackman data below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*b85nXrwDW4gFobR9cFzK0w.png" /><figcaption>Trackman Data for Charlie on 9/22</figcaption></figure><p>If you’ve never seen a Trackman graph like this, usually the more separation between each pitch, the better. His fastball (red dots) had decent shape but lacked strong IVB (Induced Vertical Break). Good IVB plots higher on the graph, and typically the more IVB you get on your fastball, the better. More IVB generally makes a fastball harder to hit because it drops less than a hitter expects. Why does this matter?</p><ul><li><strong>The ball stays higher:</strong> Compared to a fastball with less IVB, it drops less on its way to home plate.</li><li><strong>It gets on top of barrels:</strong> Hitters often swing expecting the ball to drop along a certain trajectory. More IVB can cause the ball to arrive higher than expected, so they swing underneath it.</li></ul><p>To sum it up, more IVB can induce more weak contact while also potentially creating more swings and misses, particularly at the top of the strike zone, where hitters have a harder time getting on top of the ball.</p><p>His changeup (green dots) didn’t have much separation from his fastball. It got more arm-side movement, which is why it’s plotted to the right of the fastball, but it lacked depth, which is why it isn’t lower than the fastball on the graph. Lastly, his slider wasn’t a bad pitch, but it didn’t behave like a typical slider. It got more drop and behaved like something between a slider and a curveball. After a few sessions in the pitch design lab, take a look at how his pitches moved during his retest.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jIOvoL3zQ5ekzF_vAtJezA.png" /><figcaption>Trackman Data for Charlie on 11/5</figcaption></figure><p>As you can see, there is much more separation between each pitch. His fastball is now getting much more IVB (5 of his fastballs sat around 20 IVB; he had 0 pitches above 20 during his initial assessment). He also brought back his 2-seam (orange dots), which has more arm-side action when thrown correctly. His changeup has become a much more distinct pitch. We messed around with different grips and cues and found one that has nearly as much horizontal movement as before, with a ton more depth. Adding that changeup was huge, but what really excited me was the curveball (which we swapped in for the slider).</p><p>From a pitch design perspective, this is a really interesting pitch profile. Why? A traditional right-handed curveball typically falls somewhere similar to the blue dot furthest to the left, outside the circled region (that curveball was an outlier). The new curveball we’ve been working on has:</p><ul><li>Very little horizontal movement</li><li>A more vertically oriented movement profile</li></ul><p>In my opinion, the lack of horizontal movement isn’t a limitation; it’s actually an advantage. Instead of moving across the hitter’s vision, the pitch primarily moves down, which creates a different visual experience for hitters. Hitters are trying to recognize pitch type, velocity, and trajectory as early as possible. A curveball with more horizontal movement gives the hitter another directional cue to recognize.</p><p>A more vertically oriented curveball:</p><ul><li>Maintains a trajectory closer to the pitcher’s initial line toward home plate</li><li>Can create the illusion of a fastball before showing its depth</li><li>Forces the hitter to adjust primarily vertically rather than horizontally</li></ul><p>The result can be a pitch that looks like a fastball out of the hand before falling underneath the barrel. It complements a fastball very well, especially one with high IVB, and the two can create an interesting vertical tunnel. We still have some work to do on its consistency. Ideally, the pitch sits right on or near the Y-axis (3 of the curveballs were to the left of the Y-axis, 2 to the right). Regardless, this is a very unique pitch, and one I’m excited to keep working on with him.</p><p>Overall, the progress Charlie made in just 6 weeks exceeded both of our expectations. Our next steps will focus on continuing to delay the torso, as there’s still room for improvement there. Along with that, we’ll keep doing work in the pitch design lab. During this next 6-week block, he’ll be put into a velocity phase to see how much more juice we can squeeze out of him. Charlie is 6&#39;1&quot;, 200 pounds, and his FlexPro grip test (a test we use to make sure the forearm, which helps protect the UCL, is strong enough to support the velocity a player is throwing) indicated his forearm is currently capable of handling 90 mph.</p><p>From the progress he made in his mechanics to the progress he made with pitch design, the results were exciting. Before his retest, I asked him what he was hoping to top out at, and he told me 85 mph. He averaged 85.3 mph and topped out at 86.3 mph. It goes to show that with the right programming, and more importantly the right work ethic, substantial improvement can be made.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3faca22f9b06" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Unlocking Jack Perkins: Why the Athletics Should Move Him to the Bullpen and Adjust His Arsenal]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Quinsight/unlocking-jack-perkins-why-the-athletics-should-move-him-to-the-bullpen-and-overhaul-his-arsenal-fd09a720b39d?source=rss-2827923a3e18------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fd09a720b39d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[athletics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mlb]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pitching]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[major-league-baseball]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Quinsight]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 21:54:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-14T21:57:37.457Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/0*9b7zMn0r2xxYgigW.jpg" /></figure><p>Jack Perkins has shown flashes of becoming a legitimate weapon in Major League Baseball. Consistency and durability remain the biggest issues. With the A’s lack of pitching depth, it’s no question as to why they decided to use Perkins as a starter this season. There were some really good starts, mixed in between a few really bad ones. A move to the bullpen could allow the A’s to maximize his stuff while reducing the demands that have made starting difficult. Here’s what that could look like in ’27.</p><p><strong>The Raw Stuff Is Major League Ready</strong></p><p>When you look at Jack Perkins’ underlying Statcast metrics, one thing becomes immediately clear: the raw stuff belongs in the Big Leagues. In 2026, Perkins flashed elite swing-and-miss characteristics, <strong>ranking in the 85th percentile in Chase Rate</strong> (34.3%), <strong>73rd percentile in Strikeout Rate </strong>(25.9%), and <strong>66th percentile in Whiff Rate</strong> (27.3%), backed by a fastball that averages 95.7 mph (69th percentile).</p><p>Yet, despite these frontline peripherals, Perkins endured a grueling 2026 campaign with the Oakland Athletics, posting a 3–13 record, a 6.10 ERA, a 1.45 WHIP, and a -0.8 WAR across 121.0 innings (37 appearances, 17 starts).</p><p>How does a pitcher with 85th-percentile chase ability and a 25.9% strikeout rate end up with an ERA over 6.00?</p><p>The answer lies in three core flaws that plagued his usage in 2026 — and why a transition to the bullpen, paired with a tactical pitch-mix overhaul, holds the key to unlocking his true potential in 2027.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sn5w06oiQQ18anQv6AFNgA.png" /></figure><p><strong>The Three Friction Points Holding Perkins Back</strong></p><p>A deep dive into Perkins’ 2026 performance surfaces three distinct obstacles:</p><ol><li><strong>Inconsistent Command &amp; Free Passes:</strong> Perkins struggles with control, posting a 9.4% walk rate last season (38th percentile). Falling behind in counts forced him to challenge hitters inside the strike zone when behind, neutralizing his out-of-zone chase weapons.</li><li><strong>Early-Inning Starter Meltdowns &amp; Lineup Penalty:</strong> As a starting pitcher, Perkins suffered massive early-game blowups, posting a disastrous 10.06 ERA in the 1st inning and a 6.75 ERA in the 2nd inning. Furthermore, his performance degraded significantly during his third time through the order (TTO3), as hitters adjusted to his fastball-heavy sequencing.</li><li><strong>Over-Reliance on Vulnerable Hard Pitches</strong>: In 2026, Perkins threw his 4-Seam Fastball (29.4%), Cutter (15.3%), and Sinker (5.5%) over 50% of the time combined. Opposing batters annihilated all three hard offerings:</li></ol><ul><li>4-Seam Fastball: Allowed a .291 BA, .591 SLG, 9 HRs, and a -12 Run Value.</li><li>Cutter: Allowed a .393 BA, .607 SLG, and a -4 Run Value.</li><li>Sinker: Allowed a .310 BA, .655 SLG, and a -4 Run Value.</li></ul><p>When Perkins left these pitches in the middle-down portion of the plate, opponents batted .375 with a .925 SLG and 5 home runs.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FU366TQphvck%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DU366TQphvck&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FU366TQphvck%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/e1f0003230a083256f3abad331980628/href">https://medium.com/media/e1f0003230a083256f3abad331980628/href</a></iframe><p><strong>The Relief Solution: Maximizing Short-Burst Dominance</strong></p><p>Transitioning Perkins to a high-leverage or multi-inning bullpen role solves all three of his primary weaknesses simultaneously:</p><ul><li><strong>Eliminates Lineup Exposure</strong>: In 1- to 2-inning relief stints, hitters won’t get a second or third look at his arsenal.</li><li><strong>Capitalizes on Late-Inning Success</strong>: In 2026, Perkins was dominant in relief situations, recording a 1.70 ERA in Late &amp; Close scenarios over 10.0 innings and a 0.00 ERA in the 7th inning (5.1 IP, 10 strikeouts).</li><li><strong>Protects Arm Health</strong>: Perkins has struggled with injuries throughout his career. Shorter bullpen outings manage his cumulative workload and allow his 95.7 mph fastball velocity to play up.</li></ul><p><strong>The Blueprint: Following Griffin Jax’s Path</strong></p><p>Baseball Savant explicitly lists Griffin Jax as a primary velocity and movement match for Jack Perkins. Take a look.</p><figure><img alt="Jack Perkins 2026 Movement Profile" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/847/1*_KKZCmjU9POV-YrelRfsdw.png" /><figcaption>Jack Perkins</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="Griffin Jax 2026 Movement Profile" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/847/1*qJYDcadBC5eNlxhX8aJieA.png" /><figcaption>Griffin Jax</figcaption></figure><p>Their career trajectories share striking parallels. Jax began his career with the Minnesota Twins as a struggling starter, posting a 6.37 ERA over 139.1 innings in 2021 while over-relying on a vulnerable 4-seamer. Upon moving full-time to the bullpen, Jax transformed into an elite late-inning weapon, posting a 2.03 ERA in 2024 and a 3.53 ERA in 2026.</p><p>How did Jax do it? Outside of the move to the bullpen, he overhauled his arsenal. He cut 4-Seam Fastball usage down, and elevated his best pitches (Sweeper, Sinker, &amp; Changeup) into his primary weapons.</p><p>Perkins can follow this exact roadmap to bullpen stardom.</p><p><strong>2027 Pitch Mix Overhaul</strong></p><p>In 2026, Perkins wasn’t pitching to his strengths. Regardless of whether Perkins moves to the bullpen, I’d overhaul how he attacks hitters. Here’s Perkins pitch usage Vs. RHH &amp; LHH this past season.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/846/1*0qkBvRNvXZ3Mlz7n4AEYAQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Proposed 2027 Mix</strong> <strong>vs. Right-Handed Hitters (RHH)</strong></p><ul><li>4-Seam Fastball: 30.0%</li><li>Sweeper: 28.0% ⬇️</li><li>Changeup: 17.5% ⬆️</li><li>Slider: 12.0% ⬆️</li><li>Sinker: 10.0% ⬇️</li><li>Cutter: 2.5% ⬇️</li></ul><p>The Tactical Reason:</p><ul><li><strong>Maintain the 4-Seamer:</strong> Unlike lefties, right-handed hitters struggled against Perkins’ 4-seamer in 2026, managing just a .189 expected batting average (xBA). Keeping it at 30% remains viable if elevated to the top edge of the zone.</li><li><strong>Expand the Changeup (17.5%)</strong>: Perkins’ Changeup produced a +3 Run Value, holding hitters to a .182 xBA, .224 xSLG, a 37.5% Whiff rate, and 0 HRs allowed. Increasing changeup usage forces righties to defend arm-side fade alongside glove-side sweep.</li><li><strong>Unlock the Hard Gyro Slider (12%)</strong>: In 2026, Perkins threw his slider only 19 times (0.9% usage). However, at 88.3 mph with +3.2 inches of vertical break above average, it acts as a tight, hard gyro-slider. In that small sample, it produced a 40.0% Whiff rate, a .152 xBA, and a .167 xSLG. Expanding its usage to 12% gives righties a completely different look from his 86.3 mph Sweeper (+11.9&quot; horizontal break).</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lxjae5ykVVeyvUKuv805Cg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Proposed 2027 Mix</strong> <strong>vs. Left-Handed Hitters (LHH)</strong></p><ul><li>Changeup: 32.5% ⬆️</li><li>Sweeper: 25.0%</li><li>4-Seam Fastball: 15.0% ⬇️</li><li>Cutter: 10.0% ⬇️</li><li>Slider: 12.5% ⬆️</li><li>Sinker: 2.5%</li><li>Curveball: 2.5%</li></ul><p>The Tactical Reason:</p><ul><li><strong>Eradicate the Danger Zone</strong>: Lefties crushed Perkins’ 4-Seamer (.591 SLG, -12 RV) and Cutter (.607 SLG, -4 RV) in 2026. Reducing their combined footprint from 43% down to 25% eliminates the pitch types lefties pulled for extra-base hits.</li><li><strong>Multi-Plane Breaking Balls:</strong> Featuring a 25% Sweeper, 12.5% Slider, and 2.5% Curveball gives left-handed batters three distinct breaking-ball profiles (horizontal sweep, tight vertical drop, and 12–6 curveball depth).</li><li><strong>Make the Changeup the Primary Weapon (32.5%)</strong>: Perkins’ Changeup (.204 BA, .243 SLG allowed) is his best anti-lefty pitch. With zero home runs allowed on it in his MLB career, leaning into it neutralizes both contact and power.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/986/1*IxGpSRhyNDVUJ_j6Syra1A.png" /></figure><p><strong>Conclusion: The 2027 Outlook</strong></p><p>Jack Perkins does not need to reinvent himself — the stuff already plays.</p><p>The goal in 2027 should be to put him in a role that maximizes that stuff, attack hitters with his best pitches, and limit the situations that have held him back as a starter. For me, that could mean a move to the bullpen.</p><p>Attacking hitters with his elite Changeup, Sweeper, and newly expanded Slider, and staying out of the middle of the zone, the Athletics may just be able to convert Perkins from a struggling starter into a high-leverage MLB reliever in 2027.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fd09a720b39d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Edward Cabrera’s 2026 Collapse and the Blueprint for a 2027 Revival]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Quinsight/edward-cabreras-2026-collapse-and-the-blueprint-for-a-2027-revival-fccbaa9f669a?source=rss-2827923a3e18------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fccbaa9f669a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[pitching]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[chicago-cubs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[major-league-baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mlb]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Quinsight]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 26 Sep 2026 08:32:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-26T20:16:26.516Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/0*PtTtluQXUk8Dp54P.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>Edward Cabrera’s 2026 season has been a dramatic departure from the pitcher he was in 2025.</strong> After a promising 25&#39; season with Miami, Cabrera’s performance plummeted following his trade to the Chicago Cubs. In his first year in Chicago, Cabrera has easily had the worst season of his career (-1.3 WAR). He’s posted a 5.96 ERA, 1.49 WHIP, a career-low 20.3% strikeout rate, an elevated 10.3% walk rate, and a career-worst 11.7% barrel rate over 80.0 innings while dealing with multiple blister and hamstring injuries. <strong>The good news?</strong> Cabrera is just 28 years old and has plenty of time to find his groove again.</p><p>For Edward Cabrera to deliver an elite 2027 season, he must address the mechanical changes, pitch-shape deterioration, and arsenal inefficiencies that contributed to his disappointing 2026 campaign. The table below highlights the changes in movement and performance across each pitch in his arsenal, providing a starting point for understanding what went wrong — and what needs to change moving forward.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*y4jxrIC2qYF8V9md05It6w.jpeg" /></figure><p>As you can see, the majority of Cabrera’s pitches performed significantly worse in 2026, with the slider serving as the lone exception. The question is, why? Several underlying issues help explain the decline — and, more importantly, point toward what Cabrera must fix heading into 2027.</p><h4>Biggest Weaknesses</h4><ul><li><strong>Hittable Fastball Shapes</strong>: Both his 4-seam fastball and sinker get hit hard. In 2026, hitters posted a staggering .368 BA, .842 SLG, and .543 wOBA against his 4-seamer, and a .325 BA and .494 SLG against his sinker.</li><li><strong>Command &amp; Control Volatility</strong>: Cabrera struggles with control, walking 10.3% of batters in 2026 and carrying an 11.5% career walk rate. When he misses in the zone, his mistakes are heavily punished.</li><li><strong>Arm Slot Degradation: </strong>His arm slot dropped from 36° in 2025 to 33° in 2026. This doesn’t seem to be a huge issue, and maybe it’s not. However, the lower slot could’ve compromised his release point, causing his key pitch shapes (curveball) to lose movement separation.</li><li><strong>Pitch Usage:</strong> I don’t think Cabrera uses his best stuff enough. His changeup is elite, and he uses it well. His curveball consistently gets good results year after year. Still, he throws it nearly as often as his sinker and four-seam fastball — two pitches that perform poorly. If Cabrera wants to maximize his arsenal, he should throw his best pitches more often and move away from the pitches that consistently hurt him.</li><li><strong>Health</strong>: Cabrera has pitched over 100 innings just once in his 6-year career. Multiple injuries, along with persistent middle-finger blisters (which plagued him in 21&#39;, 25&#39;, and 26&#39;) prevent him from maintaining consistent grip pressure and spin feel.</li></ul><p>The issues outlined above likely contributed to Cabrera’s struggles in 2026. But despite those flaws, there is still plenty working in his favor — and plenty of reason to believe he can bounce back in 2027.</p><h4>Biggest Strengths</h4><ul><li><strong>Elite Raw Velocity &amp; Stuff</strong>: Cabrera possesses rare, high-octane velocity across his entire arsenal, including a 96 mph fastball/sinker, a 93 mph changeup, a 89 mph hard slider, and an 84 mph curveball.</li><li><strong>Devastating Offspeed &amp; Breaking Whiff Potential</strong>: When right, Cabrera generates elite miss rates. In 2025, he was the only pitcher in Major League Baseball to generate a 41%+ whiff rate on two distinct pitches (45.2% on his curveball, 43.7% on his slider). Even in a down 2026, his slider has retained an elite 44.2% whiff rate.</li><li><strong>Chase Generation &amp; Groundball Profile</strong>: He consistently induces out-of-zone swings (64th percentile chase rate in 2026) and has historically maintained strong groundball rates (up to 55.7% in 2023 and 47.5% in 2025).</li></ul><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F9cYVGj6XKZA%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D9cYVGj6XKZA&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F9cYVGj6XKZA%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/5c4ff98d647f333539d0ead9cc912804/href">https://medium.com/media/5c4ff98d647f333539d0ead9cc912804/href</a></iframe><h4>Pitch Shape Changes, Pitch Addition(s), and Arsenal Adjustments</h4><p>So how does Cabrera adjust? As mentioned, raising his arm slot back to ~36°–40° could help. Cabrera’s lowering arm angle (33° in 2026) coincided with significant pitch-shape changes. That doesn’t mean that’s the only reason he struggled. There could be plenty of unknown factors as to why Cabrera didn’t get the same movement on his curveball than simply his arm angle. Regardless, here are a few things I would address heading into next season.</p><ul><li><strong>Fix the Curveball Shape</strong>: This has traditionally been his best pitch. However, In 2026, Cabrera’s curveball lost its sharp 12–6 depth and shape. Its horizontal break collapsed from 10.9&quot; to 6.3&quot;, its induced vertical break (drop) went from -11.0&quot; to -7.6&quot;, spin rate dropped from 2,631 rpm to 2,487 rpm, and active spin plummeted from 77% to 61%. The pitch still performed well in 26&#39;. However, recovering the vertical and horizontal break he had in 25&#39;, would likely restore its elite whiff rate (which dropped from 45.2% in 25&#39; to 33.7% in 26&#39;).</li><li><strong>Reduce Sinker Usage</strong>: This season Cabrera got less rise, and got less arm-side run on the sinker (yielding a 7.5% whiff rate). A higher slot seemed to coincided with more IVB &amp; horizontal movement, which he can then run in on righties, jamming them up and inducing weak contact. On paper, his sinker is a good pitch. It got about 2.1&quot; more inches of arm-side run than the average RHP in 26&#39;. However, historically his sinker has never performed that well against righties or lefties. Could it be an execution problem? Maybe. But it’s hard for me to believe that after five seasons of throwing the pitch, he hasn’t even slightly adapted the execution of the sinker. I believe he probably has, the results have just never seemed to be there.</li></ul><h3>Recommended Pitch Usage</h3><h4>Pitches to Throw More</h4><ul><li><strong>Slider</strong>: Increase usage. It was Cabrera’s most effective pitch in 2026 (.207 BA, .232 wOBA, 44.2% whiff rate), yet he only threw it 11.5% of the time overall and a meager 4% against left-handed hitters.</li><li><strong>Curveball &amp; Changeup</strong>: Once restored to their 2025 movement profiles, both should be primary put-away weapons alongside the slider.</li></ul><h4>Pitches to Throw Less</h4><ul><li><strong>4-Seam Fastball</strong>: Reduce usage significantly. Hitters smashed his 4-seamer for a .498 xwOBA and .842 SLG in 2026. It should be relegated to a rare high-and-tight surprise pitch.</li><li><strong>Sinker</strong>: Given its persistent struggles against both sides of the plate, the sinker should become a secondary offering — and likely disappear entirely against LHH.</li></ul><h4>Pitch to Add: Cutter</h4><p>Cabrera currently lacks an effective horizontal pitch against left-handed hitters. Throwing more sliders to lefties could be beneficial, as he threw it just 4% of the time. However, adding a hard cutter could be a solution as well. It would allow him to jam lefties in on the hands while keeping hitters off balance.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XbSJ6rdrQ3muJ0aB8-af6Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pitch Usage for Cabrera During the 26&#39; Season</figcaption></figure><h4>Against Right-Handed Hitters (RHH)</h4><p>This season against righties, Cabrera has relied heavily on his <strong>sinker</strong> (28%) <strong>changeup</strong> (23%), and <strong>slider</strong> (23%) while throwing his <strong>curveball</strong> (15%), and <strong>4-seam </strong>(11%) less often.</p><p><strong>Recommended 2027 Usage vs. RHH:</strong></p><p><strong>Changeup</strong> (27.5%): Arguably his best pitch. Has consistently performed well against RHH (<strong>.223 xBA</strong> in 26&#39; <strong>.204 xBA</strong> in 25&#39;, <strong>.135 xBA</strong> in 24&#39;).</p><p><strong>Curveball </strong>(25%): The curveball has routinely been a weapon for Cabrera throughout his career. Throw your best pitches most often. Steal early strikes or bury out of the zone as a put away pitch. (<strong>.063 BA</strong> in 26&#39; — <strong>.173 BA</strong> in 25&#39; — <strong>.188 BA</strong> in 24&#39;).</p><p><strong>Slider</strong> (22.5%): Use against righties to capitalize on his high whiff rate and strong results (<strong>.204 xBA, .190 xwOBA</strong> in 26&#39;).</p><p><strong>Sinker</strong> (12.5%): Use to run up-and-in to tie up righties. On paper, a sinker should perform well against same-sided hitters. This just has simply not been the case for Cabrera throughout his career. Use cautiously.</p><p><strong>4-Seamer</strong> (12.5%): Minimal usage. Flash conservatively above the strike zone when ahead in the count.</p><h4>Against Left-Handed Hitters (LHH)</h4><p>This season against lefties, Cabrera threw his <strong>changeup</strong> (36%), <strong>4</strong>-<strong>seamer</strong> (21%), <strong>curveball</strong> (23%), <strong>sinker</strong> (16%), and <strong>slider</strong> (4%).</p><p><strong>Recommended 2027 Usage vs. LHH:</strong></p><p><strong>Changeup</strong> (27.5%): Best pitch; Primary out-pitch to fade away from LHH barrels.</p><p><strong>Curveball</strong> (25%): Even in a season when his curveball shape got worse, it still performed well <strong>(.229 BA </strong>in 26&#39;<strong>)</strong>.</p><p><strong>Cutter</strong> (20%): Add a cutter, throwing it inside to jam lefties and prevent them from leaning over the plate.</p><p><strong>Slider</strong> (15%): Expand back-foot slider usage against lefties, a pitch that performed well in both 25&#39; and 26&#39;.</p><p><strong>4-Seamer </strong>(12.5%): Reduce usage, but flash as a weapon when needed. Lefties have consistently punished the 4-seamer throughout his career. In 2023, however, Cabrera used his 4-seamer as his primary option against LHH, and it performed remarkably<strong> (.108 BA)</strong>. His arm slot in ’23 was 44°, compared to a 33° arm angle in ’26. With the higher slot, he averaged nearly 3 more inches of rise on his 4-Seamer. The 2023 and 2026 versions of his fastball provide another example of how dramatically his arsenal can change with his arm slot. If Cabrera raises his arm slot next season, the 4-seamer should perform better than it did in 26&#39;.</p><p><strong>Eliminate the Sinker</strong>. It has never performed well against LHH throughout his career, so why not just get rid of it?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hnckVnoepKFauj-rR8cBMQ.png" /><figcaption>How the Slider Performed Against LHH/RHH in 2026</figcaption></figure><h4>Speaking of the Cutter.</h4><p>Left-handed hitters hit .279 with an .823 OPS &amp; 9 home runs in 45.1 innings against him in 2026. Even during his strong 2025 season, lefties performed better <strong>(.728 OPS)</strong> against Cabrera than righties<strong> (.640 OPS)</strong>. <strong>How does he fix this?</strong> Adding a hard cutter (92–94 MPH) could directly address Edward Cabrera’s biggest structural vulnerability against left-handed hitters.</p><p><strong>The core problem against lefties is that his movement profile is predictable</strong>. The majority of pitches Cabrera throws to lefties moves toward the arm side (changeup, fastball, and sinker). His curveball breaks more vertically (7.6 inches of Drop) than horizontally (6.3 inches of Horizontal Break). The slider is an exception but as mentioned before, he hardly throws it. <strong>A cutter would change that. </strong>It<strong> </strong>gives him a different type of glove-side weapon. Throwing the slider more will be essential as well, but a cutter would give hitters another pitch to account for when trying to identify his fastball, changeup, and secondary stuff. It would force left-handed hitters to respect movement in both directions instead of primarily sitting on pitches that move toward the arm side.</p><h4>How the Hard Cutter Fixes His Arsenal vs. LHH</h4><p><strong>A</strong>.<strong> It prevents lefties from leaning out over the plate</strong></p><ul><li><strong><em>The Vulnerability</em></strong>: Lefties know Cabrera’s primary weapon against them is his 93 mph fading changeup. Because he rarely throws a breaking ball in on their hands, left-handed hitters can dive out over the plate without fearing inside movement.</li><li><strong><em>The Cutter Solution</em></strong>: A 92–94 mph cutter breaks glove-side (in on the hands of LHH). Throwing it inside forces lefties to respect the inner edge, keeping them from sitting out over the plate on his changeup.</li></ul><p><strong>B</strong>.<strong> It replaces a struggling sinker</strong></p><ul><li><strong><em>The Vulnerability</em></strong>: Cabrera’s sinker was pummeled in 2026 — and every season before that. It has never performed well against lefties (or righties, for that matter) and it should be almost entirely removed from his arsenal against LHH.</li><li><strong><em>The Cutter Solution</em></strong>: A hard cutter offers near-fastball velocity with late horizontal glove-side action. The late cut will get hitters off the barrel, inducing weak groundballs or popups rather than hard contact.</li></ul><p><strong>C</strong>. <strong>It fills the glove-side void</strong></p><ul><li><strong><em>The Vulnerability</em></strong>: Cabrera’s slider is an elite whiff pitch <strong>(44.2% whiff rate overall</strong>), but right-handed pitchers often hesitate to throw sliders to LHH due to the risk of hanging them into the batter’s power alley.</li><li><strong><em>The Cutter Solution</em></strong>: The cutter ideally is firmer than his slider and can provide a more controlled form of glove-side movement against lefties. It allows Cabrera to establish a reliable glove-side pitch against lefties without the risk of a hung slider.</li></ul><p><strong>D</strong>.<strong> Perfect velocity differential and tunneling</strong></p><ul><li><strong><em>Pitch Tunneling</em></strong>: Out of Cabrera’s hand, the cutter can look almost identical to his fastball, changeup and even sinker (If he decides to throw it against LHH).</li><li><strong><em>Movement Separation</em></strong>: While his fastball and changeup fade away from lefties, the cutter breaks sharply toward the inside corner. This opposite-direction movement creates an uncomfortable guessing game for left-handed hitters.</li></ul><p>The cutter will give Cabrera a pitch that cuts inside to lefties, neutralizing their ability to pull his fastballs or lean out on his changeup. It bridges the gap between his fastball and breaking pitches, giving him the complete east-west movement profile required to dominate left-handed hitters in 2027. Adjusting his pitch usage and expanding his arsenal will surely help, but nothing is as important as what I’m about to talk about next.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*-W3stuivfSPvB6Gn" /></figure><h4>Control The Strike Zone — Attack Early, Finish Late</h4><p>Edward Cabrera’s control issues — and his tendency to <strong>nibble around the edges rather than aggressively attack the strike zone — </strong>remain the single biggest tactical hurdle holding him back from becoming a top-of-the-rotation starter.</p><p>Throughout his career, Cabrera has carried an elevated 11.5% walk rate.<strong> When he reached his career peak in 2025</strong> with a 3.53 ERA, his breakthrough was strongly driven by cutting his walk rate down to a career-low 8.3%. In 2026, however, his walk rate rebounded to 10.3%.</p><p>In 2025, Cabrera demonstrated what happens when he adopts an aggressive, zone-first mentality:</p><ul><li><strong>First-Pitch Strike Percentage:</strong> In 25&#39;, his first-pitch strike rate reached a career-best <strong>62.7%</strong> (compared to 57.7% in 2026). Getting ahead 0–1 or 1–1 puts the hitter in a defensive position and allows Cabrera to expand the zone. Once hitters are in a defensive position Cabrera’s changeup, curveball, and slider become unhittable put-away weapons.</li></ul><h4>The Trap of “Nibbling” Around the Strike Zone</h4><p>Cabrera often pitches as if he has marginal stuff that needs to be perfectly pinpointed to get outs. In reality, the Statcast metrics prove the exact opposite:</p><ul><li><strong>Whiffs &amp; Weak Contact:</strong> Cabrera’s <strong>changeup </strong>(32.2% whiff rate), <strong>slider</strong> (44.2% whiff rate), and <strong>curveball </strong>(33.7 % whiff rate)<strong> </strong>have such extreme movement and velocity that hitters struggle to make solid contact even when the pitch is located right in the strike zone.</li><li><strong>Groundball Safety Net:</strong> Cabrera possesses a career <strong>47.2% groundball rate</strong>. He has a knack for getting groundballs. Throwing his curveball or changeup in the lower third of the strike zone gives him a much better chance of generating ground-ball contact rather than allowing damaging contact. Cabrera must shift his mindset from <strong>“avoiding contact” to “forcing contact”, </strong>even if that means his strikeout percentage goes down<strong>. </strong>With his elite arm talent, throwing a 93 mph fading changeup or an 89 mph slider in the strike zone is infinitely safer than working into 3–1 counts and being forced to throw a predictable pitch down the middle.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wZbv73au4Qn1Nrr4O-NxhQ.png" /><figcaption>Percentile Rankings for Cabrera vs LHH &amp; RHH During the 2025 Season</figcaption></figure><h4>Final Thoughts; A Roadmap to an Elite 2027 Season</h4><p>Edward Cabrera’s 2026 season was one to forget, but it doesn’t have to define his career. The talent that made him one of Miami’s most intriguing young starters is still there. He still throws hard, still generates elite whiffs, still has a deep arsenal, and still possesses the type of raw stuff that very few pitchers in baseball can match. The difference between Cabrera’s 2025 and 2026 seasons wasn’t a lack of talent. It was the deterioration of the traits that made that talent play. If Cabrera wants to have an elite 2027 season, the roadmap is relatively simple:</p><p><strong>1. Restore the arm slot.</strong><br>Getting back toward the 36–40° range should be a priority. His 2025 season provides evidence of how much better his arsenal can play when he operates from a higher slot. The goal isn’t simply to “raise the arm.” It’s to restore the movement profiles that made his fastball, curveball and changeup so effective. If he can do that by keeping the arm slot where it was this season, great. But I do want to reinstate that a 3 degree arm angle difference isn’t <strong><em>drastic</em></strong>. I’m simply taking the evidence from what the data gives us about how he performed during his best season (25&#39;), and his worst (26&#39;).</p><p><strong>2. Rebuild the arsenal around his best pitches.</strong><br>The slider should become a much bigger part of his game, while the curveball needs to return to its 2025 shape. Meanwhile, the 4-seamer and sinker should be used more selectively rather than forcing Cabrera to rely on pitches that hitters have consistently punished. He is at his best when he uses his best pitches, and keeps hitters guessing.</p><p><strong>3. Add a hard cutter (While eliminating the Sinker vs. LHH)</strong><br>As discussed previously, Against left-handed hitters, Cabrera needs something that moves the opposite direction from his changeup and fastball. A cutter would give him that pitch while also creating another layer of deception and movement separation. More sliders against lefties should accomplish the same goal, but the cutter could give him a more reliable way to attack the inner half.</p><p><strong>4. Attack the strike zone.</strong><br>This might be the most important adjustment of them all. Cabrera does not need to pitch like a pitcher with average stuff. He has elite velocity, movement and chase ability. Get ahead early, force hitters into defensive counts, and trust the stuff to finish the at-bat. The goal should be simple: <strong>attack early, finish late.</strong></p><p>Cabrera doesn’t need to reinvent himself. He needs to get back to being the pitcher he showed he could be in 2025, while adding a few new tools to make his arsenal even harder to solve.<strong> If he can stay healthy</strong>, restore his pitch shapes, build his pitch usage around his best pitches, introduce a legitimate glove-side movement pitch against lefties, and consistently attack the strike zone, the ingredients for a breakout season are already there.</p><p>The 2026 season showed us what happens when those ingredients disappear.</p><p>A healthy 2027 season should show us what happens when they come back together.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fccbaa9f669a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Grant Taylor Has Earned A Chance to Start in 2027]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Quinsight/grant-taylor-has-earned-a-chance-to-start-in-2027-46f8bd73316d?source=rss-2827923a3e18------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/46f8bd73316d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[chicago-white-sox]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pitching]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mlb]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[major-league-baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[baseball]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Quinsight]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 00:57:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-23T02:53:50.735Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*CGsbGoVmFamCHp5u" /></figure><p>Regardless of how the season ends, the Chicago White Sox will enter the offseason with an urgent need for starting pitching depth. While Grant Taylor spent much of the 2026 season delivering high-leverage bullpen production — including 10 saves in a closer/high-leverage role — his underlying metrics, repertoire depth, and draft pedigree indicate he is far more than a pure reliever.</p><p>In 2026, Taylor established himself as one of the most dynamic young arms in baseball, posting a 2.30 ERA, 2.83 FIP, 1.10 WHIP, and a 31.2% strikeout rate across 82.0 innings. With starter-grade stuff, four legitimate pitches, and experience handling multiple innings, Taylor possesses many of the ingredients necessary to make a transition into Chicago’s rotation next season.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/948/1*ho8s52vHFYkkyoocCKOxGA.png" /></figure><h4>Core Strengths: What Makes Grant Taylor Elite</h4><p>Taylor features elite raw arm strength, led by a four-seam fastball which averages 98 mph, and a sinker that averages 98.9mph. He can easily touch 100mph with both pitches. His overall pitch grades reflect high-end power across his entire arsenal, currently 98th percentile in Stuff Grade and 97th percentile in Pitching Grade this season.</p><p><strong>A True Starter’s Repertoire</strong>: Most modern relievers rely heavily on a two-pitch mix, but Taylor utilizes four distinct pitches with double-digit usage rates:</p><ul><li><strong>Four-Seam Fastball</strong> (43.8% usage, 98.1 mph): Generates high swing-and-miss rates with elite extension (7.2 ft).</li><li><strong>Curveball</strong> (27.1% usage, 83.8 mph): A hard 12–6 power downer with exceptional vertical break.</li><li><strong>Slider</strong> (16.3% usage, 89.5 mph): A hard, power lateral-breaking pitch thrown near 90 mph.</li><li><strong>Sinker</strong> (12.5% usage, 98.9 mph): Added into heavy rotation in 2026, generating a 61.5% ground-ball rateand heavy whiffs.</li><li><em>(</em><strong><em>Cutter</em></strong><em>)</em>: Thrown 16.7% of the time in 2025 at 95.2 mph, has not thrown in 2026.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-_E3npGXFDdktZyrYVfltg.jpeg" /><figcaption>A Blob that grades Grant Taylor’s Curveball as a 76.9 Grade Pitch</figcaption></figure><p><strong>His curveball is a pitch that really catches my eye. </strong>He throws it harder than most right-handed pitchers, while generating roughly 5.5 inches more drop than the average right-handed curveball. His high slot (58-degree arm angle) is one potential contributor to the pitch’s shape. Hitters are batting .164 against the pitch, with a .219 SLG and just 1 home run hit on it all season.</p><p><strong>A big strength for Taylor, is that he has a knack for getting weak contact &amp; ground-balls</strong>: Taylor induced a 48.2% ground-ball rate in 2026 while limiting damage with a .201 expected batting average (xBA). His heavy sinker and curveball keep the ball on the ground, allowing him to suppress home runs (0.77 HR/9 in 2026).</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F6PqPqNtdyHc%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D6PqPqNtdyHc&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F6PqPqNtdyHc%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/e46210c34e9dde06a3972daa7b4f5854/href">https://medium.com/media/e46210c34e9dde06a3972daa7b4f5854/href</a></iframe><h4>Pitch-Type &amp; Platoon Splits Breakdown</h4><p>A major hurdle for relievers moving to the rotation is avoiding platoon vulnerability. Taylor exhibits neutral-to-reverse splits, making him pitch-type versatile against both left-handed (LHH) and right-handed (RHH) batters.</p><p>Vs. <strong><em>RHH</em></strong> — 40.1 IP, .190 AVG, .266 OBP, .268 SLG, .534 OPS, 47Ks-to-14BBs, 1.02 WHIP (<strong>Pitch Usage</strong>; Fastball 35%, Slider 28%, Sinker 21%, Curve 15%)</p><p>Vs. <strong><em>LHH</em></strong> — 41.2 IP, .213 AVG, .285 OBP, .348 SLG, .633 OPS, 56Ks-to-16BBs, 1.18 WHIP (<strong>Pitch Usage</strong>; Fastball 52%, Curve 38%, Slider 5%, Sinker 4%)</p><p><strong>Taylor Dominates Righties — </strong>Right handed-hitters<strong> </strong>manage a meager .268 SLG and .534 OPS against Taylor. His late-running 99 mph sinker and 90 mph slider sweep away from righties, resulting in high strikeout rates and weak ground-ball contact.</p><p>He also does a good job of neutralizing Lefties — Against Left-handed hitters, Taylor relies heavily on a two-pitch mix; His fastball, which he regularly elevates high in the zone, and his 84 mph power curveball.</p><p>I think bringing back his Cutter into the mix, specifically against LHH, could help him if he transitions into a starter. He used it in 2024 primarily against LHH, and it didn’t perform well. However, he only threw it 67 times total, which is not a large enough sample size for me to completely rule the pitch out from being effective. It averaged 95.3mph (5mph harder than the average Cutter) and as a prospect, the Cutter was his <a href="https://www.mlb.com/milb/prospects/2024/whitesox/grant-taylor-691799">best graded secondary pitch</a> (60 Grade).</p><h4><strong>Weaknesses &amp; Areas for Growth</strong></h4><p>To succeed as a full-time starter, Taylor must address three main concerns:</p><ol><li><strong>Control and Walk Rates</strong>: Taylor logged a 9.1% walk rate (3.29 BB/9) in 2026 and 9.6% in 2025. Scouting reports highlight past control swelling up to 14%. Walks inflate pitch counts, which shortens outings for starters.</li><li><strong>Lack of a Traditional Offspeed/Changeup</strong>: Taylor throws his changeup less than 1% of the time (~94 mph). Navigating an MLB lineup three times through usually requires a soft off-speed pitch to disrupt timing when hitters adjust to high-velocity fastballs. Throwing the Cutter more might solve this.</li><li><strong>Hard-Hit Vulnerability</strong>: When Taylor’s four-seamer straightens out or lacks location, hitters can connect hard, reflected in a 41.8% Hard-Hit rate in 2026 (and 50.0% in 2025).</li></ol><p>Another thing to keep in mind, is his health history. Taylor underwent Tommy John surgery in 2023 while at LSU and missed three months in 2024 due to a lat strain. Scouts note effort in his high-velocity delivery, raising durability questions when scaling up to 140+ innings.</p><h4>Blueprint: Why &amp; How Taylor Transitions to SP in 2027</h4><p>So after mentioning his weaknesses, why does the transition into a starting pitcher make sense for Taylor?</p><ul><li><strong>Draft Pedigree &amp; College/MiLB History:</strong> Taylor was drafted in the 2nd round (51st overall) out of LSU as a high-upside starting pitcher. He made 5 Minor League starts in 2024 and 6 starts in Double-A in 2025.</li><li><strong>White Sox Organizational Need</strong>: With Chicago lacking established rotation anchors, converting a 24-year-old arm with 2.8 career MLB WAR into a middle- or top-of-the-rotation starter delivers exponentially more value than keeping him in a relief role.</li></ul><p><strong>How to Execute the Transition Step-by-Step</strong></p><ol><li><strong>Workload Progression in Spring Training</strong>: Taylor has logged 82.0 IP across 59 games in 2026, regularly pitching 1.1 to 2.2 innings per relief appearance. Stretching his stamina in Spring Training will allow him to target 120–140 innings in 2027.</li><li><strong>Re-Integrating the 95 mph Cutte</strong>r: Taylor’s cutter was scouted as his best secondary pitch. Re-expanding its usage alongside his sinker will give him two distinct movement profiles to get quick early-count outs and keep pitch counts low. It will also keep lefties off balance, since they won’t be able to assume that he will only throw a fastball or curveball against them.</li><li><strong>Developing Pitch Sequencing for the 3rd Time Through the Order</strong>: Rather than relying purely on max-effort velocity, Taylor can lean on his 61.5% ground-ball sinker and 12–6 curveball to generate weak contact early in games, saving his 98+ mph four-seamer for high-leverage punchouts. Possibly experimenting more with his Changeup could be beneficial as well.</li><li><strong>Refining In-Zone Delivery Command:</strong> Improving his Location+ metric (which jumped from 100 in 2025 to 110 in 2026) will reduce non-competitive pitches and lower his walk rate toward 7–8%.</li></ol><h4>Final Thoughts</h4><p>Grant Taylor has already proven he can be a dominant bullpen arm, but his arsenal and starting-pitching background make him worth exploring as a starter. His velocity, four-pitch mix, and ability to handle both right- and left-handed hitters give him a strong foundation, while his walk rate, health history, and lack of a changeup remain legitimate concerns.</p><p>The White Sox have a major need for starting pitching, and Taylor has the tools to potentially fill that need. A move to the rotation comes with risk, but given his age, stuff, and developmental history, <strong>I believe it’s a risk worth taking.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=46f8bd73316d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Walbert Ureña’s Electric Rookie Season — and What Comes Next.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Quinsight/walbert-ure%C3%B1as-electric-rookie-season-and-what-comes-next-97b0cf90430a?source=rss-2827923a3e18------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/97b0cf90430a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mlb]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pitching]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[angels]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[major-league-baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[baseball]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Quinsight]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 19 Sep 2026 06:42:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-19T06:42:25.784Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*zygpQG9YmQ5PIdNO.jpg" /></figure><p>Walbert Ureña’s rookie campaign with the Los Angeles Angels has established him as one of the most electric young starting pitchers in Major League Baseball. Over <strong>144.1 innings</strong> (28 games, 26 starts), Ureña has compiled a <strong>2.74 ERA</strong>, <strong>1.21 WHIP</strong>, <strong>140 strikeouts</strong>, a <strong>2.7 FanGraphs WAR</strong>, and a <strong>4.0 Baseball-Reference WAR</strong>. His ERA ranks second among all qualified MLB rookies, and his <strong>16 starts allowing 1 or 0 runs</strong> are the most by any pitcher age 22 or younger in a single season since Dwight Gooden in 1985. The Angels have something special on their hands and I believe he’s flying under the radar across the league.</p><p>Underlying metrics confirm that his breakout is backed by elite raw power: Ureña posted a <strong>3.28 xERA</strong>, <strong>3.53 FIP</strong>, <strong>3.91 xFIP</strong>, and an overall <strong>105 Pitching+</strong> (including a <strong>101 Stuff+</strong> and <strong>102 Location+</strong>).</p><p>What Makes Walbert Ureña So Dominant?</p><h4>1. The High-Velocity Tunneling Duo (Sinker &amp; Changeup)</h4><p>Ureña’s signature dominance stems from pairing an overpowering turbo sinker with an elite hard changeup from virtually the same release point.</p><ul><li><strong>The Turbo Sinker (32.9% usage):</strong> Averages <strong>98.1 mph</strong> (frequently touching <strong>99–101 mph</strong>) with heavy natural sinking action and armside run. It generates a <strong>55.0% groundball rate</strong>, a <strong>17.9% whiff rate</strong>, and a <strong>+2 Run Value</strong>.</li><li><strong>The Power Changeup (34.2% usage):</strong> Thrown at an astonishing <strong>90.9 mph average</strong>, features late armside fade/sink. It is Ureña’s centerpiece, and is genuinely elite: generating a <strong>38.0% whiff rate</strong>, a <strong>25.8% putaway rate</strong>, a <strong>.173 BA</strong> (.154 xBA), and a <strong>+17 Run Value</strong>. This pitch placed in the <strong>100th percentile</strong> across MLB for Offspeed Run Value.</li><li><strong>The Pitch Tunneling Effect:</strong> Because both pitches come out of his high slot (~39°–42° arm angle), batters cannot distinguish the sinker from the changeup early in flight. By the time the changeup drops or the sinker runs, batters are committed to awkward “sword” swings or weak contact.</li></ul><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FLGSqomIxob0%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DLGSqomIxob0&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FLGSqomIxob0%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/805a4633544273c8f304634473235741/href">https://medium.com/media/805a4633544273c8f304634473235741/href</a></iframe><h4>2. Raw Stuff Across the Four-Pitch Arsenal</h4><p>Beyond his primary tandem, Ureña incorporates two additional putaway offerings:</p><ul><li><strong>Four-Seam Fastball (19.0% usage):</strong> Sitting at <strong>97.9 mph</strong> (reaching <strong>100 mph</strong>), his four-seamer carries natural heavy sinking action rather than traditional ride. Hitters managed just a <strong>.202 BA</strong>(.188 xBA) against it.</li><li><strong>Sweeper / Hard Slider (13.8% usage):</strong> Thrown at <strong>87.1 mph</strong> — well above the MLB average sweeper speed of 83.6 mph — with exceptional depth. It carries Ureña’s highest individual pitch rating with a <strong>121 Stuff+</strong>, yielding a <strong>33.6% whiff rate</strong> and a <strong>.155 BA</strong> (.161 wOBA).</li></ul><h4>3. Batted-Ball Suppression &amp; Soft Contact</h4><p>Ureña avoids damage by keeping the ball out of the air:</p><ul><li><strong>Groundball Rate:</strong> <strong>55.0%</strong> (55.4% in Statcast, placing him in the <strong>95th percentile</strong> nationally).</li><li><strong>Barrel &amp; Exit Velocity Control:</strong> Holds opponents to a <strong>5.4% Barrel rate</strong> (<strong>84th percentile</strong>) and an average exit velocity of <strong>87.1 mph</strong> (<strong>84th percentile</strong>)</li></ul><h4>Platoon Breakdown: Righties vs. Lefties</h4><p>Ureña’s current profile shows a significant split between right-handed and left-handed batters:</p><p>Vs. RHH: 64.1 IP, .177 BA, .264 OBP, .264 SLG, .528 OPS, 70Ks, 22 Walks, 0.98 WHIP</p><p>Vs. LHH: 78.2 IP, .224 BA, .329 OBP, .319 SLG, .648 OPS, 70Ks, 45 Walks, 1.41 WHIP</p><ul><li><strong>Against RHH:</strong> Ureña is practically unhittable (<strong>0.98 WHIP</strong>), leveraging mainly his Sinker (40% usage), Sweeper (23%), and Changeup (22%)to lock down the outer and inner edges.</li><li><strong>Against LHH:</strong> While his hit suppression remains strong (.224 BA), <strong>command issues emerge</strong>. He’s issued <strong>45 walks in 78.2 IP to lefties</strong> compared to just 22 walks in 64.1 IP to righties. Against LHH, he relies almost exclusively on Changeups (44% usage) and Sinkers/4-Seamers, using his Sweeper only 6.8% of the time.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*yI8GSKcRpuKxzYk-.jpg" /></figure><h3>How Walbert Ureña Can Become EVEN MORE Dominant</h3><p>While Ureña already possesses top-of-the-rotation upside, targeted adjustments could elevate him into an even higher tier.</p><h4>1. Attack Early in Counts (Taming the Walk Rate)</h4><ul><li><strong>The Issue:</strong> Ureña posted an <strong>11.1% walk rate</strong> (4.18 BB/9), landing in the <strong>17th percentile</strong> for BB%. His overall first-pitch strike rate was <strong>56.7%</strong> (below the 61.2% MLB average).</li><li><strong>The Blueprint:</strong> As Ureña demonstrated in his 9-strikeout, 7-scoreless-inning start against the Twins on September 17, throwing first-pitch strikes to <strong>19 of 25 batters (76%)</strong> completely eliminated walks and forced batters into protective, weak swings early in counts. Establishing early strike-zone presence prevents hitters from sitting on out-of-zone changeups.</li></ul><h4>2. Re-Shape or Elevate the Four-Seam Fastball</h4><ul><li><strong>The Issue:</strong> Despite sitting at 98–100 mph, Ureña’s 4-seamer carried a <strong>-4 Run Value</strong> and a <strong>45.2% hard-hit rate</strong>. Because it possesses natural sink rather than riding vertical movement, throwing it low or middle in the zone plays right into bat paths.</li><li><strong>The Adjustment:</strong> Using the 100 mph 4-seamer strictly at the <strong>very top of the strike zone</strong> as a high-velocity ladder-climber will contrast sharply with his low sinker/changeup plane, increasing whiff rates on fastballs (currently just 21.2%). He could also try adjusting his fastball shape, potentially trying to get more Induced Vertical Break.</li></ul><h4>3. Expand the Arsenal vs. Lefties (Cutter or Back-Foot Breaking Ball)</h4><ul><li><strong>The Issue:</strong> Left-handed batters can eliminate Ureña’s Sweeper because it breaks into their power zone, allowing them to lay off low-and-away changeups and wait out sinkers. <strong>So what’s the adjustment?</strong></li></ul><ol><li><strong>Develop a Cutter:</strong> Ureña experimented briefly with a Cutter in 2026. Developing a firm 92–94 mph cutter to jam LHH on the hands would give him an in-zone pitch that prevents lefties from diving out over the plate.</li><li><strong>Back-Foot Sweeper / Back-Door Slider:</strong> Throwing his <strong>121 Stuff+ Sweeper</strong> to the back foot of left-handed batters or back-door over the outside edge would steal strikes and keep LHH from sitting on changeups.</li></ol><h4>4. Increase Sweeper Usage in 2-Strike Counts vs. RHH</h4><ul><li><strong>The Issue:</strong> Ureña’s Sweeper holds his highest Stuff+ (121) and a <strong>33.6% whiff rate</strong>, yet he uses it only <strong>13.8% of the time overall</strong>.</li><li><strong>The Adjustment:</strong> Increasing Sweeper usage in two-strike counts against righties (from ~23% up to 30%+) could boost his overall strikeout rate, converting more putaway opportunities.</li></ul><h3>The Bottom Line</h3><p>Walbert Ureña’s rookie season is already impressive on its own.</p><p>A <strong>2.74 ERA over 144.1 innings</strong>, 140 strikeouts, and 16 starts allowing one run or fewer at just 22 years old puts him in some pretty rare company. But what makes Ureña so intriguing isn’t just the results. It’s the combination of <strong>velocity, movement, pitch tunneling, and his ability to suppress hard contact</strong>.</p><p>A 98 mph sinker paired with a 91 mph changeup from virtually the same release point gives him a foundation that is extremely difficult for hitters to deal with. Add a 121 Stuff+ sweeper and a fastball that can reach 100 mph, and there’s no shortage of raw ability.</p><p>At the same time, Ureña isn’t a finished product.</p><p>The walk rate, particularly against left-handed hitters, gives him an obvious area to attack. Finding a reliable weapon against lefties, getting more out of his four-seam fastball, and taking advantage of his sweeper in more two-strike situations could all help push his game forward.</p><p>And that might be the most exciting part.</p><p>Ureña just put together one of the better seasons we’ve seen from a 22-year-old pitcher in recent years, and there are still clear areas where he can improve.</p><p>The Angels have something special on their hands.</p><p>Now, it’s about finding out just how good Walbert Ureña can become.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=97b0cf90430a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Brody Hopkins: The Stuff is Real]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Quinsight/brody-hopkins-the-stuff-is-real-2157d2f1d042?source=rss-2827923a3e18------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2157d2f1d042</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mlb]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tampa-bay-rays]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[major-league-baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pitching]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[baseball]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Quinsight]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2026 04:05:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-16T04:05:24.932Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*XBWyg-suvF-N9CyT.jpg" /></figure><p>Brody Hopkins, the Rays’ 7th overall prospect, finally made his much-anticipated Major League debut. Throwing one inning, Hopkins gave up one hit (a home run), 2 earned runs, 1 walk and 1 strikeout. Although the 24-year-old didn’t have the debut he would’ve liked, Hopkins showcased some elite stuff.</p><p>Let’s talk about it, but first, let’s get into his background.</p><h3>From Seattle to Tampa Bay</h3><p>Hopkins was a 6th-round pick by Seattle in 2023. Hopkins was off to a promising start in his pro career before being traded to Tampa Bay for Randy Arozarena at the 2024 Trade Deadline.</p><p>In 2025, Hopkins put up elite numbers in Double-A, making 25 starts (116 IP), putting up a 2.72 ERA, with 141 Ks-to-60 walks, and allowing just 85 hits (.204 opponent BA).</p><p>He started the 2026 season in Triple-A, where his stats looked like this:</p><p><strong>94 IP, 5.17 ERA, 122 Ks-to-92 walks, 1.71 WHIP, and 69 hits allowed (.208 opponent BA).</strong></p><p>Hopkins’ ERA spiked so high not because he was allowing more contact, but because he struggled with his command. 92 walks in 94 IP is simply not good. Yet he still showcased the elite stuff that led to his dominant 2025 season.</p><p>According to MLB.com, Hopkins has a 60-grade fastball, 60-grade curveball, 55-grade cutter, 45-grade changeup, and 40-grade control.</p><p>Although his control continues to be a sign of concern, it’s not something that scares me off, and here’s why.</p><h3>The Stuff Is Absurd</h3><p>In his Major League debut, Hopkins averaged 100.3 mph with his fastball.</p><p>He was likely amped, as he usually sits around 96–98 mph with his fastball, but what makes it so interesting, outside of how hard he throws it, is his release point. Hopkins has a low slot, throwing from a 29-degree arm angle. Despite that, he gets an absurd amount of IVB (17.1 inches), which is unusual to see from a player who has such a low arm slot. On top of that, his curveball shockingly has a large amount of depth (11.3 inches of HB and 13.3 inches of drop). It has about 3.3&quot; more drop than the average right-handed curveball.</p><p>To get that much depth, and that much rise from the arm slot he’s throwing at is simply absurd.</p><p>He also had a <strong>136 proStuff+</strong>, the highest single-game mark by an MLB reliever this season. Second and third is +115 and +112 for a full relief appearance. It’s no wonder why Hopkins had such elite strikeout numbers in the minor leagues.</p><p>He also has a cutter, which has average shape, but he throws it about 4 mph harder than the average right-handed cutter. He has yet to showcase his changeup, so I’ll be interested to see what that looks like.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FryV6xuvUUxI%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DryV6xuvUUxI&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FryV6xuvUUxI%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/2ae8fb27f3e753ab822867ab42dacf69/href">https://medium.com/media/2ae8fb27f3e753ab822867ab42dacf69/href</a></iframe><h3>The Command Question</h3><p>The biggest question surrounding Hopkins is obvious: <strong>Can he throw enough strikes?</strong></p><p>The 92 walks in 94 innings at Triple-A are impossible to overlook. His 40-grade control is also a clear indication that command is currently the weakest part of his arsenal.</p><p>But there are reasons to believe the Rays can work with it.</p><p>The Rays experimented with him throwing out of the bullpen in Triple-A this season. Since pitching out of the bullpen, he’s lived more consistently in the strike zone but still has room to improve. In nine innings over nine appearances for Durham after Aug. 15, Hopkins allowed three runs on seven hits and five walks while striking out 16 of the 39 batters he faced.</p><p>That transition to the bullpen continued in his Major League debut.</p><p>It seems like this is how the Rays are going to deploy Hopkins over the course of the rest of the season. It’s likely he’ll get an opportunity to break into the big league rotation next spring training, but right now the Rays are breaking him in slowly, which I believe will translate well with his command.</p><h3>What Comes Next?</h3><p>At 6&#39;4&quot;, 200 pounds, Hopkins is built like a workhorse, with elite athleticism. With his electric arsenal, throwing from a unique arm slot, I believe it’s only a matter of time until Hopkins is pitching atop the Rays’ starting rotation.</p><p>Hopkins reminds me of Jacob Misiorowski as a prospect: an electric fastball from a low arm slot, with 3 pitches graded above average.</p><p>I’m not saying Hopkins will develop at the same pace as Misiorowski has, who is undoubtedly a unicorn, but the stuff plays.</p><p>And if he’s able to develop even average control, Hopkins will be an exciting pitcher in Major League Baseball for years to come.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2157d2f1d042" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Best Closer in Baseball is Reportedly Available. Who Lands Him?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Quinsight/the-best-closer-in-baseball-is-reportedly-available-who-lands-him-4b9e8d4f8cfa?source=rss-2827923a3e18------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4b9e8d4f8cfa</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mlb]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[major-league-baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[san-diego-padres]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mason-miller]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Quinsight]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 24 Jul 2026 07:59:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-24T07:59:48.961Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/0*DS323NgELEoBjhvD.jpg" /></figure><p>At last year’s deadline, the Padres went all-in, sacrificing blue-chip prospect Leo De Vries to land Mason Miller. Since arriving, Miller hasn’t just been elite — he’s been historic. Boasting a 0.83 ERA with 123 strikeouts in 65 innings, he has been arguably the most dominant pitcher in baseball. But with San Diego sitting at 50–53, A.J. Preller — perhaps the most aggressive executive in baseball — could once again shock the league by flipping his biggest asset. The Padres have holes both offensively and on the pitching staff beyond Miller, and dealing one superstar for multiple impact pieces could address both problems at once while replenishing a farm system that has been thinned by years of win-now trades. As the deadline looms, which contenders have the prospect capital to pull off one of the biggest blockbuster deals in recent memory?</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FBXp2ToclsJI%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DBXp2ToclsJI&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FBXp2ToclsJI%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/cd3a0cbead15e723ec1a96022a1d2712/href">https://medium.com/media/cd3a0cbead15e723ec1a96022a1d2712/href</a></iframe><h3>Milwaukee Brewers</h3><p>The Brewers aren’t an organization known for making blockbuster moves, but this could be the rare exception. Milwaukee reached the NLCS last season and somehow continues to find ways to win, currently sitting atop a competitive NL Central. Their identity has always been built around pitching, so why not lean even further into what they do best?</p><p>The Brewers also have something they’ve rarely had in this position: one of the deepest farm systems in baseball. They boast <strong>Jesus Made</strong> (the №1 overall prospect in baseball), <strong>Luis Peña</strong> (№18), and <strong>Cooper Pratt</strong> (№53), any of whom could headline a package for Mason Miller. Even if Milwaukee is unwilling to move one of those elite names, there’s enough depth throughout the system to construct a compelling offer if A.J. Preller decides replenishing the Padres’ farm system is the direction he wants to take.</p><p>That’s the fascinating part of this scenario. For years, Preller has aggressively emptied San Diego’s farm system in pursuit of immediate contention. While those moves have produced talented rosters, they haven’t consistently translated into deep postseason success. At some point, every organization has to ask whether it’s time to reset the pipeline instead of continuing to mortgage it. Miller’s value only adds to the appeal. He isn’t scheduled to reach free agency until 2030, giving Milwaukee multiple pennant races with one of baseball’s most electric arms before ever having to think about a long-term contract they likely wouldn’t win in free agency. For a small-market club that has built a contender through elite pitching development, adding a controllable superstar like Miller could be the move that finally pushes them over the top.</p><p>Don’t expect the Brewers to dominate the headlines at the deadline — but don’t be surprised if they’re lurking behind the scenes. This feels like the type of move Milwaukee rarely makes… but one that could make perfect sense.</p><p><strong><em>Milwaukee’s Offer — Luis Pena, INF (Brewers №2 Prospect), Jett Wiliams, SS/3B/OF (№5 Prospect), Jefferson Quero, Catcher (№13 Prospect), and Logan Henderson, RHP</em></strong></p><h3>Chicago White Sox</h3><p>Who would’ve thought at the beginning of this season that the White Sox would be on a list like this? Yet here they are, sitting atop the AL Central and looking like legitimate buyers. Recent reports suggested Chicago was heavily interested in Aroldis Chapman before Boston’s incredible winning streak quickly shifted the Red Sox from sellers to contenders. That alone tells you the White Sox aren’t content with simply exceeding expectations — they’re looking to capitalize on an unexpected opportunity.</p><p>If that’s the case, why stop at Chapman when Mason Miller could be available? Miller is only 27 years old, remains under team control through 2030, and would give Chicago one of the most dominant late-inning weapons in baseball for years to come. Pairing him with <strong>Grant Taylor</strong>, who has already flashed elite, high-leverage stuff, could instantly give the White Sox arguably the most intimidating bullpen duo in baseball. Imagine trying to navigate the eighth inning against Taylor before handing the ball to Miller in the ninth.</p><p>Chicago also has one of the better farm systems in baseball, giving them the prospect capital to build a package that San Diego would have to seriously consider. The biggest question isn’t whether the White Sox can make the deal — it’s whether they believe this season is the beginning of their championship window. If they do, an aggressive move for Miller would send a clear message to the rest of the American League that Chicago isn’t just happy to be here. They’re trying to win now.</p><p><strong><em>Chicago’s Offer — Caleb Bonemer, 3B/SS (White Sox №1 Prospect), Tanner Mcdougal, RHP (№5 Prospect), Jaden Fauske, OF (№6 Prospect), and Mathias LaCombe, RHP (№14 Prospect)</em></strong></p><h3>Los Angeles Dodgers</h3><p>When a player like Mason Miller becomes available, it almost feels irresponsible not to assume the Dodgers will at least pick up the phone. Los Angeles has one of the deepest farm systems in baseball, loaded with prospects who are either Major League-ready or knocking on the door. The problem? There simply isn’t room for all of them. The Padres, meanwhile, have holes throughout their roster and could immediately benefit from that kind of young talent.</p><p>The Dodgers have also been searching for a long-term answer at closer. After signing Edwin Díaz this past offseason and Tanner Scott the year before, they’ve made it clear they value locking down the back end of games. Díaz has battled inconsistency and injuries during his first season in Los Angeles, while Scott has bounced back nicely but still isn’t in Mason Miller’s class. Quite frankly, nobody is. Imagine a postseason game where the Dodgers shorten it to seven innings because Miller is waiting in the bullpen. That’s the type of advantage that wins championships, and it’s exactly the kind of move Andrew Friedman has built his reputation on — turning organizational depth into Major League stars.</p><p>The biggest obstacle isn’t the prospect package; it’s the division. San Diego and Los Angeles have developed one of baseball’s fiercest rivalries, and trading arguably the sport’s most dominant reliever to your biggest rival is a difficult pill to swallow. But if the Dodgers present a package the Padres believe accelerates their retooling more than any other offer, A.J. Preller may have to put the rivalry aside. When elite talent becomes available, the Dodgers always seem to find themselves in the conversation — and this deadline should be no different.</p><p><strong><em>Los Angeles’ Offer — Mike Sirota, OF (Dodgers №2 Prospect), Zyhir Hope (№5 Prospect), and Christian Zazueta, RHP (№6 Prospect)</em></strong></p><h3>New York Yankees</h3><p>The Yankees find themselves in a similar position as the Dodgers. They’ve been perennial contenders for years, yet they’ve continued searching for a true lockdown closer. Enter Mason Miller in pinstripes. As New York looks to overtake Tampa Bay in the AL East, adding the most dominant reliever in baseball could be the move that shifts the balance of power. A bullpen anchored by Miller would make an already dangerous Yankees team even more intimidating come October. What separates the Yankees from many of the other teams on this list is the type of prospect capital they can offer. Every team mentioned above has talented prospects, but few organizations have developed young pitchers as consistently as New York in recent years. From homegrown contributors to arms they’ve helped unlock after acquiring them, the Yankees have built a reputation as one of baseball’s premier pitching development organizations.</p><p>If A.J. Preller decides San Diego’s next chapter is built around replenishing the farm system with high-upside arms, the Yankees may have the most appealing package of any contender. New York has both the motivation to make a blockbuster move and the pitching depth to convince the Padres it’s worth listening. If the Yankees truly believe this roster is built to win a World Series, there’s no better way to shorten a postseason game than handing the ball to Mason Miller with the lead.</p><p><strong><em>New York’s Offer — Elmer Rodriguez, RHP (Yankees №2 Prospect), Henry Lalane, LHP (№5 prospect), Spencer Jones, OF (№7 prospect), and Jasson Dominguez</em></strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4b9e8d4f8cfa" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Team Building Philosophies: Categorizing Every Organization before the MLB Draft]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Quinsight/team-building-philosophies-categorizing-every-mlb-organization-before-the-mlb-draft-a9d51a195e93?source=rss-2827923a3e18------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a9d51a195e93</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[major-league-baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[minor-league-baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mlb]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mlb-draft]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Quinsight]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 11 Jul 2026 07:32:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-14T19:16:02.733Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*rXWDGBto43J3b9Av" /></figure><p>Tomorrow marks the start of the 2026 MLB Draft, where every organization will look to add more pieces to its future. While fans often focus on <em>who</em> their team drafts, I’ve always found it just as interesting to look at <em>why</em> they draft certain types of players.</p><p><strong>Every front office has a different blueprint for building a winning baseball team</strong>. Some organizations are built around dominant pitching. Others prioritize lineups capable of changing a game with one swing. Some value contact, speed, defense, and putting constant pressure on opponents. And then there are the teams that seem determined to beat you in every phase of the game. No philosophy is necessarily right or wrong. Baseball has shown that there are multiple paths to winning a World Series.</p><p><strong>One thing to keep in mind before we begin</strong>: these categories aren’t based solely on the current major-league roster or one season’s worth of results. They’re based on the organizational direction each franchise appears to be taking through player development, drafting, trades, free agency, and overall roster construction. <strong>Some organizations, like the Braves, Brewers, and Dodgers, have spent years establishing a clear identity. Others, like the Marlins and Nationals, appear to be laying the foundation for a new one.</strong> Because of that, I’ll be considering both long-term organizational philosophies and the direction teams seem to be heading, rather than evaluating every franchise under the exact same timeline. <strong>With that in mind, I’m going to categorize every Major League organization into one of five team-building philosophies:</strong></p><ul><li><strong>Offense First (Power)</strong></li><li><strong>Offense First (Contact &amp; Speed / Small Ball)</strong></li><li><strong>Pitching First</strong></li><li><strong>Balanced</strong></li><li><strong>Still Finding Their Identity</strong></li></ul><p>I’m sure you’ve already started placing teams into categories in your head. Let’s see if we agree.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*BgFkuTRSGN12PIED.jpg" /></figure><h3>Offense-First Teams (Power)</h3><ul><li><strong>New York Yankees</strong></li><li><strong>Philadelphia Phillies</strong></li><li><strong>Atlanta Braves</strong></li><li><strong>Washington Nationals</strong></li><li><strong>Baltimore Orioles</strong></li><li><strong>Athletics</strong></li></ul><p><strong>When it comes to organizational philosophies, these teams tend to build around power and home runs, rather than small-ball or having pitching at the forefront. </strong>Their offensive identity begins with hitters capable of changing a game with one swing. <strong>The New York Yankees</strong> were one of the harder teams for me to categorize, as I seriously considered placing them under the balanced category. They’ve done a really nice job developing pitching. Cam Schlittler, Will Warren, Luis Gil, and Michael King are all examples of pitchers who developed through the Yankees’ farm system and have produced at the major-league level. However, because they’ve also relied on signing established starters like Gerrit Cole, Carlos Rodón, and Max Fried to anchor the rotation, I decided there wasn’t enough evidence to consider them balanced. This is still a team built on power. Aaron Judge, Ben Rice, Giancarlo Stanton, Cody Bellinger, Trent Grisham, Jazz Chisholm Jr., and even Paul Goldschmidt are all capable sluggers. Spencer Jones could soon add another power bat to that group.</p><p>I view the <strong>Philadelphia Phillies</strong> in a similar way as the Yankees. While they’ve consistently fielded quality pitching staffs, the identity of the organization is driven by a lineup capable of overwhelming opponents with power.</p><p><strong>No organization better represents the modern power-first philosophy than the Atlanta Braves.</strong> The 2023 Braves produced one of the greatest offensive seasons in baseball history, tying the MLB record with <strong>307 home runs</strong> while posting the highest team slugging percentage ever. Built around stars like Ronald Acuña Jr., Matt Olson, Austin Riley, and Marcell Ozuna, Atlanta has consistently prioritized hitters capable of changing games with one swing.</p><p><strong>The Athletics</strong> were one of the harder teams to evaluate. They’ve developed hitters at a higher rate than pitchers, although not at the same level as some of the other organizations in this category. They continue making progress on both sides of the ball, but the pitching still has plenty of room to grow, which is why I ultimately placed them here rather than under balanced. They do, however, have a bright future offensively. Nick Kurtz, Shea Langeliers, and Tyler Soderstrom give the Athletics a promising young core of sluggers. Brent Rooker should find his footing soon, while Zack Gelof has impressed this season with an <strong>.803 OPS</strong>.</p><p>The <strong>Washington Nationals</strong> and <strong>Baltimore Orioles</strong> appear to be following a similar blueprint, although they’re at different stages of the process.</p><p>The Nationals seem to be laying the foundation for a power-first philosophy. Surprisingly, they currently rank <strong>2nd in Major League Baseball in home runs, 3rd in OPS, and 1st in RBIs. </strong>One thing that makes the <strong>Nationals, and also the Yankees, </strong>stand out from the rest of this group is that both teams currently rank inside the <strong>top three in stolen bases</strong>. Power is dangerous. Speed is dangerous. Having both makes an offense incredibly difficult to defend.</p><p>Every team in this category currently ranks inside the <strong>top 10 in home runs</strong>, with the Orioles being the lone exception at <strong>15th</strong>.</p><p>The <strong>Orioles</strong> have built and developed a young core around power hitters such as Samuel Basallo, Gunnar Henderson, Coby Mayo, Colton Cowser, and Adley Rutschman (I still believe he has a 30-home-run season in him). They’ve also reinforced that philosophy by adding proven power bats through trades and free agency, including Pete Alonso, Tyler O’Neill, and Taylor Ward. Ward hit 36 home runs last season but has just five so far this year. I’d expect that number to climb as the season progresses, which should help move the Orioles further up the team home run rankings.</p><p>One thing you’ll notice about the <strong>Braves, Orioles, and Nationals</strong> is that their offensive development has progressed faster than their pitching development. The <strong>Braves</strong>, <strong>however, appear to be trending in the right direction. Young</strong> pitchers like AJ Smith-Shawver, Hurston Waldrep, Didier Fuentes, and JR Ritchie have given Atlanta reason to believe its pitching pipeline is catching up to its offense.</p><p><strong>Another interesting trend I’ve noticed is that organizations built around offensive power also seem to prioritize power on the mound</strong>. While it isn’t true across the board, many of these clubs appear to value pitchers with premium velocity and explosive raw stuff, much like they target hitters with elite bat speed and power potential. It’s not necessarily a direct correlation, but it does suggest a shared organizational preference for acquiring elite physical tools on both sides of the baseball.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/0*TvUz2uhQNefQxbcU.jpg" /></figure><h3>Offense-First (Contact &amp; Speed, Small Ball)</h3><ul><li><strong>Tampa Bay Rays</strong></li><li><strong>Miami Marlins</strong></li><li><strong>Kansas City Royals</strong></li></ul><p>There are a couple of reasons why there are only three teams in this category.</p><p><strong>The first is simple: in today’s game, where so many organizations prioritize power, it’s become increasingly rare to build an offense around contact, speed, and small-ball. Ironically, that’s part of what makes it so effective</strong>. When you face a team that constantly puts the ball in play, takes extra bases, bunts when necessary, and forces your defense to execute every pitch, it creates a different kind of pressure. Most teams simply aren’t built to defend that style of baseball on a nightly basis.</p><p><strong>The second reason</strong> is that many of the organizations in the next category — <strong>Pitching First</strong> — also embrace many of these same offensive principles. The difference is that those teams have developed pitching so well that I believe it would be a disservice to categorize them anywhere else.</p><p><strong>The Tampa Bay Rays</strong> were the only team in this category that I seriously considered placing under Balanced. They’ve become one of baseball’s premier pitching development organizations, and that’s impossible to ignore. But they also play a different brand of offense than almost everyone else. This is a team built on aggression, contact, speed, and versatility. The Rays currently rank <strong>3rd in team batting average, 5th in OBP, 6th in stolen bases, and 1st in caught stealing. </strong>Their roster is filled with players capable of moving around the diamond, putting the ball in play, and creating pressure without relying solely on the home run.</p><p><strong>The Miami Marlins</strong> seem to have found a new identity.</p><p>They’re one of baseball’s biggest breakout teams this season, and a major reason why has been their commitment to contact and speed. The Marlins currently rank <strong>7th in batting average, 6th in OBP, 7th in doubles, 1st in triples, 2nd in stolen bases, 2nd in caught stealing, and just 23rd in home runs. </strong>It’s pretty clear what they’re building. Miami is another organization that has developed pitching well relative to the rest of the league. If I were writing this article a year ago, I probably would’ve categorized them as Pitching First. But because so much of their breakout has been driven by an offense that finally seems to have found its own identity, I think they belong here.</p><p><strong>Then there’s the Kansas City Royals</strong>, who follow a very similar blueprint to Miami, although they haven’t executed it quite as efficiently in many of the offensive categories mentioned above this season. Even so, Kansas City continues to emphasize athleticism, putting the ball in play, and creating offense with pressure rather than pure slugging.</p><p><strong>One thing I really like about the small-ball philosophy is that it allows organizations to build competitive offenses without relying on expensive middle-of-the-order power bats</strong>. As I mentioned above, many of these teams have also developed strong pitching departments, and I don’t think that’s a coincidence. By building an offense around contact, speed, and versatility, organizations can devote more resources to developing pitching and creating a more complete roster.</p><p><strong>In a league where nearly everyone is chasing power, building a team that wins with contact and speed can become an advantage simply because it’s different.</strong> Sometimes the best way to gain an edge isn’t by following the trend — it’s by forcing everyone else to play your style of baseball.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*-ZdPqhgTFwhZALjd.jpg" /></figure><h3>Pitching First</h3><ul><li><strong>Detroit Tigers</strong></li><li><strong>Cleveland Guardians</strong></li><li><strong>Milwaukee Brewers</strong></li><li><strong>Seattle Mariners</strong></li><li><strong>Pittsburgh Pirates</strong></li><li><strong>Cincinnati Reds</strong></li></ul><p>One thing you’ll notice almost immediately is that these are all competitive organizations. You’ll also notice that several of these organizations don’t spend like the Yankees, Dodgers, or Mets. That’s not a coincidence. <strong>Developing pitching internally is one of the most cost-effective ways to build a contender, and these organizations have turned it into a competitive advantage</strong>.</p><p>The <strong>Detroit Tigers </strong>are a good example of this<strong>. </strong>They’ve been one of the more competitive teams in baseball over the last couple of years. Currently sitting at <strong>44–50</strong>, they have undoubtedly been disappointing this season, but I still believe they’ll find their footing. Their pitching certainly hasn’t been the problem, ranking <strong>6th in ERA, 6th in WHIP, and 7th in batting average against.</strong></p><p>The <strong>Milwaukee Brewers</strong>, <strong>Cleveland Guardians</strong>, and <strong>Seattle Mariners</strong> have especially excelled in this department.</p><p><strong>The Brewers</strong> might be the gold standard for pitching development. Every season it feels like another young arm emerges into their rotation, and whenever they acquire a pitcher through a trade, that pitcher almost always seems to take a step forward. Take <strong>Kyle Harrison</strong>, for example. Harrison struggled early in his career, and after once being viewed as one of baseball’s top pitching prospects, his value had begun to slip. Milwaukee acquired him anyway, and this season he’s posted a <strong>3.01 ERA across 83.2 innings.</strong></p><p>That’s not an isolated success story — it’s become the Brewers’ identity.</p><p>Their player development has helped produce the <strong>best ERA in Major League Baseball</strong>, while also ranking <strong>2nd in strikeouts, 2nd in batting average against, and 2nd in WHIP.</strong></p><p><strong>The Cleveland Guardians</strong> aren’t far behind.</p><p>Cleveland’s pitching lab has quietly become one of the best in baseball. They’ve won the <strong>AL Central in back-to-back seasons</strong> and are looking to make it three straight this year. <strong>The Brewers and Guardians actually share a lot in common</strong>. As I mentioned in the previous category, both organizations are built around pitching while still embracing many elements of small-ball. Rather than trying to outslug everyone, they’re content winning the margin game — scoring enough runs, manufacturing an extra run whenever possible, and trusting their pitching staff to do the rest.</p><p>Their philosophy isn’t “hit five home runs.”</p><p>It’s “make every inning uncomfortable.”</p><p><strong>Then there’s the Seattle Mariners, who might actually have the strongest argument of anyone for being baseball’s premier pitching development organization</strong>. Seattle hasn’t had a losing season since the shortened 2020 campaign, and pitching development has been the biggest reason why. Bryan Woo, Bryce Miller, Emerson Hancock, Logan Gilbert, and George Kirby headline one of the youngest and most talented rotations in baseball. The Mariners almost seem to be a step ahead of the rest of the league when it comes to developing frontline starting pitching, particularly pitchers with elite stuff.</p><p>Then there are the <strong>Pittsburgh Pirates</strong> and <strong>Cincinnati Reds</strong>, two division rivals that have quietly built very similar organizations. Both teams have developed an impressive collection of young pitching over the last several seasons and appear committed to building from the mound outward. The Pirates have started separating themselves offensively, however, after making significant improvements this season. Would you have guessed Pittsburgh ranks <strong>2nd in OPS, 2nd in OBP, 2nd in batting average, and 2nd in RBIs?</strong> I certainly wouldn’t have. If that offensive production continues alongside their pitching development, Pittsburgh could become one of the more complete teams in the National League.</p><p><strong>The Reds aren’t far behind</strong>. If they can continue producing quality pitching while taking the next step offensively, I wouldn’t be surprised to see both the Pirates and Reds competing for an <strong>NL Central title as early as next season.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*6xL93gK4qvIt6kJ-.jpg" /></figure><h3>Balanced Teams</h3><ul><li><strong>Los Angeles Dodgers</strong></li><li><strong>New York Mets</strong></li><li><strong>Texas Rangers</strong></li><li><strong>Arizona Diamondbacks</strong></li><li><strong>Toronto Blue Jays</strong></li><li><strong>Minnesota Twins</strong></li><li><strong>Houston Astros</strong></li><li><strong>Boston Red Sox</strong></li><li><strong>Chicago Cubs</strong></li><li><strong>San Diego Padres</strong></li><li><strong>St. Louis Cardinals</strong></li></ul><p>When it comes to balanced organizations, these are the teams that seem capable of doing just about everything well. <strong>They don’t rely on one specific philosophy. Instead, they consistently develop talent across the board — </strong>whether that’s power hitters, contact hitters, starting pitchers, relievers, defenders, or versatile athletes.</p><p>One thing you’ll notice is that many of the larger-market organizations fall into this category. A bigger payroll certainly helps. Teams like the <strong>Dodgers, Cubs, Red Sox, Blue Jays, Mets, Rangers, and Padres</strong> have the financial flexibility to fill holes through free agency while also maintaining strong farm systems capable of producing talent or acquiring established stars through trades. But it isn’t just big-market organizations. Balanced teams tend to be adaptable. Rather than forcing one organizational philosophy, they adjust based on the players they have and the opportunities available to them.</p><p><strong>The Los Angeles Dodgers</strong> may be the closest thing baseball has to the perfect organization. They draft and develop power hitters, contact hitters, frontline starters, relievers, defenders, and versatile athletes. On top of that, they consistently maximize value in trades and player development. Their philosophy isn’t centered around one strength — it’s centered around having no weaknesses.</p><p>The <strong>Boston Red Sox</strong>, under Craig Breslow, have recently placed a greater emphasis on pitching in the draft. Even so, their overall roster-building philosophy still feels balanced. They continue developing position players while strengthening what had become a weakness on the pitching side.</p><p>The <strong>New York Mets</strong>, currently sitting at <strong>40–55</strong>, have been one of baseball’s biggest disappointments this season. At first glance, it’s fair to question whether they belong in this category because the major-league roster has holes throughout. However, I still view them as a balanced organization. They consistently maintain one of baseball’s stronger farm systems, and with David Stearns leading the front office, this feels much more like a retool than the beginning of a lengthy rebuild.</p><p>The <strong>Arizona Diamondbacks</strong> have leaned more heavily toward pitching in recent years, but I still believe they’re one of the more complete organizations in baseball. They are sort of in a retooling phase right now, opposed to a full rebuild.</p><p>The <strong>Houston Astros</strong> built a legacy team that won two World Series championships and reached the ALCS in seven consecutive seasons — one of the most dominant stretches of sustained success in modern MLB history. Although the organization is now entering more of a retooling stage, it’s impressive that Houston has remained competitive without undergoing a complete reset. I strongly considered placing the Astros under <strong>Offense First (Power)</strong> because so much of their recent success has been driven by a lineup capable of producing damage throughout the order. However, the organization has generally developed and acquired talent at a strong rate on both sides of the ball. The pitching has taken a step backward over the last few seasons, but Houston’s overall approach still feels balanced. Rather than completely committing to one strength, the Astros have consistently found ways to address weaknesses and extend their competitive window.</p><p>The <strong>Minnesota Twins</strong> have been better than expected this season, largely because of an offense that’s exceeded expectations. While they appear to be navigating some form of a retool rather than a full rebuild — they still have cornerstone players like Byron Buxton, Joe Ryan, and Pablo López — they’ve continued to build a well-rounded organization instead of leaning heavily into one specific philosophy. The <strong>St. Louis Cardinals</strong> find themselves in a similar position. They may not have the same level of established star power as Minnesota, but they arguably possess a deeper collection of young talent, led by JJ Wetherholt and Jordan Walker. Like the Twins, the Cardinals have continued taking a balanced approach to roster construction, developing talent across the board rather than building around one defining strength.</p><p>One trend I noticed while putting this list together is that several of these balanced organizations also prioritize defense. The <strong>Cubs, Dodgers, Diamondbacks, Padres, Blue Jays, and Red Sox</strong> all rank among the <strong>top eight defensive teams in baseball</strong> this season.</p><p>I don’t think that’s a coincidence.</p><p><strong>Balanced organizations understand that winning isn’t just about scoring runs or preventing them. It’s about minimizing weaknesses. </strong>They want to beat you with power, contact, pitching, defense, baserunning, or versatility — whatever the game calls for that night. In my opinion, that’s what separates a balanced organization from every other philosophy. They aren’t trying to be the best at one thing.</p><p>They’re trying to avoid being bad at anything.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*3AOqNdot6rza05sH.jpg" /></figure><h3>Still Finding Their Identity</h3><ul><li><strong>Colorado Rockies</strong></li><li><strong>Chicago White Sox</strong></li><li><strong>Los Angeles Angels</strong></li><li><strong>San Francisco Giants</strong></li></ul><p>Not every organization fits neatly into one of the four philosophies above.</p><p><strong>These teams are still searching for a clear organizational identity. Some are rebuilding. </strong>Others are retooling. Some simply haven’t developed enough strengths in one particular area to establish a recognizable philosophy.</p><p><strong>The Chicago White Sox</strong> are the biggest exception in this category.</p><p>They’ve been one of baseball’s most surprising breakout teams this season. Sitting at <strong>48–45</strong>, they’re leading the AL Central and have positioned themselves to become buyers at the trade deadline. Almost everything has gone right. Their young players — <strong>Colson Montgomery, Sam Antonacci, Miguel Vargas, and Chase Meidroth</strong> — have taken major steps forward. The pitching has improved, even if it still has room to grow, and offseason addition <strong>Munetaka Murakami </strong>has exceeded expectations with a <strong>.931 OPS</strong>. The White Sox also continue to boast one of baseball’s strongest farm systems, particularly on the pitching side. With several high-end pitching prospects still on the way, I could easily see Chicago evolving into one of the league’s more balanced organizations over the next few seasons.</p><p><strong>The Colorado Rockies</strong> have been searching for answers for quite some time.</p><p><strong>Despite playing in arguably the most hitter-friendly ballpark in baseball, they haven’t consistently developed impact hitters in recent years, while pitching continues to be the organization’s biggest obstacle</strong>. Because of the Coors Field effect, developing pitchers has always been one of baseball’s toughest challenges.<strong> To Colorado’s credit, they’ve begun experimenting with different approaches.</strong> One noticeable example is their increased emphasis on velocity throughout the minor leagues, where they now rank among the league leaders in average fastball velocity. Whether that approach ultimately works remains to be seen, but it’s clear the Rockies recognize that something has to change if they’re going to climb out of the National League cellar.</p><p><strong>The San Francisco Giants</strong> and <strong>Los Angeles Angels</strong> find themselves in similar situations. Both organizations entered this season under new managers and are still trying to establish a long-term direction. They have talented players throughout their organizations, but neither roster currently excels enough in one particular area to establish a clear identity.</p><p>That’s why I ultimately placed them here.</p><p>Every successful organization eventually develops a philosophy — something it consistently does better than everyone else. Whether that’s power, pitching, contact, or balance, having an identity matters.</p><p>Right now, these four organizations are still figuring out exactly what that identity will be.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Tomorrow night, dozens of young players will hear their names called in the 2026 MLB Draft. Every organization will celebrate the newest addition to its farm system, but what happens after that announcement is just as important as the pick itself.</p><p>Player development.</p><p>Organizational philosophy.</p><p>Identity.</p><p><strong>There’s no single blueprint for building a World Series Champion.</strong></p><p>The <strong>Guardians</strong> continue proving you can win with contact, small-ball, and elite pitching development. The <strong>Yankees </strong>chase power. The <strong>Mariners</strong> continue producing frontline starting pitchers seemingly every season. The <strong>Brewers</strong> have built a reputation for turning overlooked arms into major contributors. The <strong>Cubs</strong> focus on run prevention and playing strong defense. And then there are the <strong>Dodgers</strong>, who somehow seem capable of doing all of it.</p><p><strong>None of these philosophies are inherently better than another.</strong></p><p>What separates great organizations isn’t whether they prioritize power, pitching, contact, or balance. It’s that they know exactly who they are. Their scouting departments, player development staffs, free-agent signings, and trade decisions all work toward the same vision. That’s why organizations like the Dodgers, Brewers, Guardians, Mariners, and Rays remain competitive year after year, even as their rosters change. Players come and go, but the philosophy stays the same. On the flip side, organizations that struggle often aren’t lacking talent — they’re still searching for an identity. Until they establish one, every offseason feels like starting over.</p><p>The 2026 MLB Draft will undoubtedly produce future All-Stars, Cy Young winners, MVPs, and perhaps even Hall of Famers. But more importantly, it’ll provide another glimpse into how each front office views the game of baseball.</p><p><strong>Because every draft pick tells a story.</strong></p><p>Not just about the player.</p><p><strong>But about the organization making the selection.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a9d51a195e93" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How Batting Average Became Baseball’s Most Underrated Statistic]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Quinsight/how-batting-average-became-baseballs-most-underrated-statistic-bc4eed0871da?source=rss-2827923a3e18------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bc4eed0871da</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mlb]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[minor-league-baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[major-league-baseball]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[chicago-cubs]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Quinsight]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 03:01:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-10T08:31:39.811Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*48R-4wDpDW3XMJvL.png" /></figure><p>For the majority of baseball history, batting average was considered one of the defining statistics for a hitter. <strong>A .300 season meant something</strong>. It separated the game’s elite contact hitters from everyone else. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, seeing 20 or more qualified hitters finish above .300 wasn’t unusual. Today, there are seasons where only a handful accomplish the feat.</p><h4>Number of Qualified .300 hitters by season</h4><p><em>1999–55</em></p><p><em>2000–52</em></p><p><em>2005–33</em></p><p><em>2010–23</em></p><p><em>2018–16</em></p><p><em>2022–11</em></p><p><em>2025–7</em></p><p>That should make us stop and think. Scarcity creates value. If dozens of players can slug .500 but almost nobody can consistently hit .300, maybe we’ve started overlooking one of baseball’s most difficult skills.<strong> I’m not arguing that batting average is more important than on-base percentage or slugging percentage.</strong> Modern analytics have proven the importance of both. But somewhere along the way, I think many people misinterpreted the message. Analytics never said batting average doesn’t matter.</p><p>They said <strong>on-base percentage matters more than batting average.</strong></p><p>Those are two completely different statements.</p><p>A hitter with a .300 average is almost always a valuable offensive player. Likewise, a hitter with a lower average but a .380+ OBP is usually an outstanding offensive contributor. Both skills deserve recognition. The problem in today&#39;s game is that as organizations have increasingly prioritized power, hitters have become more willing to trade contact for slugging. <strong>The result has been a historic rise in strikeouts and a steady decline in batting average</strong>. That has made players capable of consistently batting .300 significantly rarer — and arguably more valuable.</p><p>Speaking of the rise in strikeouts, striking out eliminates any possibility of something positive happening. There can’t be an infield hit. There can’t be a bad hop. There can’t be a throwing error. There can’t be a productive ground ball or sacrifice fly. High-average hitters create opportunities by forcing throws, difficult plays, rushed decisions, and defensive mistakes. Every ball in play introduces uncertainty.</p><p><strong>It’s also important to acknowledge that part of the reason strikeout rates have climbed and batting averages have declined is because pitching has never been better.</strong> Velocity is higher than ever. Breaking balls are nastier. Pitchers have access to elite biomechanics, data, pitch design, and scouting reports. Hitting for average against today’s pitching environment is considerably harder than it was twenty years ago. That makes consistent contact an increasingly valuable skill.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FfxTZituJUaY%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DfxTZituJUaY&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FfxTZituJUaY%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/0907bf5e0ce9d6082b1c2e5cf476f51e/href">https://medium.com/media/0907bf5e0ce9d6082b1c2e5cf476f51e/href</a></iframe><h4>Correlation between Batting Average &amp; Strikeout Percentage</h4><p><em>Understanding why batting average has become more undervalued is only half the story. The next question is why it’s still so valuable.</em></p><p>There is a strong correlation between a high batting average and a low strikeout percentage. It’s not a perfect relationship — batting average also depends on line-drive rate, quality of contact, speed, and BABIP — but strikeout rate remains one of its strongest predictors. Take Yandy Díaz, who currently ranks second in baseball in batting average (.326 BA) and does it while striking out just 13.8% of the time (87th percentile in MLB). Díaz combines his elite bat-to-ball skills with surprisingly good power, making him somewhat of a unicorn. As I’ve mentioned, his strikeout rate sits among the best in baseball, while his whiff rate (14.9%, 94th percentile) is even more impressive.</p><p>For fun, let’s compare him to Kyle Schwarber.</p><p>Schwarber is one of baseball’s premier power hitters and, over the course of an entire season, you could certainly argue he’s the more valuable player. His ability to change a game with one swing is undeniable. But baseball isn’t played only over 162 games. It’s played one situation at a time.</p><p>Tie game. Bottom of the ninth. Runner on third. One out.</p><p><strong>Who would you rather have hitting?</strong></p><p>The player who strikes out over 30% of the time but might hit a home run? Or the hitter who consistently puts the baseball in play, giving his team multiple ways to score the winning run? A line drive wins the game. A sacrifice fly wins it. A ground ball to the right side advances the runner. A bloop single ends it. Batting average doesn’t just increase the likelihood of a hit — it increases the likelihood of <strong>something productive </strong>happening. Players like Nico Hoerner, Steven Kwan, Luis Arraez, and Yandy Díaz have built successful careers by doing exactly that.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F92_j6f-4qu4%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D92_j6f-4qu4&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F92_j6f-4qu4%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/20f019a89035902eb25add40761f7e93/href">https://medium.com/media/20f019a89035902eb25add40761f7e93/href</a></iframe><h4>Correlation between Batting Average &amp; Batting Average with RISP</h4><p><em>So if contact hitters are more likely to avoid strikeouts, it raises another question: Does that success carry over into high-leverage situations?</em></p><p>This brings me to the correlation between batting average and hitting with runners in scoring position. Once again, let’s take Yandy Díaz. He currently leads Major League Baseball with a <strong>.455 batting average with runners in scoring position (30-for-66)</strong>. Given his elite bat-to-ball skills, that shouldn’t come as much of a surprise.</p><p>But Díaz isn’t the only example.</p><p>Let’s look at last season, where we have a much larger sample size.</p><p>The 2025 MLB leader in batting average with runners in scoring position was <strong>Bo Bichette</strong>, a <strong>.290 career hitter</strong>, who posted a remarkable <strong>.381 average with RISP</strong>. Second was <strong>Nico Hoerner</strong>, a <strong>.277 career hitter</strong>, at <strong>.371</strong>. Hoerner has built his career on elite contact ability, rarely striking out and consistently putting the baseball in play. Tied with Hoerner at <strong>.371</strong> was <strong>Jacob Wilson</strong>, another pure contact hitter who owns a <strong>.293 career batting average</strong>. <strong>Brice Turang</strong> hit a career-best <strong>.288</strong> in 2025 while also coincidentally posting a career-best <strong>.368 average with runners in scoring position</strong>. <strong>Xavier Edwards</strong>, a <strong>.299 career hitter</strong>, ranked sixth with a <strong>.356 average with RISP in 2025. </strong>And <strong>Steven Kwan</strong>, another hitter known for elite bat-to-ball skills and one of the lowest strikeout rates in baseball, finished <strong>11th</strong>. At some point, this stops looking like coincidence.</p><p>The hitters who consistently produce high batting averages also tend to be the hitters who excel with runners in scoring position. That makes sense. Players who frequently put the baseball in play simply create more opportunities to drive in runs. And at the end of the day, what’s more important than scoring runs?</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2Fm73J1q4JSXk%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3Dm73J1q4JSXk&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2Fm73J1q4JSXk%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/94add6d3c954426e6d00b22bb547bd2a/href">https://medium.com/media/94add6d3c954426e6d00b22bb547bd2a/href</a></iframe><h4>Runs aren’t created only by slugging.</h4><p>Ultimately, all of this points to one simple truth: runs aren’t created only by slugging. Home runs dominate highlight reels, and have for decades. But rallies are usually built differently. They’re built through singles.</p><p>Doubles.</p><p>Moving runners.</p><p>Avoiding strikeouts.</p><p>Extending innings.</p><p>Months ago, I heard Cubs commentator Jim Deshaies say that home runs can actually be momentum killers. Not because they aren’t valuable — they absolutely are — but because they immediately clear the bases. A string of singles and doubles keeps constant pressure on the defense. Pitchers have to work from the stretch. Infielders rush throws. Defenders begin anticipating the next ball in play.</p><p>Anyone who’s watched baseball long enough has probably heard broadcasters and coaches describe that exact feeling.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*QagRYOeI7extw6lq.jpg" /><figcaption>Nico Hoerner; Chicago Cubs</figcaption></figure><h4>Then there’s October.</h4><p>The postseason is where contact often becomes even more valuable.</p><p>Elite pitching suppresses home runs.</p><p>Strikeouts increase.</p><p>One run frequently decides entire series.</p><p>Winning teams suddenly need opposite-field singles, two-strike adjustments, productive outs, and situational hitting. Nearly every playoff team features multiple frontline starters capable of neutralizing power for a night. When facing the best pitchers in the world, simply putting the baseball in play becomes an enormous advantage.</p><p><strong>To be clear, this isn’t an argument against analytics or against power hitting.</strong></p><p>It’s an argument that batting average has become undervalued because it measures one of baseball’s hardest skills: consistently putting the bat on the baseball. That skill contributes to run scoring in ways traditional power metrics don’t always capture. There are situations — especially with runners in scoring position and fewer than two outs — where a hitter who consistently makes quality contact may provide just as much value, or even more, than a player whose value comes primarily from home runs.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F5iol1I0K4yw%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D5iol1I0K4yw&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Ffd.xuwubk.eu.org%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F5iol1I0K4yw%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/18ef9d2f103f9bf662b2b5ef97887f72/href">https://medium.com/media/18ef9d2f103f9bf662b2b5ef97887f72/href</a></iframe><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>Recently I read a tweet from Trevor Bauer, in which he discussed what makes an ace pitcher. His point was simple: you don’t need to be elite at everything. You need one truly elite skill. He used Shane Bieber as an example — a pitcher who wasn’t known for overwhelming stuff or velocity, but possessed elite command. That one exceptional tool helped him win a CY Young Award. Why shouldn’t we view hitters the same way?</p><p>If command alone can make a pitcher elite, why can’t elite bat-to-ball ability and the rare ability to hit .300 consistently make a hitter just as special?</p><p>After all, we’ve already seen the evidence. High-average hitters tend to strike out less. They consistently perform with runners in scoring position. They create longer rallies, apply more pressure to opposing defenses, and often become even more valuable when the postseason arrives and every run matters.<strong> None of that means batting average is the most important offensive statistic.</strong> It isn’t. <strong>But somewhere along the way, it feels like we’ve gone from overvaluing batting average to undervaluing it</strong>.</p><p>Maybe the pendulum has swung too far.</p><p>Maybe we’ve spent so much time appreciating power that we’ve forgotten just how difficult — and valuable — it is to simply get a hit.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bc4eed0871da" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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