<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by @DFRLab on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by @DFRLab on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@DFRLab?source=rss-105bc7078bae------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 02:14:37 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@DFRLab/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The DFRLab has a new home: Visit DFRLab.org]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/dfrlab/the-dfrlab-has-a-new-home-visit-dfrlab-org-dfa1fb48f127?source=rss-105bc7078bae------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dfa1fb48f127</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[@DFRLab]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 05 Feb 2025 21:33:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-02-05T21:33:02.157Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) has officially moved! Our work — investigating disinformation, documenting influence operations, and analyzing digital authoritarianism — now lives at <a href="https://dfrlab.org/">DFRLab.org</a>.</p><p>For years, we’ve shared our research on Medium, but to better serve our community, we’ve launched a dedicated platform where we will regularly publish our latest findings, reports, and event updates.</p><p><strong>What This Means for You</strong></p><ul><li><strong>No new content will be published here</strong> on Medium.</li><li>You can now find <strong>all our latest research, analysis, and event coverage</strong> on DFRLab.org.</li><li>Want updates straight to your inbox? Subscribe to our newsletter, <a href="https://dfrlab.org/about/">The Source</a>, for the latest on global information ecosystems.</li><li><a href="https://linkin.bio/dfrlab">Follow us</a> for real-time updates and insights.</li></ul><p>Thank you for following our work. We hope to see you over at DFRLab.org!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dfa1fb48f127" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/the-dfrlab-has-a-new-home-visit-dfrlab-org-dfa1fb48f127">The DFRLab has a new home: Visit DFRLab.org</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab">DFRLab</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Russia builds a “special information operation” around Transnistria]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/dfrlab/russia-builds-a-special-information-operation-around-transnistria-bcc61fb06778?source=rss-105bc7078bae------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bcc61fb06778</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[transnistria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[disinformation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[moldova]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[@DFRLab]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 Mar 2023 11:02:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-03-21T11:02:16.140Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Rhetoric increasingly pushes idea of military conflict in the separatist region of Moldova</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*8Y0gMaqUcyjWLYp_.jpg" /><figcaption><em>A Russian serviceman walks past the Operational Group of Russian Forces headquarters in Tiraspol, in Moldova’s self-proclaimed separatist Transnistria, November 3, 2021. The banner reads “Army of Russia.” (Source: REUTERS/Gleb Garanich)</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>By Victoria Olari</em></strong></p><p>Intent on sowing discord in Moldova and providing a supposed rationale for intervention, the Kremlin is flooding the country’s information space with narratives designed to undermine support for its pro-Western government.</p><p>Russia has intentionally heightened the level of tension in the region by pushing alarmist narratives, spreading messages across multiple platforms, and using state media as amplifiers. As part of this information operation, Kremlin-affiliated Telegram channels created false alarms, disseminated forged documents, and misinterpreted facts.</p><p>The Republic of Moldova has been in a precarious situation as a collateral victim of Russia’s war against Ukraine since that conflict’s inception. An estimated 405 kilometers of Moldova’s 1,222-kilometer shared border with Ukraine are under the control of separatist authorities in Transnistria, where the Russian Federation maintains a force of 1,500 soldiers. In the spring of 2022, early in Russia’s Ukraine invasion, Russian Major General Rustam Minnekaev openly <a href="https://www.interfax.ru/world/837353">admitted</a> that one of the goals of Moscow’s “special military operation” was the creation of a land corridor to Transnistria.</p><p>Besides a Soviet past, Moldova and Ukraine share a similar traumatic experience of a war in which Russia played a direct role. After the <a href="https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/3/42308.pdf">1992 war in Transnistria</a> in which Moscow sided with separatist forces, Moldova succumbed to Russian pressure and included a guarantee for <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49727.htm">permanent neutrality in its 1994 Constitution</a>. The plan was to barter neutrality in exchange for Russian troop withdrawals from the region, but these withdrawals never took place, as evident in Russia’s continuing military presence in the region.</p><p>Arguing on the principle of Moldova’s constitutionally mandated neutrality, Russia has consistently stifled support for Moldova’s efforts to increase its defense and military capabilities. Pro-Kremlin propaganda in Chisinau has targeted Moldova with a narrative that it does not need an army because it is a neutral nation. Critics claim that successive Moldovan governments, under the pretext of neutrality, have deliberately ignored the security and defense sectors over the years, refusing to acknowledge the evolving Russian threat. This paradigm, however, shifted dramatically due to the war in Ukraine. To face the existing threat and increase the country’s defense capabilities, the pro-Western government of Moldova requested support from the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/moldova-calls-for-eu-sanctions-on-oligarchs-helping-russia/a-64766972">European Union</a>, <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/nato-allies-vow-back-moldova-georgia-bosnia-94214895">NATO</a>, and those NATO member states with which it has long-term partnerships.</p><p>Russia, for its part, showed discontent at every announcement of military aid for Moldova. In December 2022, in an <a href="https://ria.ru/20221224/nato-1841007850.html">interview</a> with RIA Novosti, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mihail Galuzin said that NATO’s plans to provide Moldova with weapons threaten to lead to “catastrophe.”</p><p>Russia’s attempts to incite new hostilities around the Republic of Moldova and in the region have been more blatant in recent months. The Transnistria region has recently been at the forefront of Russian media attention. On February 23, 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defense’s Telegram channel posted <a href="https://t.me/mod_russia/24367">information</a> about a supposed Ukrainian attack on the separatist region. The news quickly spread around the internet. High-ranking Russian officials and the state media subsequently disseminated the allegations widely on numerous Telegram channels, leading both <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/24/moldova-dismisses-russia-claims-of-ukraine-plot-to-invade-transnistria-region">Moldovan</a> and <a href="https://tass.com/world/1581411">Ukrainian</a> officials to refute the allegations.</p><p>Although it may appear that Moscow’s statements sprang out of nowhere, the themes of the information operation were laid some months in advance. The DFRLab identified two of the most common narratives in statements from Russian officials, Kremlin-affiliated media, and pro-Russian Telegram channels, as well as the engagement of pro-Russian political forces in Moldova, to understand how Moscow prepared and established the belligerent information around Moldova’s Transnistria region.</p><h4>Narrative 1: The West is weaponizing Moldova to wage a war in Transnistria</h4><p>Russian narratives related to Moldova generally emphasize the country’s militarization, questioning Chisinau’s right to consolidate its defense capabilities. For its part, Moscow claims that the West is <a href="https://www.pravda.ru/world/1762052-moldova/">preparing</a> Moldova to enter the war and that the country has become overly militarized, which, according to the Kremlin, poses a danger for the Transnistrian region, Russian citizens, and the Russian military in the area.</p><p>During the last year, Kremlin-affiliated Russian-language news portals posted a series of <a href="https://absatz.media/politika/28604-ukraina-po-novomu-kak-zapad-prevrashaet-moldaviyu-v-goryachuyu-tochku">articles</a> and <a href="https://eurasia.expert/chto-stoit-za-peredachey-oruzhiya-nato-moldove/?utm_source=google.com&amp;utm_medium=organic&amp;utm_campaign=google.com&amp;utm_referrer=google.com">analyses</a> aimed at amplifying the topic of the militarization of Moldova. Between May and September 2022, Eadaily.com, a website known for promoting the Kremlin’s narratives, ran a series of articles highlighting how the United States, the EU, and the United Kingdom are arming Moldova. On June 8, Eadaily published the article “<a href="https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2022/06/08/rossiya-obespokoena-tem-kak-agressivno-moldaviyu-tolkayut-v-nato-mid">Russia is worried about how aggressively Moldova is being pushed into NATO</a>,” in which the author quotes Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, who claimed that NATO supplying Moldova with weapons does not cohere with the neutral status of the republic. The article’s authors also noted the increased allocation in the country’s budget toward national defense, causing Moscow to doubt its intentions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*_qcswtxJJ5IEH741.png" /><figcaption><em>Screencaps of articles from Kremlin-affiliated Eadaily.com targeted at expanding on the topic of Moldova’s weaponization. (Source, left to right, top to bottom: </em><a href="https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2022/05/21/glava-mid-britanii-prizvala-vooruzhit-moldaviyu-po-standartam-nato"><em>EurAsia Daily</em></a><em>/</em><a href="https://archive.ph/SBmKe"><em>archive</em></a><em>; </em><a href="https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2022/06/03/premer-moldavii-podtverdila-namereniya-vooruzhit-stranu-s-pomoshchyu-evrosoyuza"><em>EurAsia Daily</em></a><em>/</em><a href="https://archive.ph/P24nL"><em>archive</em></a><em>; </em><a href="https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2022/06/08/rossiya-obespokoena-tem-kak-agressivno-moldaviyu-tolkayut-v-nato-mid"><em>EurAsia Daily</em></a><em>/</em><a href="https://archive.ph/kJszR"><em>archive</em></a><em>; </em><a href="https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2021/09/27/ssha-vooruzhaet-moldaviyu-nacarmiya-poluchila-tehniku-i-oruzhie-na-5-mln"><em>EurAsia Daily</em></a><em>/</em><a href="https://archive.ph/UT7qG"><em>archive</em></a><em>; </em><a href="https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2021/09/28/ssha-vooruzhaet-moldaviyu-dlya-voyny-s-pridnestrovem-deputat"><em>EurAsia Daily</em></a><em>/</em><a href="https://archive.ph/YQZgx"><em>archive</em></a><em>)</em></figcaption></figure><p>In another post, titled “<a href="https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2021/09/28/ssha-vooruzhaet-moldaviyu-dlya-voyny-s-pridnestrovem-deputat">The United States Arms Moldova for War with Transnistria</a>,” the same outlet accused the US of arming Moldova for it to wage war with Transnistria. According to the sources cited in the article, US weapons delivered to the National Army of Moldova look like a “deliberate and objectively threatening demarche,” increasing the risk of a new military conflict between Moldova and Transnistria.</p><p>On October 5, 2022, Vzglyad (vz.ru), which is run by the <a href="https://realnoevremya.ru/articles/75291-vzglyadru-pereshla-ot-volodina-k-komande-kirienko">Russian Presidential Administration</a>-affiliated Institute of Experts for Social Research, published the article “NATO prepares to arm Moldova.” The paper examined the military support that the EU and NATO nations have provided Moldova and alleged that increasingly militaristic rhetoric from Chisinau has alarmed Russia and the separatist authorities in Transnistria, who have voiced skepticism that these actions will contribute to the Republic of Moldova’s security. On February 2, 2023, the same website published an <a href="https://vz.ru/news/2023/2/2/1197650.html">analytical note</a> suggesting that Moldova might become another hot spot on the European map “if Chisinau receives from Washington the ‘go ahead’ command” to attack Transnistria.</p><h3>Narrative 2: NATO and Ukraine are preparing to open a second front in Transnistria</h3><p>Besides a purported danger from Moldova, Russia has built several alternative scenarios around Transnistria, including the involvement of third parties like Romania (a NATO member) and Ukraine. Russian Telegram channels frequently spread speculation concerning Romanian military participation in the conflict.</p><p>On February 14, when Moldova’s airspace was <a href="https://www.intellinews.com/flights-suspended-after-mystery-objects-spotted-in-sky-above-romania-and-moldova-270066/?source=romania">temporarily closed</a> due to the detection of “an unidentified small object,” Telegram channel Старая площадь (“Old Square”), which has 136,000 subscribers, <a href="https://t.me/staraya/9456">published</a> a panic-inducing message stating in Russian, “Moldova is on the verge of some terrible events. All civilian planes have disappeared from the sky…Under the leadership of President Maia Sandu [a Romanian citizen], a conflict with Transnistria with the participation of British special services will be provoked. After that, Romanian troops will enter the territory of Moldova under the guise of military assistance to the ‘fraternal’ people.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*o-Rkw_Hq8fzJ-Bqe.png" /><figcaption><em>Screencap of post to Telegram channel Старая площадь in which the poster invoked a potential war in Transnistria, specifically with the involvement of Romanian troops. (Source: </em><a href="https://t.me/staraya/9456"><em>Старая площадь</em></a><em>/</em><a href="https://archive.is/iblkj"><em>archive</em></a><em>)</em></figcaption></figure><p>Previously in October 2022, a well-known Russian Telegram channel called WarGonzo wrote, “The [Western] curators have directed [Moldovan President] Sandu to work out the details of a large-scale military mobilization in Moldova to build a second front for Russia alongside Romanian forces.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/916/0*71GXo5JAgNb-LguP.png" /><figcaption><em>Screenshot of Telegram channel WarGonzo promoting claims of Romanian military involvement in a potential Transnistrian war. (Source: </em><a href="https://t.me/wargonzo/8588"><em>WarGonzo</em></a><em>/</em><a href="https://archive.is/dQr0O"><em>archive</em></a><em>)</em></figcaption></figure><p>Although the possibility of a Ukrainian military intervention in Transnistria has been discussed on a regular basis in pro-Russian networks over the last year, it gained momentum at the end of January 2023. On January 31, Vzglyad published an interview with Transnistrian Foreign Minister Vitaly Ignatiev titled “<a href="https://vz.ru/world/2023/1/31/1196957.html">The militarization of Moldova is a threat</a>.” In the interview, Ignatiev highlighted Moldova’s ongoing militarization as a form of Chisinau’s pressure on Transnistria. He also said that he does not rule out the possibility that the first assault on the unrecognized republic would be made not by the Moldovan army but by the Ukrainian one.</p><p>To stir up talk of an impending Ukrainian attack on Transnistria, Moscow also used Ukrainian channels linked to the Kremlin. On February 21, Ukrainian blogger Anatoly Shariy, whom Ukrainian authorities <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/uncategorized/popular-pro-russian-blogger-politician-anatoly-shariy-detained-in-spain">charged with high treason</a>, uploaded a video to YouTube called “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ueSVR6wJLXA">Transnistria may blaze</a>.” A few hours later, he published <a href="https://t.me/ASupersharij/16317">information</a> to his Telegram channel from unidentified sources about the movement of Ukrainian forces near the country’s border with Transnistria. Shariy’s Telegram channel has more than a million subscribers.</p><p>Around the same time, Telegram channel Канал Форт (“Canal Fort”) <a href="https://t.me/south_fort/1236">claimed</a> that over 260 Ukrainian soldiers had been sent to the Transnistrian border to attack the territory near the village of Cobasna, where a massive Soviet-era ammunition depot is located. Almost immediately, Telegram channel Typical Odesa shared Canal Fort’s post, <a href="https://t.me/odessa_typical/25794">claiming</a> that “the number of Ukrainian offensive groups is estimated at 5,000–6,500, plus around 600–800 NATO troops.” An <a href="https://archive.ph/u310h">analysis</a> of incoming and outgoing mentions using TGStat showed that the Canal Fort and Typical Odessa channels routinely reference each other. The Ukrainian security service <a href="https://t.me/SBUkr/7284">arrested</a> Typical Odesa admin Alexander Sinitsyn on February 27, 2023, as part of its investigation into the Russian spy network that intentionally promotes Kremlin propaganda.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*vovFylKPNFonJ35y.png" /><figcaption><em>Screenshots showing the synchronization of Telegram channels in sharing allegations of an attack on Transnistria by Ukraine (Source: </em><a href="https://t.me/south_fort/1236"><em>Канал Форт</em></a><em>/</em><a href="https://archive.is/91mSS"><em>archive</em></a><em>, left; </em><a href="https://t.me/odessa_typical/25794"><em>Типичная Одесса</em></a><em>/</em><a href="https://archive.is/UlGfn"><em>archive</em></a><em>, right)</em></figcaption></figure><p>Later, another pro-Russian Telegram channel, Vorpost, which has almost 103,000 subscribers, referred to information published by Canal Fort, <a href="https://t.me/vorposte/35740?single">stating</a> that the Ukrainian plan provides for a staged attack by the RF Armed Forces from Transnistria as a pretext for the Ukrainian army to invade the separatist region. The Kremlin adopted this version as its official narrative two days later on February 23, when the Russian Ministry of Defense warned that Ukraine was planning provocative actions in Transnistria. Russian state media, including <a href="https://www.1tv.ru/news/2023-02-26/448050-ukraina_gotovit_vooruzhennuyu_provokatsiyu_na_granitse_s_pridnestroviem">1TV</a>, <a href="https://www.ntv.ru/novosti/2749083/">NTV</a>, <a href="https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/17124877">TASS</a>, <a href="https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2023/02/23/964158-minoboroni">Vedomosti.ru</a>, and <a href="https://ria.ru/20230223/provokatsiya-1853918523.html">RIA</a>, as well as their affiliated Telegram channels from <a href="https://t.me/smuglianka/10360">Moldova</a> and the <a href="https://t.me/pridnestrovec/36075">Transnistria</a> region, quickly amplified the official statement.</p><p>The narrative was also quickly adopted by Moldovan pro-Russian politicians, who accused Ukraine of warmongering. In a <a href="https://t.me/igordodon/4772">video</a> posted on his Telegram channel, former Moldovan President Igor Dodon, who is known for his pro-Russian position, stated, “We will deal with Transnistria ourselves. This is our territory, our country. We will solve this problem ourselves, peacefully. Not the way they want. They want to bring in troops and so on.” Ilan Shor, another opposition politician who is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/12/moldova-pro-russian-protesters-gather-amid-fears-of-orchestrated-violence">accused</a> of organizing anti-government protests at the behest of the Russian secret service, used the same rhetoric, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/ilanshorofficial/videos/713438793610921/">accusing</a> the Moldovan government of conspiring with the Ukrainian authorities. “[President] Maia Sandu is trying to drag Moldova into a war with Russia; she is doing everything possible, at any cost, to spill blood on the territory of Moldova, just to stay in power,” Sor said in a video posted to his Facebook page. In the video, he also called on the population to protest: “Say NO to war, NO to the shedding of blood, NO to the murder of the Moldovan people in the name of the interests of Maia Sandu and her gang!”.</p><p>On Sunday, February 26, a <a href="https://t.me/Novorossia_Region/19656">post</a> on the Novorossia_Region Telegram channel stated, “The Ukronazi regime in Kyiv, stirred up by the American military, is preparing an armed provocation against Transnistria.” As supposed proof, it showed a picture of what it claimed to be a document from the Ukrainian army. The Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security of Ukraine, however, <a href="https://t.me/spravdi/25975">denied</a> the veracity of the document. Declaring that through this fake, “the propagandists are trying to discredit the Armed Forces of Ukraine.” According to the institution, the document does not correspond to the standard model used by the military command of Ukraine, and the wording in the document does not correspond to formal Ukrainian, including grammatical errors.</p><p>On February 27, the Canal Fort channel published a video titled “<a href="https://t.me/south_fort/1355">The Romanian anti-aircraft missile system is advancing to the border (with Moldova)</a>.” In the video, with a Romanian war song in the background, a column of military equipment can be seen moving through the central streets of a Romanian city. The same video, with the same description, was uploaded to a YouTube channel called <a href="https://www.youtube.com/shorts/KhyPpDCkgWM">Anonymous Network | News</a>, which was created on February 27, 2023. The video was also actively circulated on Twitter by openly pro-Russian or far-right accounts, as well as ones that spread COVID-19 conspiracy narratives. The GeoConfirmed twitter account <a href="https://twitter.com/geoconfirmed/status/1630197689047560193?s=46&amp;t=CLwfYR-DYY0NVoC0FsjsNQ&amp;fbclid=IwAR1dGsBafx87l5prRBoYBRt9IKjZoaEAemLdibADYNjFBSpasYl3_pKxs4k">geolocated</a> the video as being from Alba Iulia, 500km away from the border with Moldova. The Romanian Ministry of Defense also <a href="https://inforadar.mapn.ro/tema32/index.php">reported</a> the fake. According to the <a href="https://inforadar.mapn.ro/tema32/index.php">statement</a>, the video material with military equipment were indeed filmed in the Romanian city of Alba Iulia. However, it was shot at the end of November 2022, during the preparation of the military ceremony organized on Romania’s National Day, and not on the morning of February 27, as the authors of the fake posts claimed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*7vWnSq1Utb0rhpzu.png" /><figcaption><em>Screenshots of the Twitter accounts that shared fake videos about the movement of Romanian military to the Moldovan border (Source, left to right, top to bottom: </em><a href="https://twitter.com/cyberspec1/status/1630133021629349888?s=12&amp;fbclid=IwAR3pEu6oYwy5gKIp4O31kh5Un2mShXvbQW5ioZUD0gehmRFKfsJBnoEbeBo">@Cyberspec1/archive; @Roberto05246129/archive; @PrateekRoutray/archive; @EWright/archive; @StarSeed_2020/archive)</a></figcaption></figure><p>In the following days, Russian authorities continued to raise tensions around Transnistria with new warnings and accusations against “the United States, NATO members, and their Ukrainian proxies.” On February 24, the Russian defense ministry issued a <a href="https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1855478/">statement</a> saying, “Any actions that pose a threat to our compatriots, the Russian peacekeeping contingent, the Operational Group of Russian Forces, and military depots in Colbasna will be considered, in accordance with international law, an attack on the Russian Federation.” Later, foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova <a href="https://ria.ru/20230301/porty-1855024930.html">expressed</a> concern about the possibility of delivering radioactive substances to Ukraine through the ports of Odesa and Chernomorsk, fearing a provocation in Transnistria.</p><p>Moscow’s rhetoric in recent months has been increasingly provocative. Its push of inflammatory and escalatory narratives is supported by a complex information ecosystem in Moldova, which includes state representatives, media outlets, social media platforms, and influencers with vested interests working to create, disseminate, and amplify Kremlin-induced narratives. This disinformation campaign exacerbates the regional security situation and undermines Moldova’s internal political stability, as exemplified by the protests held by pro-Russian opposition forces intent on <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/white-house-says-intelligence-shows-russia-is-stirring-unrest-in-moldova">forcing a state coup</a>.</p><p><strong><em>Victoria Olari</em></strong><em> is a DFRLab Research Assistant in Chisinau, Moldova.</em></p><p><strong><em>Cite this case study:</em></strong></p><p>Victoria Olari, “Russia builds a ‘special information operation’ around Transnistria,” Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), March 20, 2023, <a href="https://dfrlab.org/2023/03/20/russia-builds-a-special-information-operation-around-transnistria.">https://dfrlab.org/2023/03/20/russia-builds-a-special-information-operation-around-transnistria</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bcc61fb06778" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/russia-builds-a-special-information-operation-around-transnistria-bcc61fb06778">Russia builds a “special information operation” around Transnistria</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab">DFRLab</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How the Kremlin misrepresented a video to claim Georgian protesters seek war with Russia]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/dfrlab/how-the-kremlin-misrepresented-a-video-to-claim-georgian-protesters-seek-war-with-russia-aaa01f6a0fb3?source=rss-105bc7078bae------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/aaa01f6a0fb3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[georgia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[telegram]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[@DFRLab]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 Mar 2023 16:01:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-03-14T16:01:05.149Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Footage from a protest in Tbilisi was presented with false context to accuse protesters of seeking war in the Russian-occupied Georgian region of Abkhazia</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Qw7G5koup7IcbtRyMNRWQQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>A protester wrapped in a Georgian national flag raises hands while standing in front of law enforcement officers during a rally against the “foreign agents” law in Tbilisi, Georgia, March 7, 2023. (Source: Reuters/Zurab Javakhadze)</figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>By Sopo Gelava</em></strong></p><p>The Kremlin and its proxies are attempting to claim that <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/the-kremlin-and-georgian-dream-spread-similar-narratives-about-protests-in-georgia-c7aa35cd716e">protesters in Georgia</a> want to wage war with Russia to reclaim occupied Georgian territories. The narrative paints Georgian protesters, who opposed the now-withdrawn “foreign agents bill,” as ultra-nationalist warmongers. The narrative is the latest attempt at creating an environment of fear by suggesting a war with Russia is brewing. For years, sowing fear over a war with Russia has been the leading <a href="http://mdfgeorgia.ge/uploads/antidasavlurieng2020_compressed.pdf">strategy</a> of pro-Kremlin information operations in Georgia.</p><p>In a <a href="https://t.me/margaritasimonyan/12740">Telegram post</a>, Margarita Simonyan, editor-in-chief of the Kremlin-owned news outlet RT, claimed that the protest chant “Sokhumi” (the capital of the Russian-occupied Abkhazia region) was a reference to Georgian protesters wanting to “open a second front” with Russia. She said that if Russia were to repeat the 2008 invasion of Georgia, Moscow would “not send troops there, but will simply shy away [slang for “bomb”] Tbilisi, without particular discernment.”</p><p>The narrative was picked up and amplified by the Kremlin-backed leaders of Georgia’s occupied regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russian media and pundits, and Russian-language Telegram channels.</p><p>The international community maintains that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are part of Georgia. Despite this, Russia and a handful of its <a href="https://eurasianet.org/syria-formally-recognizes-abkhazia-and-south-ossetia">allies</a> (Syria, Nicaragua, Nauru, and Venezuela) <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/Russia_Recognizes_Abkhazia_South_Ossetia/1193932.html">recognized</a> the occupied regions as Russian after the 2008 Georgian war.</p><h4><strong>Online amplification of “warmongers” narrative</strong></h4><p>The narrative that equates protesters with “warmongers” was prompted by a speech made by an activist during a March 9 demonstration against the “foreign agents” bill. Irakli Pavlenishvili, a member of the opposition United National Movement (UNM) party, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/irakli.pavlenishvili/videos/916936292776492">told</a> the protesters that he was from Eredvi, Tskhinvali, a Russia-occupied region in Georgia. “My land is occupied,” he said. “The St. George Church, where my ancestors prayed, is partially destroyed. My purpose in life is to go back and throw out occupiers. Everyone must return to Gagra, Sokhumi, Tskhinvali, Eredvi.” After his speech, Pevlenishvili started chanting “Sokhumi,” and several protestors joined in the chant.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/904/1*n52BQtFuXab4mQx9TaYVJQ.png" /><figcaption><em>A video of Pavlenishvili’s address to the crowd. The caption states, “I address all agents of the Kremlin in Georgia; you will lose all battles with the Georgian people! Sokhumi! Tskhinvali!” (Source: </em><a href="https://www.facebook.com/irakli.pavlenishvili/videos/916936292776492"><em>Irakli Pavlenishvili</em></a><em>/</em><a href="https://archive.is/wip/krLLd"><em>archive</em></a><em>)</em></figcaption></figure><p>Kremlin proxies quickly capitalized on the video to promote a false narrative that claimed the real aim of the demonstrations was to open a second front with Russia to regain control over the occupied regions. Simonyan’s Telegram post <a href="https://tgstat.ru/en/channel/@margaritasimonyan/12740">garnered</a> more than 700,000 views and 10,500 shares. The total reach of the keyword “Сухуми” (Sokhumi in Russian) on Telegram on March 10 exceeded eight million views.</p><p>This narrative was further amplified in a <a href="https://tgstat.ru/en/channel/@YUGLIVE/20729">post</a> on the Telegram channel ЮГ LIVE (“South Live”), which is the southern bureau of СОЛОВЬЁВ LIVE (“Solovyov Live”), a Telegram channel operated by Kremlin propagandist <a href="https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/faces-of-kremlin-propaganda/vladimir-solovyov/">Vladimir Solovyov</a>. The post contained a fragment of a video from the March 10 demonstration in Tbilisi, showing the crowd chanting “Sokhumi.” The video was disseminated with the caption, “Protesters demand waging war against Russia…The real reason [for the protests] is uncovered.” The post was forwarded to dozens of Telegram channels, including <a href="https://t.me/SolovievLive/163261">СОЛОВЬЁВ LIVE</a>. It reached more than 600,000 users, according to a TGStat query.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/904/1*1gX1cO30XfzS9s7_Po8YGg.png" /><figcaption><em>Screenshots from different pro-Kremlin Telegram channels claiming that the Tbilisi protesters wanted to wage war in Abkhazia. (Source: </em><a href="https://t.me/YUGLIVE/20729"><em>ЮГ LIVE💤</em></a><em>, top left; </em><a href="https://t.me/SolovievLive/163261"><em>СОЛОВЬЁВ LIVE</em></a><em>, top right; </em><a href="https://t.me/Krymchanin_Z/21064"><em>КРЫМЧАНИН 🇷🇺 Z</em></a><em>, bottom left; </em><a href="https://t.me/poroshokz/1393"><em>Порошок Зеленского 🥥</em></a><em>, bottom right)</em></figcaption></figure><p>Pro-Kremlin media outlets also picked up the narrative. For example, Tsargrad TV, owned by the sanctioned oligarch Konstantin Malofeev, published an <a href="https://tsargrad.tv/news/buntovshhiki-v-gruzii-vydali-sebja-odnim-slovom-hudshie-opasenija-pro-vtoroj-front-sbyvajutsja_739483">article</a> about the Tbilisi protests titled “Georgian rioters gave themselves away just with one word. The worst fears about the second front are coming true.” Meanwhile, on March 10, the pro-Kremlin online media outlet EurAsia Daily <a href="https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2023/03/10/abhaz-ob-otkrytii-gruziey-vtorogo-fronta-konchim-na-meste">published</a> an interview with Akhra Avidzba, a combatant from Abkhazia who fought against Ukraine in the Donbas. Avidzba repeated the same pro-Kremlin narrative that the real aim of the protests was to open a second front with Russia.</p><p>The narrative also coincided with the official statements released by the de-facto leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. A day earlier, on March 9, Abkhazia Foreign Minister Inal Ardzinba <a href="https://t.me/SputnikAbkhazia/12845">said</a> that the primary goal of the United States in the South Caucasus was to open a second front with Russia. The same day, Ardzinba held a phone conversation with Akhsar Dzhioyev, his counterpart in South Ossetia, and <a href="https://cominf.org/en/node/1166548600">agreed</a> on coordinating actions to prevent possible threats from Georgia.</p><h4><strong>Views of Georgian citizens on occupied regions</strong></h4><p>There is consensus among Georgian youth on a peaceful solution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, according to a 2021 <a href="https://oc-media.org/features/datablog-young-georgians-do-not-want-a-military-solution-in-abkhazia-and-south-ossetia/">survey</a> by the Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC). The results showed that the overwhelming majority (95 percent) of young Georgians support negotiations rather than using force. The majority (66 percent) of young Georgians also said they would participate in reconciliation efforts.</p><p>More recent public opinion polls from December 2022 also <a href="https://cdniq.us1.myspdn.com/atsdpid1d6u5cmy4j61kro6gh/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/NDI-Georgia_December-2022-poll_public-version_ENG_vf-2.pdf">demonstrate</a> that Georgians feel socio-economic issues are the most important national issues, with territorial integrity listed in fourth place.</p><p>In addition, the <a href="https://www.gov.ge/files/225_31228_851158_15.07.20-StateStrategyonOccupiedTerritories-EngagementThroughCooperation(Final).pdf">State Strategy on Occupied Territories</a> rejects any military solution, seeking peaceful means of reintegration and de-occupation “in conjunction with the return of internally displaced persons and refugees.”</p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/sgelava?lang=en"><strong><em>Sopo Gelava</em></strong></a><em> is a Research Associate, Caucasus, with the Digital Forensic Research Lab.</em></p><p><strong><em>Cite this case study:</em></strong></p><p>Sopo Gelava, “How the Kremlin misrepresented a video to claim Georgian protesters seek war with Russia,” Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), March 14, 2023, <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/how-the-kremlin-misrepresented-a-video-to-claim-georgian-protesters-seek-war-with-russia-aaa01f6a0fb3">https://medium.com/dfrlab/how-the-kremlin-misrepresented-a-video-to-claim-georgian-protesters-seek-war-with-russia-aaa01f6a0fb3</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=aaa01f6a0fb3" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/how-the-kremlin-misrepresented-a-video-to-claim-georgian-protesters-seek-war-with-russia-aaa01f6a0fb3">How the Kremlin misrepresented a video to claim Georgian protesters seek war with Russia</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab">DFRLab</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Kremlin and Georgian Dream spread similar narratives about protests in Georgia]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/dfrlab/the-kremlin-and-georgian-dream-spread-similar-narratives-about-protests-in-georgia-c7aa35cd716e?source=rss-105bc7078bae------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c7aa35cd716e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[protest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[georgia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[propaganda]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[georgian-dream]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[@DFRLab]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 10 Mar 2023 18:45:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-03-10T19:14:41.720Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Narratives attempt to discredit protesters, blame the West for public dissent</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nAvj1DSaOV7d6V_lJ9RrsQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Participants protest against a draft law on “foreign agents” during a rally outside the parliament building in Tbilisi, Georgia, March 8, 2023. (Source: Reuters/Irakli Gedenidze)</figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>By Eto Buziashvili and Sopo Gelava</em></strong></p><p>Anti-Russian, anti-government protests in Georgia forced the country’s ruling party, Georgian Dream (GD), to withdraw its bill on “foreign agents,” while GD officials attempted to discredit the protests by spreading anti-Western narratives, echoing Kremlin propaganda, including the threat of another Russian invasion and blaming the West for orchestrating the protests.</p><p>GD <a href="https://civil.ge/archives/530648">dropped</a> the bill on Friday, after three nights of protests in Tbilisi brought thousands of people to the streets to condemn the legislation. The bill, an almost identical copy of a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/01/russia-new-restrictions-foreign-agents">Russian law</a>, required civil society organizations and media outlets that receive at least 20 percent of their annual funding from abroad to register as “agents of foreign influence.” Because of its similarity to the Russian legislation, the Georgian bill was derided locally as the “Russian law.” The bill was initiated by the political movement People’s Power, a GD offshoot, that espouses anti-Western views.</p><p>Despite being <a href="https://twitter.com/HelsinkiComm/status/1632755440764190720?s=20">widely</a> <a href="https://www.facebook.com/usingeo/posts/pfbid09FT74e1FEfwW4CTUux11LhYV6Wt3EHP9wXUiL9Rto9GR41XeqViSSUjnWwXPU1ail">condemned</a> domestically and internationally, the law <a href="https://oc-media.org/georgian-foreign-agent-bills-begin-first-reading-as-thousands-gather-to-protest-russian-law/">passed</a> its first reading on March 7, prompting the protests that escalated to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/georgia-protests-eu-russia-ukraine-war-tbilisi-riot-police-foreign-agents-law/">riots</a> after police used water cannons and tear gas against peaceful protesters. The US Embassy in Tbilisi <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/03/08/dark-day-for-georgias-democracy-mass-protests-over-foreign-agent-law">referred to</a> the bill’s passage as a “dark day for Georgia’s democracy.” The European Union High Representative <a href="https://www.facebook.com/EUinGeorgia/posts/pfbid02L8gqgibEVrXpbDnYRV5MDm3hCQzr6HxwHdQRTT8Zq4eXzkNMKcTms99ix5dhZ8nDl">said</a> that the law was incompatible with EU values and standards.</p><p>In a <a href="https://gd.ge/show-news/1657/%E2%80%9E%E1%83%A5%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83%97%E1%83%A3%E1%83%9A%E1%83%98-%E1%83%9D%E1%83%AA%E1%83%9C%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1%E2%80%9C-%E1%83%9E%E1%83%9D%E1%83%9A%E1%83%98%E1%83%A2%E1%83%98%E1%83%99%E1%83%A3%E1%83%A0%E1%83%98-%E1%83%A1%E1%83%90%E1%83%91%E1%83%AD%E1%83%9D%E1%83%A1,-%E2%80%9E%E1%83%AE%E1%83%90%E1%83%9A%E1%83%AE%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1-%E1%83%AB%E1%83%90%E1%83%9A%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1%E1%83%90%E2%80%9C-%E1%83%93%E1%83%90-%E1%83%A1%E1%83%90%E1%83%9E%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83%9A%E1%83%90%E1%83%9B%E1%83%94%E1%83%9C%E1%83%A2%E1%83%9D-%E1%83%A3%E1%83%9B%E1%83%A0%E1%83%90%E1%83%95%E1%83%9A%E1%83%94%E1%83%A1%E1%83%9D%E1%83%91%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1-%E1%83%94%E1%83%A0%E1%83%97%E1%83%9D%E1%83%91%E1%83%9A%E1%83%98%E1%83%95%E1%83%98-%E1%83%92%E1%83%90%E1%83%9C%E1%83%AA%E1%83%AE%E1%83%90%E1%83%93%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%90?lang=ge">statement</a> announcing the withdrawal of the bill on Friday, GD said a “machine of lies was able to present the bill in a negative light and mislead a certain part of the public.” The party pledged to “better explain to the public what the bill was for and why it was important” after the “emotional background is diminished.”</p><p>Since Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, GD members and the GD-led government have <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/undermining-ukraine/">parroted</a> Kremlin messaging by promoting an anti-Western narrative that the West is plotting against the country to drag it into a war in Ukraine.</p><h4><strong>Georgian Dream narratives</strong></h4><p>Generally, the GD’s anti-Western rhetoric intensifies whenever Georgia’s Western partners criticize the government for democratic backsliding. GD officials routinely label protests or criticism as orchestrated externally. On March 7, for example, Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili <a href="https://civil.ge/archives/529427">labeled</a> protesters as “servants” of foreign countries, referring to the West. On March 10, immediately after GD gave into public pressure and dropped the legislation, GD chairperson Irakli Kobakhidze once again branded protesters as “foreign agents” intent on <a href="https://tabula.ge/ge/news/698491-kobakhidze-chagdebul-rusul-kanonze-tavisi?redir">overthrowing the government</a>. Russian media often pushes <a href="https://twitter.com/euvsdisinfo/status/1299587586613284865">narratives</a> about Western governments organizing coups and revolutions to discredit pro-democracy protests worldwide.</p><p>Echoing another common Kremlin narrative, Kobakhidze <a href="https://oc-media.org/georgian-dream-kill-foreign-agent-draft-law/">blamed</a> Georgian civil society and nongovernmental organizations for attacking the Orthodox Church and promoting “LGBT propaganda.” Accusing the West and civil society of targeting traditions and identity has been a leading theme of pro-Kremlin disinformation targeting Georgia and Eastern European countries for years.</p><p>Kobakhidze also <a href="https://civil.ge/archives/529711">lambasted</a> Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity and Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution. On March 8, he said that the Rose Revolution, which accelerated the country’s democratization and closeness to the West, was, in fact, a “revolution of spies.” In the Georgian and Russian languages, certain words like “spy” and “agent” carry a specific negative connotation referring to a person spying against their own country.</p><p>Alluding to Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, Kobakhidze blamed the Rose Revolution for the loss of 20 percent of Georgian territory. Similarly, he blamed Ukraine’s 2014 revolution for bringing the war to Ukraine and losing Crimea and the Donbas Oblast to Russia. Putting the blame on countries invaded by Russia is a common Kremlin tactic to shift focus and responsibility away from Russia’s culpability.</p><h4><strong>Russian narratives</strong></h4><p>The protests in Georgia caused widespread reaction in Russia. Kremlin officials, as well as traditional and online media, commented on the demonstrations en masse, spreading false and misleading narratives similar to the ones spread by GD officials.</p><p>The official Twitter account of Russia’s MFA in Crimea compared the protests in Georgia to the 2014 protests in Ukraine, which led to the country’s pro-Russian government being run out of Ukraine. The tweet also threatened Tbilisi with re-invasion, warning Georgians, “We recommend to the georgian people to recall a similar situation in Ukraine🇺🇦 in 2014 and what it finally led to! #ThinkTwice” Georgia has been a <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/fighting-for-the-hearts-and-minds-of-sakartvelo/">target</a> of Kremlin <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/undermining-ukraine/">influence operations</a> ever since the Russian invasion of 2008.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/855/1*MI6e563c25dC3cFNo6B4LA.png" /><figcaption>Screencap of a tweet from the official Twitter account for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Crimea. Responding to the ongoing protests in Tbilisi, the post threatens Georgia with a re-invasion. (Source: <a href="https://twitter.com/PMSimferopol/status/1634111915596173312">Russia’s MFA in Crimea</a>/<a href="https://archive.is/5Cu59">archive</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>In a <a href="https://ria.ru/20230310/protesty-1857011924.html">statement</a>, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov also compared the recent Georgian protests to Ukraine in 2014 and called the latest demonstrations “attempted violent change of power” that “are, of course, being orchestrated from abroad.” Putin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, meanwhile, <a href="https://radiosputnik.ria.ru/20230310/gruziya-1856990492.html">denied</a> any links between the GD-backed foreign agents bill and its Russian equivalent. He also <a href="https://ria.ru/20230309/gruziya-1856727430.html">stated</a>, “[I]t is important for Russia that there is calm on the perimeter of the border.” Concurrently, the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia “<a href="https://economy.gov.ru/material/press/official_position/informaciya_dlya_turistov_planiruyushchih_poezdki_v_gruziyu_ili_nahodyashchihsya_v_dannoy_strane.html">advised</a>” Russian citizens to refrain from traveling to Georgia.</p><p>In a <a href="https://t.me/margaritasimonyan/12740">Telegram post</a>, Margarita Simonyan, editor-in-chief of Kremlin-operated propaganda outlets <em>RT</em> and <em>Sputnik</em>, falsely claimed that the Georgian protests are “needed solely to open a second front” for Russia. She added that, in the event that Russia repeats its 2008 invasion of Georgia, Moscow “will not sent troops there, but will simply shy away [slang for “bomb”] Tbilisi, without particular discernment.”</p><p>The Georgian protests were one of the main topics discussed in Kremlin-owned traditional broadcasters and <a href="https://radiosputnik.ria.ru/20230310/gruziya-1857051500.html">online</a> <a href="https://radiosputnik.ria.ru/20230310/gruziya-1857044568.html">outlets</a>. Footage from television programs on Russian state-owned broadcasters spreading Kremlin narratives about the protests surfaced online. On the television show “<a href="https://twitter.com/gerashchenko_en/status/1633858325162115074?s=46&amp;t=LwnTUcloP8JWN-ja3bHJeQ">60 minutes</a>,” one Kremlin pundit stated, “Georgians will never live as prosperous a life as they used to during the Soviet Union.” They recommended Georgian society to draw lessons from Ukraine and see what “aggressive, Nazi politics” would result in. Kremlin commentators added that it was the right decision for Georgia to avoid being dragged into Russia’s war against Ukraine. On Russia’s “Channel One,” pundits <a href="https://www.facebook.com/seduceyoutwice/videos/916128466090276/">expressed</a> their dissatisfaction over the GD’s decision to withdraw the law. They threatened the Georgian Dream-led government by paraphrasing Winston Churchill’s <a href="https://www.military-history.org/feature/winston-churchill-quotes.htm">reported</a> rebuke of Neville Chamberlain: “Georgia’s ruling party chose dishonor, therefore they will have war.”</p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/EtoBuziashvili"><strong><em>Eto Buziashvili</em></strong></a><em> is a Research Associate, Caucasus, with the Digital Forensic Research Lab.</em></p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/sgelava?lang=en"><strong><em>Sopo Gelava</em></strong></a><em> is a Research Associate, Caucasus, with the Digital Forensic Research Lab.</em></p><p><strong><em>Cite this case study:</em></strong></p><p>Eto Buziashvili and Sopo Gelava, “The Kremlin and Georgian Dream spread similar narratives about protests in Georgia,” Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), March 10, 2023, <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/the-kremlin-and-georgian-dream-spread-similar-narratives-about-protests-in-georgia-c7aa35cd716e">https://medium.com/dfrlab/the-kremlin-and-georgian-dream-spread-similar-narratives-about-protests-in-georgia-c7aa35cd716e</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c7aa35cd716e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/the-kremlin-and-georgian-dream-spread-similar-narratives-about-protests-in-georgia-c7aa35cd716e">The Kremlin and Georgian Dream spread similar narratives about protests in Georgia</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab">DFRLab</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Seven steps to spread a conspiracy: How Russia promoted weapons trade allegations]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/dfrlab/seven-steps-to-spread-a-conspiracy-how-russia-promoted-weapons-trade-allegations-a3e80ebedaf5?source=rss-105bc7078bae------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a3e80ebedaf5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[disinformation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[telegram]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[@DFRLab]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 09 Mar 2023 20:09:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-03-09T20:09:31.931Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><em>Kremlin sources planted and amplified fake stories about Western weapons destined for Ukraine being sold in Germany</em></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*P9TIExpzuAMFXsZ3OuGNog.jpeg" /><figcaption>A US cavalry scout assigned to 2nd Cavalry Regiment fires a Stinger missile using Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADs) during a live fire exercise at the NATO Missile Firing Installation (NAMFI) off the coast of Crete, Greece, November 6, 2017.</figcaption></figure><p>A conspiracy theory claiming Western-made weapons destined for Ukraine are being illegally sold online can be traced back to the Russian disinformation machine. In this article, the DFRLab examines the seven steps Russia took to disseminate and bring credibility to a conspiracy theory asserting that Ukraine sold Stinger man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) on the dark web, presenting a danger to Europe’s security because they are capable of downing civilian aircrafts.</p><p>For Russian audiences, this narrative is likely intended to demonstrate that the Ukrainian government is hypocritical and corrupt for purportedly profiting from the sale of Stinger MANPADS. And by suggesting that military aid to Ukraine could be used against civilians elsewhere in Europe, this narrative is intended to prove to Western audiences that Ukraine is an unreliable and dangerous partner.</p><p>The DFRLab has <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-war-report-forged-document-claims-ukraine-is-selling-surplus-weapons-to-african-countries/#forged">previously</a> <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/how-russia-promoted-the-claim-that-ukraine-re-sold-french-howitzers-for-profit-fd51f71a9362">covered</a> <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-war-report-russian-mayor-kursk/#telegram">similar</a> iterations of this narrative.</p><h4><strong>Step 1 — Build a false foundation</strong></h4><p>On September 7, 2022, the obscure <a href="https://www.youtube.com/shorts/xQ6ONFkclWs">YouTube</a> and Telegram <a href="https://t.me/friekorps/295">channel</a> Journalisten Freikorps (“Free Corp of Journalists”) published a six-second video of a Stinger MANPAD lying on the ground. The video description claimed the footage was filmed at the German port of Bremen on July 20, 2022, as Ukrainian military personnel were being arrested for transporting multiple “tubular devices.” The post also claimed the Ukrainian troops were aboard the ship <em>Floriana</em>, sailing under a Ukrainian flag, and bound for Turkey.</p><p>In the footage, an authoritative German voice can be heard asking someone to stop filming. Researchers from the Ukrainian fact-checking organization StopFake and the US fact-checking organization <a href="https://leadstories.com/hoax-alert/2022/09/fact-check-this-video-does-not-show-ukrainians-being-arrested-for-selling-a-stinger-missile-launcher-in-Bremen.html">Lead Stories</a> found that the audio was copied from an old YouTube <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220923130727/https:/www.youtube.com/watch?v=U6piM6JTbJI">video</a> uploaded on January 23, 2022. In addition, while the <em>Floriana</em> is a <a href="https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:1592/mmsi:229033000/imo:9486477/vessel:FLORIANA">real</a> <a href="https://www.vesseltracker.com/en/Ships/Floriana-9486477.html">vessel</a>, it sails under the Maltese flag rather than the Ukrainian flag. Bremen police <a href="https://twitter.com/BremenPolizei/status/1571557101583085569">confirmed</a> the report was false and that they “did not arrest any Ukrainians who dealt in weapons.”</p><p>The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) <a href="https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/inside-the-journalisten-friekorps-a-pro-kremlin-influence-operation/">conducted</a> a separate investigation into Journalisten Friekorps’s assets and found the organization was connected to Russia by tracing it to an expired Russian e-commerce domain name. The organization also spread anti-Ukraine petitions in Germany that were recently included in a <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2022/09/removing-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-from-china-and-russia/">Facebook</a> takedown covered by the <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/russia-based-facebook-operation-targeted-europe-with-anti-ukraine-messaging-389e32324d4b?source=collection_home---4------0-----------------------">DFRLab</a> and promoted other websites aimed at discouraging support for Ukraine. Further analysis from threat intelligence researcher Kyle Ehmke <a href="https://twitter.com/kyleehmke/status/1577272528342380544">found a connection</a> between Journalisten Friekorps and other pro-Russia websites in German.</p><p>The Journalisten Freikorps Telegram channel was created on May 18, 2022; it typically <a href="https://www.24rhein.de/leben-im-westen/freizeit/nrw-festival-parookaville-san-hejmo-juicy-beats-haldern-pop-hype-festival-ueberblick-91670037.html">reposts</a> <a href="https://t.me/friekorps/219">short</a> <a href="https://t.me/s/friekorps/295">news</a> stories from <a href="https://www.allgaeuer-zeitung.de/welt/politik/millionen-werden-heizkosten-nicht-zahlen-koennen_arid-455413">local</a> German media outlets. The Journalisten Freikorps YouTube <a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC3IQzFMatZiy45-UNpm4Kwg/about">channel</a> was created on August 24, 2022 and links to an <a href="https://j.friekorps.de/">non-functioning</a> website.</p><h4><strong>Step 2 — Use forgeries to support a false debunk</strong></h4><p>The next step in the Russian playbook is providing additional “evidence” to cement the narrative. In this case, a September 7, 2022 <a href="https://nbnews.com.ua/politika/2022/09/07/sholts-obyasnil-pochemu-ukraina-do-sikh-p/">article</a> by the fringe Ukrainian publication National Bank of News (NBN) claimed it had fact-checked the story using a letter that turned out to be a forgery. The article, which appeared the same day Journalisten Freikorps published the video to its Telegram and YouTube videos, discussed a <a href="https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/olaf-scholz-im-interview-wir-werden-genug-strom-haben-18296311.html?printPagedArticle=true">Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</a> interview with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. NBN claimed that Scholz “deliberately” delayed weapons shipments to Ukraine because of the Journalisten Freikorps video. The article then stated that Ukrainian troops were not detained in Germany for transporting weapons, “debunking” the claim using the forged letter.</p><p>The letter in question, purportedly written by Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov, was addressed to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. It claimed that the Stinger MANPADS identified at the port of Bremen were now in Kharkiv. In the letter, the word “Kharkiv” is written as “Харьків,” which is a combination of the Ukrainian spelling “Харків” and Russian spelling “Харьков.” The letter also used a copy of Reznikov’s digital signature, stolen from another <a href="https://www.minre.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/docs/zatverdzhennya_grafika_provedennya_telefonnoyi_garyachoyi_liniyi.pdf">document</a> signed on April 9, 2022; it previously appeared in a September 2022 forged letter <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/russia-aligned-hacktivists-stir-up-anti-ukrainian-sentiments-in-poland-f2d6660cf09a">documented</a> by the DFRLab.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*P_ltC2dCwT4JuniOG8Ff0A.png" /><figcaption>Left: June 2022 forged document from June 2022 utilizing a stolen Reznikov digital signature. Right: August 2022 MANPADS document using the same stolen signature, displayed at center. (Source: <a href="https://t.me/hackberegini/917/">beregini</a>/<a href="https://archive.ph/6HcMH">archive</a>, left; <a href="https://nbnews.com.ua/politika/2022/09/07/sholts-obyasnil-pochemu-ukraina-do-sikh-p/">NBN</a>/<a href="https://archive.ph/wip/CoiTZ">archive</a>, right)</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Step 3 — Plant bogus evidence in a credible source</strong></h4><p>The next day, on September 8, Ukraine’s public radio broadcaster <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220908101821/http:/nrcu.gov.ua/news.html?newsID=99510">published</a> a story at 12:25pm about the testing of a new emergency notification system. According to archival versions of the piece preserved by the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine, at some point in the next three hours, hackers breached the website and replaced the text with a new story titled, “The General Staff conducts unscheduled inspections of warehouses with weapons.” In addition, there is a third <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220914120233/http:/nrcu.gov.ua/news.html?newsID=99510">version</a> of the story that appeared before the article was taken offline with the title “Test” and the body text “123.” Ukrainian Radio confirmed the breach to the DFRLab.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*Vh2Pd9sCPC6dZ-4g3Csj_Q.png" /><figcaption>A composite image of the original article (top left), the hacked article (top right), and the final version of the article before it went offline (bottom). The publication date and time are highlighted in red; the audio file is highlighted in green. (Sources: <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220908101821/http:/nrcu.gov.ua/news.html?newsID=99510">Internet Archive</a>, top left; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220908135222/http:/nrcu.gov.ua/news.html?newsID=99510">Internet Archive</a>, top right; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220914120233/http:/nrcu.gov.ua/news.html?newsID=99510">Internet Archive</a>, bottom)</figcaption></figure><p>The inserted story was about Serhiy Shaptala, Chief of the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, demanding inspections of the 92nd Mechanized Brigade. The article quoted Freikorps and NBN and shared the forged Reznikov letter. The article also included another document, which does not bear any digital signatures. The document sets out an additional “separate assignment” to check on the availability of Stinger systems, resulting from random inspections that purportedly found three missing Stinger MANPADS.</p><p>While the style of the hacked article is somewhat similar to the style of Ukrainian Radio, it lacked one essential component — audio. Ukrainian Radio embeds audio clips in its articles, containing excerpts from its broadcasts. The hacked story did not include any audio recordings.</p><h4><strong>Step 4 — Launder the source of information</strong></h4><p>The next step in the Russian disinformation playbook is to launder the source of the information by appearing to amplify other coverage. On <a href="https://archive.ph/EiOul">Telegram</a>, Journalisten Freikorps <a href="https://t.me/friekorps/305">highlighted</a> the “investigation” of “Ukrainian colleagues” at Ukrainian Radio — e.g., the hacked web page — adding that they “hope for the answers.” The post included a screenshot from a dark web marketplace and claimed that users can order Stinger MANPADS online. Journalisten Freikorps suggested that the dark web shop and the disappearing weapons may be related. The use of the dark web as a scarecrow is a recurring approach that Russian disinformation outlets have relied on since the invasion of Ukraine, as the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-war-report-satellite-imagery-confirms-destruction-of-aircraft-at-crimea-airbase/#narratives">DFRLab</a> has <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/how-russia-promoted-the-claim-that-ukraine-re-sold-french-howitzers-for-profit-fd51f71a9362">previously</a> <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-war-report-russian-mayor-kursk/#telegram">reported</a>. The DFRLab attempted to access the dark web marketplace, but the site was unreachable at the time.</p><p>Later, Journalisten Freikorps <a href="https://t.me/friekorps/309">published</a> another post that said Ukrainian Telegram groups are offering to pay people to place dark web orders. The claim appears to have originated from a single Telegram account that published two posts in a Telegram group, one in English and one in Ukrainian, offering payment for dark web orders. However, Ukrainian moderators immediately deleted the post and <a href="https://t.me/ukrainehelpberlin/54953">kicked</a> <a href="https://t.me/ukrainehelpberlin/54956">the</a> account out of the group. The account is no longer active on Telegram.</p><p>Journalisten Freikorps also <a href="https://t.me/friekorps/312">published</a> a screenshot of a private chat allegedly sent to them by a German student who claims to have exposed the dark web marketplace and alerted local police in Dresden. The DFRLab attempted to verify the student’s claim with Dresden police, who told the DFRLab, “the occurence you are refering to ist [sic] know to Polizeidirektion Dresden and is currently under investigation from the Staatsschutz department of Dresden Police.”</p><h4><strong>Step 5 — Time the release</strong></h4><p>Image metadata suggests that some consideration also went into timing the release of the disinformation campaign materials. A key website in the operation is World and We, a blogging platform where registered users can publish stories. On September 17, it <a href="https://www.worldandwe.com/ru/page/v_germanii_obnaruzhen_kanal_nelegalnyh_postavok_pzrk_stinger_iz_ukrainy.html">published</a> a story about the Stinger MANPADS and said that Ukraine “has already been repeatedly convicted of outright lies,” so any denials should be ignored. The article also claimed Europe’s security was under threat. The article cited the Journalisten Freikorps’ Telegram channel and included images of the forged letters and the supposed dark web marketplace. Three image file names contain the date “20220909” and times that range from 12:26:28 a.m. to 1:58:54 a.m.. This is a standard naming format many computers use when taking a screenshot or saving a file. The images published on the website do not follow a unified naming system, suggesting images maintain the file name provided by the author. The file name suggests that preparations were underway for this article as early as September 9. However, it was published eight days later. While the reason for this delay is unknown, it is worth noting that during this period the Ukrainian army was <a href="https://ig.ft.com/ukraine-counteroffensive/">conducting</a> a counteroffensive in Kharkiv oblast that was making headlines.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/936/1*lJ6unZ07xwvOjqHWGNkt1g.png" /><figcaption>The three images from World and We and their respective URL addresses (below each picture) with the date “20220909” highlighted in yellow boxes, and times highlighted in red boxes. (Source: <a href="https://www.worldandwe.com/ru/page/v_germanii_obnaruzhen_kanal_nelegalnyh_postavok_pzrk_stinger_iz_ukrainy.html">World and We</a>/<a href="https://archive.ph/wip/ugtdk">archive</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>On September 14, the story also appeared on the German <a href="https://weltexpress.info/die-militaerische-hilfe-fuer-die-ukraine-birgt-eine-unmittelbare-bedrohung-fuer-diebewohner-europas/">website</a> Weltexpress, which accepts <a href="https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/inside-the-journalisten-friekorps-a-pro-kremlin-influence-operation/">payment for coverage</a>. The outlet has previously published pro-Kremlin narratives, including an article that <a href="https://weltexpress.info/hinrichtungen-von-kollaborateuren-in-der-ukraine-im-allgemeinen-und-in-butscha-im-besonderen/">blamed</a> Ukraine for the Bucha massacre. Weltexpress cited the NBN article and the “evidence” provided by Journalisten Friekorps. After Russian media began promoting the narrative), the Weltexpress article was <a href="https://www.facebook.com/102505911172634/posts/830000871756464">amplified</a> by <a href="https://olga-petersen.de/">Olga Petersen</a>, a Russian-born German politician with the Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD) party. In her post, Petersen said she would ask the Hamburg senate to investigate. AfD is <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/documents-link-afd-parliamentarian-to-moscow-a-1261509.html">known</a> to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/20/far-right-german-politicians-accused-of-pro-putin-propaganda-trip">have</a> <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/putin-wages-hybrid-war-on-germany-and-west-a-1075483.html">links</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russians-have-helped-fuel-the-rise-of-germanys-far-right-105551">with</a> Russia.</p><h4><strong>Step 6</strong> –<strong>Pro-Kremlin sources pick up the baton</strong></h4><p>On September 16, the pro-Russia YouTuber Vladimir Gorbovskiy <a href="https://t.me/gorbovskiyfsb/2698">published</a> the Stinger video on his Telegram channel. He claimed that German authorities had contacted Ukrainian officials to discuss missing weapons and Ukraine responded that it was storing the weapons. He then hypothesized that the weapons would be used against civilian aircrafts in Europe. Another Telegram <a href="https://t.me/Slavyangrad/8979">channel</a> found a Bremen police statement regarding the theft of electronic equipment and falsely interpreted it as being related to the Stinger operation.</p><p>On September 17, World and We’s Telegram <a href="https://t.me/worldandwe/2127">channel</a> published the Stinger video and asked, “Germans, have Lufthansa planes fallen yet?” A few hours later, the abovementioned World and We article was published. The story was republished verbatim by the pro-Russia fringe media outlet <a href="https://naspravdi.info/novosti/v-germanii-obnaruzhen-kanal-nelegalnyh-postavok-pzrk-stinger-iz-ukrainy">Naspravdi.info</a>, while a slightly edited version appeared on the pro-Kremlin website <a href="https://bloknot.ru/glavnaya/ukraina-soobshhila-chto-ukradenny-e-i-najdenny-e-v-germanii-stingery-nahodyatsya-na-sklade-vsu-986545.html">Bloknot</a>. Bloknot also <a href="https://bloknot.ru/v-mire/iz-za-ukradenny-h-na-ukraine-amerikanskih-stingerov-pod-ugrozoj-aviatsiya-evropy-987584.html">published</a> a followup story that claimed people in the West were protesting military aid to Ukraine. This story included one image with “2022–09–08” in its name. The article also included the two documents shared in the hacked Ukrainian Radio story; however, it shared the documents in reverse order. This is noteworthy because the two documents were shared as a single image file. The Bloknot version also removed the digital signature. A comparison of the documents revealed minor differences in the document that does not bear a letterhead, indicating the text was slightly edited.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/866/1*mO1l7ZvEKywkwz7cpTHcRQ.png" /><figcaption>A composite image of the documents shared by Bloknot (top) and the Ukrainian Radio (bottom) of fake documents with the letter and separate assignment being moved within a monolith picture (Source: <a href="https://bloknot.ru/v-mire/iz-za-ukradenny-h-na-ukraine-amerikanskih-stingerov-pod-ugrozoj-aviatsiya-evropy-987584.html">Bloknot</a>/<a href="https://archive.ph/wip/kn209">archive</a>, top; <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220908135222/http:/nrcu.gov.ua/news.html?newsID=99510">Internet Archive</a>, bottom)</figcaption></figure><p>The story also circulated in mainstream pro-Kremlin media. The tabloids <a href="https://www.mk.ru/politics/2022/09/17/v-germanii-zaderzhali-ukraincev-torgovavshikh-zapadnym-oruzhiem.html">Moscow Komsomolets</a> and <a href="https://www.kp.ru/online/news/4924822/">Komsomolet’s Pravda</a> repeated the claim that Ukrainians had been detained in Germany for trading weapons and amplified the narrative that a German student discovered the illegal marketplace. They also cited anonymous “local media” to claim that the weapons were intended for the Kharkiv counteroffensive.</p><p>The next day, the story appeared on <a href="https://www.1tv.ru/news/2022-09-19/437984-v_nemetskom_bremene_zaderzhali_ukraintsev_pytavshihsya_prodat_zenitno_raketnye_kompleksy">Channel One Russia</a>. It <a href="https://twitter.com/ivan_8848/status/1571238967013523456">then</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/CzeKuku2/status/1571396430291501056">reached</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/Vladimi03721352/status/1571032176489287681">Twitter</a>, where it was shared by <a href="https://twitter.com/Dpol_un/status/1571263327216467968">Dmitry Polyanskiy</a>, the Deputy Permanent Representative of Russia to the United Nations. The story also made waves on Russian social media platform VK. The posts appeared on both <a href="https://vk.com/wall166703565_13079">personal</a> <a href="https://vk.com/wall41837601_11527">pages</a> and <a href="https://vk.com/wall-68059090_82127">groups</a>, including one dedicated to the city of <a href="https://vk.com/wall-13457639_60156">Boston</a>. The VK posts mostly cited the archived Ukrainian Radio article as evidence.</p><h4><strong>Step 7 — Prepare some “analysis” and translate it into English</strong></h4><p><a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/russian-telegram-channel-embraces-fact-checking-tropes-to-spread-disinformation-c6a54393c635">War On Fakes</a>, a pro-Kremlin disinformation outlet masquerading as a fact-checking organization, also reported on the claim, first in <a href="https://xn--80aaenqccitej3b1b.xn--p1ai/analitika/chernyj-chernyj-rynok-kak-ukrainskie-voennye-pereprodajut-zapadnoe-vooruzhenie/">Russian</a>, and a few hours later in <a href="https://waronfakes.com/vsu/black-black-market-how-the-ukrainian-military-resell-western-arms/">English</a>. The article replicates much of the World and We article, cites the NBN article, and includes a screenshot of the Ukrainian Radio article. The article claims that “Western arms were literally flooding from Ukraine to different countries of the world,” and concludes that Ukraine should not be trusted. The article was <a href="https://www.facebook.com/100064934820205/posts/460491112792046">shared</a> on Facebook by the Russian Embassy of New Zealand.</p><p><strong><em>Roman Osadchuk</em></strong><em> is Research Associate for Ukraine at the DFRLab.</em></p><p><strong><em>Cite this case study:</em></strong></p><p>Roman Osadchuk, “Seven steps to spread a conspiracy: How Russia promoted weapons trade allegations,” Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), March 9, 2023, <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/seven-steps-to-spread-a-conspiracy-how-russia-promoted-weapons-trade-allegations-a3e80ebedaf5">https://medium.com/dfrlab/seven-steps-to-spread-a-conspiracy-how-russia-promoted-weapons-trade-allegations-a3e80ebedaf5</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a3e80ebedaf5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/seven-steps-to-spread-a-conspiracy-how-russia-promoted-weapons-trade-allegations-a3e80ebedaf5">Seven steps to spread a conspiracy: How Russia promoted weapons trade allegations</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab">DFRLab</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The DFRLab responds to “Twitter Files” story]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/dfrlab/the-dfrlab-responds-to-twitter-files-story-ec19222b09af?source=rss-105bc7078bae------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ec19222b09af</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[@DFRLab]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 Mar 2023 17:20:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-03-06T15:20:27.805Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*707rv3oiMSIMrfwV.png" /></figure><p>On Wednesday, Matt Taibbi released the most recent installment of his “Twitter Files” in which he names the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab. We wish to correct some of the points he makes, which are wrong, misinterpret events, or do not incorporate our responses made in good faith.</p><p>Taibbi reports that DFRLab contacted Twitter’s Trust and Safety Team to examine a dataset of 40,000 Twitter accounts in 2021. As Taibbi reported, Twitter found almost all of the accounts to be authentic users.</p><p>The dataset was part of an investigation into alleged coordinated disinformation and online harassment in India, conducted in parallel with the Indian outlet <em>The Wire</em>. One of their reporters at the time collected the dataset and shared it with our team; he attributed the tweets to the BJP, but his analysis failed to meet our research standards. The DFRLab therefore decided not to publish that investigation, terminating our collaboration with <em>The Wire</em> in October 2021.</p><p>When an investigation necessitates it, the DFRLab shares our findings with social media platforms to help ensure our research is accurate. This was the case with the alleged BJP dataset; we shared it with Twitter solely as part of our due diligence. As neither our internal research staff nor Twitter could find a connection between this particular dataset and the BJP, we decided to not move forward with the research. We stand by that decision. The Wire eventually published its own investigation in early 2022 <a href="https://thewire.in/government/tek-fog-and-a-dangerous-new-world">but later retracted it</a> after losing confidence in their report’s accuracy.</p><p>As an independent research organization, the DFRLab thoroughly vets all research prior to publishing, particularly when it involves data received from outside sources. That vetting process often involves sharing initial findings with outside experts, sometimes including experts at the social media platforms we investigate. This type of information sharing, exchange, and due diligence is standard across many of the professions we work with including media, academia, and industry. However, when we share initial research with any outside expert, especially those at platforms, there is no expectation that they will take action. The DFRLab does not make content moderation decisions.</p><p>Additionally, Taibbi tweeted that he asked DFRLab Senior Director Graham Brookie whether he had informed a <em>Reuters</em> reporter that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/facebook-accounts-india-idINKCN1RD1R2">a story</a> written about this investigation was inaccurate and says Brookie did not respond. Brookie responded on Wednesday, a day in advance of the thread’s publication. As Brookie explained, Taibbi is conflating two different stories. The <em>Reuters </em>story Taibbi linked to in his thread cites an entirely unrelated <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-inauthentic-activity-in-india-8940588e09b5">case study</a> from 2019 and is not the same as the research from 2021 in which the 40,000 accounts were examined.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pEQvFjrzWToxOX7e98mUVw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Correspondence with Matt Taibbi, 2:44pm ET, March 1, 2023. (Source: DFRLab)</figcaption></figure><p>While the DFRLab welcomes valid criticism, Taibbi’s reporting contains errors and omits context. The DFRLab stands by its work and will continue its mission of producing timely research, driving policy change, and building a global coalition dedicated to ensuring human rights, transparency, and accountability in our global information ecosystem.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ec19222b09af" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/the-dfrlab-responds-to-twitter-files-story-ec19222b09af">The DFRLab responds to “Twitter Files” story</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab">DFRLab</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Networks of pro-Kremlin Telegram channels spread disinformation at a global scale]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/dfrlab/networks-of-pro-kremlin-telegram-channels-spread-disinformation-at-a-global-scale-af4e319bd51e?source=rss-105bc7078bae------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/af4e319bd51e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[disinformation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-media]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[telegram]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[@DFRLab]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Mar 2023 11:58:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-03-01T11:58:32.930Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><em>Three networks comprising fifty-six channels targeted Telegram users in twenty countries and ten languages</em></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lpzUqrxHO008fM7MdzTJeQ.png" /><figcaption><em>Close-up view of a network graph showing forwarded messages from the fifty-six analyzed Telegram channels. (Source: </em><a href="https://twitter.com/sayyara_a"><em>@sayyara_a</em></a><em> and </em><a href="http://twitter.com/nikaaleksejeva"><em>@nikaaleksejeva</em></a><em>/DFRLab via Telegram API, TGStat and Gephi)</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>By Sayyara Mammadova and Nika Aleksejeva</em></strong></p><p>Fifty-six pro-Kremlin Telegram channels divided into three networks of similarly named accounts are spreading pro-Kremlin narratives to users worldwide, including in Europe, Asia, South America, and the Middle East. The channels purport to share “truthful” information but are in fact conduits to help pro-Kremlin narratives reach people in other languages. A language assessment revealed that the channels’ content utilized both machine and human translations. Open-source analysis also revealed that one network is connected to a Kremlin-affiliated voluntary military training program called NVP ROKOT. <br> <br> An analysis of forwarded posts, creation dates, and naming systems reveals that all three networks — Surf Noise, Info Defense, and Node of Time — are connected, with Info Defense and Node of Time being closely associated with one another and Surf Noise existing on the periphery. The cross-amplification efforts between the channels were most evident in Russian, German, Italian, and Spanish. A cluster of thirty-four Info Defense channels was the most interconnected, sharing each other’s posts despite language barriers.</p><p>This investigation sheds light on how pro-Kremlin Telegram channels try to reach users in other languages globally. Yet their simplistic approach, combined with a lack of obfuscation, suggests that the network operators are not sophisticated or well-resourced. <br> <br> Telegram is the primary <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/what-russia-reads-on-telegram-a45d90e3bdc1">platform</a> for sharing information about the Ukraine war. The platform has loose content moderation politics, making it fertile ground for disinformation.</p><h4><strong>General overview of the channels</strong></h4><p>The DFRLab identified three groups of Telegram channels employing similar naming patterns to coordinate across continents in various languages. There were ten channels containing “Node of Time” in their channel name. An additional eleven channels incorporated “Surf Noise,” while another thirty-five channels used “Info Defense” or “Info Def.” The channels operated in more than ten languages and targeted over twenty countries with Kremlin propaganda.</p><p>The channels with the largest subscriber count from each network were the Russian account @surf_noise1, the multi-language account @InfoDefense, and the German account @node_of_time_DE. Fifteen of the fifty-six channels have been inactive for at least one month.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ufshysplQSsbRNr4KaM2aw.png" /><figcaption><em>Chart shows the subscriber count for the fifty-six Telegram channels analyzed. Inactive channels are marked in red. (Source: </em><a href="https://twitter.com/sayyara_a"><em>@sayyara_a</em></a><em> and </em><a href="http://twitter.com/nikaaleksejeva"><em>@nikaaleksejeva</em></a><em> /DFRLab via Telegram API, TGStat)</em></figcaption></figure><p>Several channels had creation dates in common. Twenty-eight of the thirty-five channels in the Info Defense cluster shared their creation date with at least one other channel in the cluster.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OpnWhnuIV8eVruZUTB-paA.png" /><figcaption><em>Creation dates for the analyzed Telegram channels. Common dates are marked in orange. (Source: </em><a href="https://twitter.com/sayyara_a"><em>@sayyara_a</em></a><em> and </em><a href="http://twitter.com/nikaaleksejeva"><em>@nikaaleksejeva</em></a><em>/DFRLab via TGStat)</em></figcaption></figure><p>The DFRLab used Telegram’s API to collect 45,054 messages forwarded by the fifty-six Telegram channels, and TGStat to collect 12,593 messages forward from them by other channels. The observation period for this analysis began February 24, 2022 — on the day of Russia’s invasion — and continued through January 17, 2023. This data is represented in a network graph consisting of 3,871 Telegram channels, represented by nodes, and 57,646 forwarded messages, represented by edges. The direction of each edge starts at the source channel and goes to the channels where it was forwarded. The node size represents the number of incoming messages and highlights the amplifiers. A modularity analysis, which identifies accounts that are closely connected based on how they amplify each other’s content, detected nine clusters.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FXGDaASZuajLfg_6V5FVVQ.png" /><figcaption><em>Network graph showing forwarded messages from the fifty-six analyzed channels. The direction of the edges starts at the channel where the message was originally published and goes to the channels where it was forwarded. The size of nodes represents the number of incoming messages and highlights the amplifiers. The color of nodes and edges represents the modularity class determined by Gephi. (Source: </em><a href="https://twitter.com/sayyara_a"><em>@sayyara_a</em></a><em> and </em><a href="http://twitter.com/nikaaleksejeva"><em>@nikaaleksejeva</em></a><em>/DFRLab via Telegram API, TGStat and Gephi)</em></figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Surf Noise and peers</strong></h4><p>The network graph revealed that @surf_noise1 is the largest amplifier, but despite its size and activity, it exists on the margins of the larger network and is most closely clustered with the @node_of_time_RUS and @InfoDefenseRUS clusters. All three channels have different approaches to the content they post; @surf_noise1 <a href="https://t.me/surf_noise1/23765">often</a> <a href="https://t.me/surf_noise1/23758">posts</a> <a href="https://t.me/surf_noise1/23768">news</a> about the activities of the voluntary military training program NVP ROKOT, while @node_of_time_RUS is <a href="https://t.me/node_of_time_RUS/5391">more</a> <a href="https://t.me/node_of_time_RUS/5401">focused</a> on international news and @InfoDefenseRUS <a href="https://t.me/InfoDefenseRUS/16176">posts</a> <a href="https://t.me/InfoDefenseRUS/16182">updates</a> from the front lines of the war.</p><p>The second largest account in the Info Defense network is the Russian account @InfoDefenseRus, which spreads narratives that blame the United States and NATO for the invasion. For example, a February 6, 2023 <a href="https://t.me/InfoDefenseRUS/16495">post</a> contained an old political cartoon that depicts Poland and the United Kingdom as dogs; Poland is shown as a small dog sitting on the back of the United Kingdom. The dog representing the UK is on a leash held by a figure dressed in garb resembling the US flag. The illustration is intended to convey that Poland is dependent on the UK, which in turn is dependent on the US. The cartoon was originally <a href="https://ria.ru/20180319/1516783230.html">published</a> in 2018 by Russian state-owned media outlet RIA Novosti.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Zw-9DdNEdMKpNqdXK2P_IA.png" /><figcaption><em>A 2018 political cartoon shared on the @InfoDefenseRus channel in February 2023. The caption reads, “‘Brave’ Poland and its real place.” (Source:</em><a href="https://t.me/InfoDefenseRUS/16495"><em> @</em> <em>InfoDefenseRUS </em></a><em>/</em><a href="https://archive.is/Jxg4R"><em>archive</em></a><em>)</em></figcaption></figure><p>When it comes to the sources of the forwarded messages, the accounts @surf_noise1, @node_of_time_RUS, and @InfoDefenseRUS all relied on similar pro-Kremlin channels for their content, including the accounts of <a href="https://t.me/MariaVladimirovnaZakharova">Maria Zakharova</a>, spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; <a href="https://t.me/tass_agency">TASS</a>, the Kremlin-owned news agency; <a href="https://t.me/margaritasimonyan">Margarita Simonyan</a>, editor-in-chief of RT and Sputnik; <a href="https://t.me/pushilindenis">Denis Pushilin</a>, head of the Donetsk People’s Republic; <a href="https://t.me/wargonzo">Semyon Pegov</a>, a Russian blogger; and <a href="https://t.me/medvedev_telegram">Dmitry Medvedev</a>, the former Russian president.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/944/1*z8wDg5JCjSj2JcOq79LObw.png" /><figcaption><em>Network graph shows the pro-Kremlin channels cited by @surf_noise1, @node_of_time_RUS, and @InfoDefenseRUS. (Source: </em><a href="https://twitter.com/sayyara_a"><em>@sayyara_a</em></a><em> and </em><a href="http://twitter.com/nikaaleksejeva"><em>@nikaaleksejeva</em></a><em>/DFRLab via Telegram API, TGStat and Gephi)</em></figcaption></figure><p>The network graph also shows a strong connection between @surf_noise1 and @kremlinprachka. The account @surf_noise1 forwarded seventy-one messages from @kremlinprachka that contained daily statistics published by the Russian defense ministry; every post included the caption, “Denazification is inevitable!” (“Денацификация неизбежна!”). In June 2022, the independent Russian media outlet <a href="https://www.proekt.media/research/ofitsialnaya-statistika-minoborony/">Proekt</a> analyzed daily defense ministry statistics and found the data was riddled with errors and falsehoods.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FKLKjWpsDKgn7L5dZhTkCg.png" /><figcaption><em>Examples of @surf_noise1 sharing @kremlinprachka posts about Russian “achievements” in the war in Ukraine. (Source: </em><a href="https://t.me/surf_noise1/15426"><em>@surf_noise1</em></a><em>/</em><a href="https://archive.is/wip/p8qtl"><em>archive</em></a><em>, top left; </em><a href="https://t.me/surf_noise1/15463"><em>@surf_noise1</em></a><em>/</em><a href="https://archive.is/wip/pwYkD"><em>archive</em></a><em>, top right; @</em><a href="https://t.me/surf_noise1/15479"><em>surf_noise1</em></a><em>/</em><a href="https://archive.md/wip/hj92I"><em>archive</em></a><em>, bottom left; </em><a href="https://t.me/surf_noise1/15503"><em>@surf_noise1</em></a><em>/</em><a href="https://archive.md/wip/z54fc"><em>archive</em></a><em>, bottom right)</em></figcaption></figure><p>In 2022, there was a period of time in which Russian Telegram channels exposed the owners of other channels. The channel @Surf_noise was one of the accounts revealing the identities of <a href="https://archive.is/7uP1p">other</a> Telegram channel owners. One <a href="https://archive.is/u2Qpn">claim</a> speculated that the deputy mayor of Moscow, Natalya Sergunina, ran @kremlinprachka. The DFRLab cannot confirm this allegation.</p><h4><strong>Affiliation with a Kremlin-approved military training program</strong></h4><p>The account @surf_noise1 frequently reports on the activities of the Kremlin-approved voluntary military training program NVP ROKOT. The program <a href="https://vmeste-rf.tv/news/aktivisty-zapustili-v-rf-programmu-nachalnoy-voennoy-podgotovki-rokot/">offers</a> basic military training to volunteers and others to fight in Ukraine.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/688/1*wHhHtEbaPHJ3BjXyiYVcxw.png" /><figcaption><em>A Telegram post from @surf_noise1 referencing the NVP-ROKOT (НВП-Рокот) basic military training program. (Source: </em><a href="https://t.me/surf_noise1/23098"><em>@surf_noise1</em></a><em>/</em><a href="https://archive.is/PUVL2"><em>archive</em></a><em>)</em></figcaption></figure><p>The NVP-ROKOT<em> </em>program <a href="https://archive.is/cJlLw">originated</a> in <a href="https://archive.is/pSQ3v">Volgograd</a> but now operates across Russia, according to the state-owned outlet <a href="https://archive.is/P36Fn">Gazeta</a>. According to <a href="https://archive.is/wip/ogfeg">posts</a> from @surf_noise1, NVP (“НВП”) is an abbreviation for “Наше дело правое, Враг будет побежден, Победа будет за нами,” which translates to “Our cause is right, the enemy will be defeated, victory will be ours.” The channel <a href="https://archive.is/E92PP">invites</a> users to pick from a list of 120 closed groups, based on location, dedicated to trainings. The DFRLab could not further analyze these groups because users are <a href="https://archive.is/KQken">vetted</a> via a form that requests personal data before being accepted in the ancillary groups.</p><p>A pro-Kremlin <a href="https://news.russia.postsen.com/">Russian blog</a> reported that the trainings were organized by the administers of the ROKOT Telegram channel, which appears to be a reference to @surf_noise1, which uses the handle ROKOT Z (“Deadline Z”). Further, the Russian outlet <a href="https://archive.is/wgJEj">Volga News</a> reported that the administrators of the program are Maryana <a href="https://archive.is/FZbh0">Kudryashova </a>and Anastasia Andreichenko.</p><p>According to posts made by @surf_noise1, NVP-ROKOT<em> </em>had a <a href="https://archive.is/Rq2uo">contract</a> with DOSAAF (ДОСААФ), the Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Navy. DOSAAF was a paramilitary sport organization in the Soviet Union re-formed in December 1991 as the Russian Defense Sports-Technical Organization (ROSTO). The organization <a href="https://lenta.ru/news/2009/12/07/dosaaf/">reverted</a> to its old name in 2009 after President Putin <a href="https://archive.is/V8jrI">signed</a> a government decree on renaming the organization. The decree <a href="https://rg.ru/documents/2009/12/07/dosaaf-dok.html">lists</a> “tasks given by the state” to DOSAAF, including “maintenance of infrastructure facilities of DOSAAF of Russia in order to fulfill tasks during the period of mobilization and in wartime.”</p><p>According to posts from @surf_noise1, there were <a href="https://archive.is/1jnQX">conflicts</a> between NVP ROKOT and DOSAAF. NVP ROKOT, citing Kudryashova and Andreichenko, <a href="https://archive.is/U0eos">accused</a> DOSAAF of not <a href="https://archive.is/Rq2uo">providing</a> a physical space for their program and complained that the free program was being charged rent. Later posts suggest that the conflict was resolved, as <a href="https://archive.is/ftq8G">ROKOT</a> <a href="https://archive.is/TH1HK">thanked</a> DOSAAF for helping to organize trainings.</p><p>The Telegram channel @Surf_noise1 <a href="https://archive.is/b8Ff0">took over</a> operations from the oldest channel in the network, @<a href="https://t.me/surf_noise">Surf_noise</a>. The latter channel was created on December 26, 2019, and has not been active since January 24, 2021, when the former <a href="https://t.me/surf_noise1">was created</a>. The third post by @Surf_noise1 <a href="https://archive.is/b8Ff0">claimed</a> that @surf_noise was suspended after a mass reporting campaign was carried out against the channel “from the territory of Ukraine.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eL3mb-uJb4inb3XAOj5BXQ.png" /><figcaption><em>The third post from @surf_noise1 claims that the previous channel was suspended after a mass reporting campaign. (Source: </em><a href="https://t.me/surf_noise1/5"><em>@surf_noise1</em></a><em> /</em><a href="https://archive.is/b8Ff0"><em>archive</em></a><em>)</em></figcaption></figure><p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine boosted @surf_noise1’s audience. Between February 24 and 25, 2022, the channel gained 8,677 new subscribers. On February 26, the channel gained an additional 12,706 subscribers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Lpr4omkl-NhN0XoLRVfGrw.png" /><figcaption><em>Chart shows the subscriber growth for @surf_noise1. (Source: </em><a href="https://twitter.com/sayyara_a"><em>@sayyara_a</em></a><em>/DFRLab via TGStat)</em></figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Info Defense and volunteer translators</strong></h4><p>Info Defense is the second-largest cluster identified in the network graph. The cluster consists of many channels targeting specific countries. Eleven channels in the Info Defense network were created on October 13, 2022.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uK0hcbYP9D6vsM2ZH-1PuA.png" /><figcaption><em>Eleven Info Defense channels created on October 13, 2022. (Source: </em><a href="https://twitter.com/sayyara_a"><em>@sayyara_a</em></a><em> and </em><a href="http://twitter.com/nikaaleksejeva"><em>@nikaaleksejeva</em></a><em>/DFRLab via TGStat)</em></figcaption></figure><p>Channel history data from TGStat reveals connections between the Info Defense network and the Node of Time network. For example, the channel @InfoDefensePOR was created on March 6, 2022, and used the name “InfoDefensePOR // InfoDefence” until December 8, 2022, at which point it <a href="https://tgstat.com/channel/@InfoDefensePOR/history">changed</a> its name to “Node of Time Português.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VBlxbfftpP1R3kvzjd90ng.png" /><figcaption><em>Screenshot shows the name history for @InfoDefensePOR (Source: </em><a href="https://twitter.com/sayyara_a"><em>@sayyara_a</em></a><em> and </em><a href="http://twitter.com/nikaaleksejeva"><em>@nikaaleksejeva</em></a><em>/DFRLab via TGStat)</em></figcaption></figure><p>The channel description for @InfoDefenseSerbia suggests a possible affiliation with Yuri Podolyaka, a popular pro-Kremlin blogger of Ukrainian origin, as it presents itself as “The channel of Yuri Podolyaka, the most famous military blogger in the Serbian language.”</p><p>A modularity analysis conducted via Gephi revealed that the Telegram channel @InfoDefense is central to this network, as seen in the box below outlined in orange. Channels in the network dedicated to various geographies frequently forwarded pro-Kremlin posts from @InfoDefense, including @InfoDefenseESP (74 forwards); @InfoDefenseEn (71 forwards); @InfoDefenseARB (51 forwards); @InfoDefenseGer (39 forwards); and @InfoDefenseFRA (36 forwards).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_YyofOqY7h-fGHdz53B2iA.png" /><figcaption><em>Network graph mapping the Info Defense network and related channels via the frequency with which they forward each other’s posts. Purple and orange rectangles can be seen in a closer view below. (Source: </em><a href="https://twitter.com/sayyara_a"><em>@sayyara_a</em></a><em> and </em><a href="http://twitter.com/nikaaleksejeva"><em>@nikaaleksejeva</em></a><em>/DFRLab via Telegram API, TGStat and Gephi)</em></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7qNZjagH2SppiUGTY7gmlA.png" /><figcaption><em>Close-up view representing the purple rectangle of the Info Defense network and related channels. (Source: </em><a href="https://twitter.com/sayyara_a"><em>@sayyara_a</em></a><em> and </em><a href="http://twitter.com/nikaaleksejeva"><em>@nikaaleksejeva</em></a><em>/DFRLab via Telegram API, TGStat and Gephi)</em></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pfqDdqUcuQG59POFi_AmdA.png" /><figcaption><em>Close-up view representing the orange rectangle of the Info Defense network and related channels. (Source: </em><a href="https://twitter.com/sayyara_a"><em>@sayyara_a</em></a><em> and </em><a href="http://twitter.com/nikaaleksejeva"><em>@nikaaleksejeva</em></a><em>/DFRLab via Telegram API, TGStat and Gephi)</em></figcaption></figure><p>The amplification went in the opposite direction as well. For example, @InfoDefense forwarded the same Russian-language video from each respective account, using captions written in <a href="https://t.me/informdefense/957">Arab</a>ic, <a href="https://t.me/informdefense/633">English</a>, <a href="https://t.me/informdefense/632">Greek</a>, <a href="https://t.me/informdefense/481">Spanish</a>, and <a href="https://t.me/informdefense/459">German</a>. The account also directly posted the same video with captions written in <a href="https://t.me/informdefense/456">French</a>, <a href="https://t.me/informdefense/448">Ukrainian</a>, <a href="https://t.me/informdefense/447">Swedish</a>, <a href="https://t.me/informdefense/446">Polish</a>, <a href="https://t.me/informdefense/418">Portuguese</a>, and <a href="https://t.me/informdefense/413">Italian</a>. The DFRLab could easily locate the videos because they each included Russian text that read, “Ukraine: castrate wounded Russian soldiers!” (Украина: Кастрировать раненых русских солдат!).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/874/1*Ua4OR2Bv7rjvojLcRWvMnA.png" /><figcaption><em>Screenshot shows forwarded same videos from eleven channels to @InfoDefense channel. (Source: </em><a href="http://twitter.com/nikaaleksejeva"><em>@nikaaleksejeva</em></a><em>/DFRLab via Telegram Desktop)</em></figcaption></figure><p>This behavior suggests that the channel serves as a hub for content to be amplified in other languages. A call to action, written in Russian, is <a href="https://t.me/informdefense/3036">pinned</a> to the @InfoDefense channel, asking people to translate and disseminate the channel’s content and “break through the information blockade TOGETHER.”</p><p>The DFRLab consulted our global team of researchers to examine the accuracy of the @InfoDefense network’s translations. The translation quality suggests that non-native speakers and machine translations were involved. For example, at 00:40 in the Italian video, the wrong article, <em>gli</em>, is used, instead of<em> i</em>. In the Ukrainian translation, the word <em>prizvav</em> (“призвав”) might have been used by a bilingual person as a direct adaptation of a Russian word meaning “mobilization,” but the correct word in Ukrainian would be <em>zaklikav</em> (“закликав”). In Spanish, a voiceover was done by an individual who appears to have a Russian accent, while the translation uses confusing sentence structures. In German, the voiceover was done by a non-native speaker. The Arabic version contains many errors, suggesting the use of machine translation. The French version also includes poor language quality.</p><p>The channel @InfoDefense <a href="https://t.me/informdefense/3379">ceased</a> operations on October 21, 2022. Its last post <a href="https://t.me/informdefense/3393">redirected</a> users to its new channel, @InfoDefAll, which has only posted three times. The first two posts, made in October 2022, were a Russian and English version of the call for “translators, editors, people available to assist with information distribution.” On January 25, 2023, the same post appeared in <a href="https://t.me/InfoDefAll/10">Spanish</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/342/1*hoEEmSNSYgRIG4YuNgLCiw.png" /><figcaption><em>Screenshot of the English call to action, posted by @InfoDefAll. (Source:</em><a href="https://t.me/InfoDefAll/4"><em>@InfoDefAll</em></a><em>/</em><a href="https://archive.is/Ni92K"><em>archive</em></a><em>)</em></figcaption></figure><p>Twenty-seven region-specific channels from the InfoDefense network remained active at the time of writing.</p><h4><strong>Country-specific clusters</strong></h4><p>The accounts targeting Italian and German speakers appear to have a strong connection. Gephi’s modularity analysis suggested that @surf_noise_ger is in the same cluster as @node_of_time_ita, @infodefITALY, and @surf_noise_ita. However, @infodefGERMANY and @node_of_time_DE were detected in a separate cluster, despite some instances of forwarded messages connecting the accounts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*D5qcpbSKVw9cUQhvB6P52Q.png" /><figcaption><em>Network graph showing connections between @surf_noise, @node_of_time, and Info Defense channels in Italian and German. (Source: </em><a href="https://twitter.com/sayyara_a"><em>@sayyara_a</em></a><em> and </em><a href="http://twitter.com/nikaaleksejeva"><em>@nikaaleksejeva</em></a><em>/DFRLab via Telegram API, TGStat and Gephi)</em></figcaption></figure><p>Both @surf_noise_ger and @surf_noise_ita forwarded more posts from @video_languages than any other accounts — 348 and 342 times, respectively. The official name for the <a href="https://t.me/video_languages/">@video_languages</a> channel, РОЛИКИ НА РАЗНЫХ ЯЗЫКАХ, translates to “Video Clips in Different Languages.” The channel’s purpose is similar to @InfoDefense, but it includes subtitles in its videos, making them more accessible to a larger audience. The quality of subtitles produced varied but was generally of better quality than the translations offered by the Info Defense network. For example, the Serbian translation indicated the involvement of a native speaker, but it was written in cyrillic, which <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10993-018-9478-2">Serbian nationalists</a> mostly use. The Chinese translation also was correct, and it used casual forms of expression, suggesting that it was done by a person familiar with Chinese. The German, Arabic, and Persian translations also seemed to be generated by people rather than machine translation. However, the French and Italian videos appeared to be machine-translated.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*20wI68Ce6kt0PmjAUES5WA.png" /><figcaption><em>Examples of posts from @video_languages containing videos adapted in different languages. (Source: </em><a href="https://t.me/video_languages/12378?single"><em>@video_languages</em></a><em>/</em><a href="https://archive.md/wip/hIHu9"><em>archive</em></a><em>, left; </em><a href="https://t.me/video_languages/12361"><em>@video_languages</em></a><em>/</em><a href="https://archive.md/wip/bsJqZ"><em>archive</em></a><em>, right)</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Amplifying Russian embassies abroad</strong></p><p>Other language-specific networks identified in Gephi’s modularity analysis were centered around @surf_noise_sp’s connection to @node_of_time_fr, @surf_noise_jp, and @infodefSPAIN. Notably, @surf_noise_sp actively spread the Kremlin narrative that falsely alleges that Ukrainians are Nazis, using the word word “Nazi” in its posts 404 times.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YjWS8cw_CO8Hs1ZJOMb6JA.png" /><figcaption><em>Network of Telegram channels targeting Spanish, French, and Japanese language spaces. Green and pink boxes highlight clusters with Russian Embassies. A closeup of the pink box can be found below. (Source: </em><a href="https://twitter.com/sayyara_a"><em>@sayyara_a</em></a><em> and </em><a href="http://twitter.com/nikaaleksejeva"><em>@nikaaleksejeva</em></a><em>/DFRLab via Telegram API, TGStat and Gephi)</em></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bNS3sfxJK7FpptjXB2T7qw.png" /><figcaption><em>Close-up of the pink box highlighting a cluster with Russian Embassies. (Source: </em><a href="https://twitter.com/sayyara_a"><em>@sayyara_a</em></a><em> and </em><a href="http://twitter.com/nikaaleksejeva"><em>@nikaaleksejeva</em></a><em>/DFRLab via Telegram API, TGStat and Gephi)</em></figcaption></figure><p>Several channels also forwarded Telegram content from Russian embassies in Japan and Latin America. For example, @surf_noise_jp forwarded messages from the <a href="https://t.me/rusembjp">Russian embassy in Japan</a> 1,254 times. In addition, both @infodefSPAIN and @surf_noise_sp forwarded messages from Russian embassies in <a href="https://t.me/EmbajadaRusaEs">Spain</a> (101), <a href="https://t.me/EmbRusiaEnArg">Argentina</a> (48), <a href="https://t.me/EmbRusNic">Nicaragua</a> (32), <a href="https://t.me/embajadarusaven">Venezuela</a> (32), <a href="https://t.me/EmbRusPan">Panama</a> (22), <a href="https://t.me/embruschile">Chile</a> (20), <a href="https://t.me/EmbRusUruguay">Uruguay</a> (17), <a href="https://t.me/EmbRusEc">Ecuador</a> (15), <a href="https://t.me/embrusiamexico">Mexico</a> (9), <a href="https://t.me/EmbRusCuba">Cuba</a> (3), <a href="https://t.me/EmbajadaRusa_CR">Costa Rica</a> (1), and <a href="https://t.me/embrusbolivia">Bolivia</a> (1). The DFRLab has <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/rt-and-sputnik-in-spanish-boosted-by-russian-embassy-tweets-and-suspicious-accounts-3a24ded7ef57">previously identified</a> Russian embassies as amplifiers of Russian disinformation in Latin America. Russian embassies also <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-war-report-russia-makes-false-claims-while-blaming-ukraine-for-kramatorsk-railway-station-attack/#telegram">disseminated</a> false fact-checks about the Bucha massacre.</p><p>Additionally, the Russian embassy in Bulgaria and two of its consular branch offices promoted @surf_noise1 and eleven other Telegram channels, describing them as “channels that cover the current events in Ukraine objectively” and “expose fake news.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/560/1*sB1fkBnhe6THyiHaEiiurw.png" /><figcaption><em>Facebook posts from The Consulate General of Russia in Ruse, Bulgaria, and the Embassy of Russia in Bulgaria promoting @surf_noise1. (Source: </em><a href="https://twitter.com/sayyara_a"><em>@sayyara_a</em></a><em>/DFRlab via CrowdTangle)</em></figcaption></figure><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>The three networks of Telegram channels uncovered by the DFRLab actively spread Kremlin propaganda and disinformation about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to a global audience. Despite the large number of countries the channels targeted globally, the number of subscribers, average readership of posts, and content quality suggest that the networks have limited resources, which potentially explains their call-outs for translation assistance. Further research will hopeful shed more light on country-specific targeting on Telegram, as well as local Telegram influencers that amplify pro-Kremlin propaganda.</p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/nikaaleksejeva"><strong><em>Nika Aleksejeva</em></strong></a><em> is Resident Research Fellow in the Baltics, with the Digital Forensic Research Lab.</em></p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/sayyara_a"><strong><em>Sayyara Mammadova</em></strong></a><em> is Research Assistant, Azerbaijan with the Digital Forensic Research Lab.</em></p><p><strong><em>Cite this case study:</em></strong></p><p>Nika Aleksejeva and Sayyara Mammadova, “Networks of pro-Kremlin Telegram channels spread disinformation at a global scale,” Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), March 1, 2023, <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/networks-of-pro-kremlin-telegram-channels-spread-disinformation-at-a-global-scale-af4e319bd51e">https://medium.com/dfrlab/networks-of-pro-kremlin-telegram-channels-spread-disinformation-at-a-global-scale-af4e319bd51e</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=af4e319bd51e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/networks-of-pro-kremlin-telegram-channels-spread-disinformation-at-a-global-scale-af4e319bd51e">Networks of pro-Kremlin Telegram channels spread disinformation at a global scale</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab">DFRLab</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Russia takes next step in domestic internet surveillance]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/dfrlab/russia-takes-next-step-in-domestic-internet-surveillance-aa3fdbf0120f?source=rss-105bc7078bae------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/aa3fdbf0120f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[@DFRLab]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 17 Feb 2023 13:09:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-02-17T16:55:59.109Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Oculus surveillance system goes live as the Kremlin tightens public sector access to Google services</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*35dk0KYXmKBEMsO5p4dcHA.png" /><figcaption>(Jakub Porzycki/NurPhoto via Reuters Connect)</figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>By Eto Buziashvili</em></strong></p><p>Russia’s telecommunications regulator Roskomnadzor has launched Oculus, an Internet surveillance system that will automatically detect online content the Kremlin considers undesirable. Concurrently, Moscow has started to tighten control over usage of Google products, instructing Russian official agencies and state-owned companies to replace them with Russian-developed services.</p><p>Russia <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-war-report-russia-and-ukraine-warn-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-facing-imminent-threat/#prohibited">announced</a> its initial plans for the Internet surveillance system in August 2022, with the intent of rolling it out by mid-December of that year. On February 13, 2022, a representative of Roskomnadzor’s <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/data-leak-suggests-crackdown-on-anti-war-social-media-posts-by-russias-telecom-regulator-f2a3d09d6b2f">General Radio Frequency Center</a> (GRFC) <a href="https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2023/02/13/962682-roskomnadzor-zapustil-sistemu-poiska-okulus">told</a> <em>Vedemosti</em> that Oculus was operational and that it “reveals violations of Russian law in images and videos.”</p><p><a href="https://ria.ru/20230213/okulus-1851607639.html"><em>RIA Novosti</em></a><em>,</em> citing the same unnamed GRFC official, reported that the system uses “computer vision technology” and “recognizes images and symbols, given scenes and actions, and analyzes text in photos and videos.” The official added that Oculus detects materials including “extremist themes, calls for massive illegal events, suicide, pro-drug content, LGBT propaganda.” The GRFC claims that Oculus will analyze more than 200,000 images and videos per day; in contrast, Roskomnadzor staff previously analyzed approximately 200 images and videos manually. When processing footage of mass gatherings, Oculus reportedly will also be able to <a href="https://meduza.io/news/2023/02/13/roskomnadzor-otchitalsya-o-zapuske-sistemy-okulus-dlya-poiska-ekstremizma-i-lgbt-propagandy-v-internete-sudya-po-nedavney-utechke-ona-takzhe-budet-iskat-kak-oskorblyayut-putina">identify</a> the faces of individuals even “under a beard or a mask” and “determine [their] age.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*59XpoiC2fwa1Act6Xw7T0g.png" /><figcaption>GRFC headquarters in Moscow. (Source: <a href="https://grfc.ru/grfc/eng/">GRFC.ru</a>/<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221203063642/https://grfc.ru/grfc/eng/">archive</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>According to <em>Vedemosti</em>, Roskomnadzor <a href="https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2023/02/13/962682-roskomnadzor-zapustil-sistemu-poiska-okulus">plans</a> a more advanced version of Oculus by 2025 capable of “adding new classes and types of violations, as well as the function of determining the postures of people and their actions.” Other advancements might include detecting “prohibited material” in complex handwriting and hand-drawn content.</p><p>Russian law <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-hybrid-war-report-social-platforms-crack-down-on-kremlin-media-as-kremlin-demands-compliance/">prohibits</a> a range of content. To prevent factual information about the war from spreading domestically, Russia passed legislation in 2022 that allows imprisoning a person for sharing “fake” content about Russian troops for fifteen years. The Kremlin has also cracked down on the LGBTQ community as part of its efforts to frame the war in Ukraine as defending “traditional Russian values” against Western values, which Vladimir Putin has described as a <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-war-report-russia-defends-traditional-values-criminalizes-lgbtq-propaganda/#lgbtq">national security matter</a>. Russian lawmakers, meanwhile, <a href="http://duma.gov.ru/news/55609/">passed</a> a legislative amendment in October 2022 expanding the prohibition of “gay propaganda” to all age groups. Russian law enforcement has exploited these legislative changes, <a href="https://vm.ru/technology/1031988-v-rossii-vklyuchili-okulus-chto-eto-za-sistema-kak-rabotaet-i-kakoj-zapreshennyj-kontent-ishet">targeting</a> individuals and entities for propagating “<a href="https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/85023/">non-traditional sexual values</a>.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lUnAVpq4tkGab5r3q8vjiw.png" /><figcaption>Russian State Duma passes legislation prohibiting the propagation of “non-traditional sexual values” on October 27, 2022. (Source: <a href="http://duma.gov.ru/news/55609/">Duma.gov.ru</a>/<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20221230072016/http://duma.gov.ru/news/55609/">archive</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>According to a February 2023 <a href="https://www.svoboda.org/a/monopoliya-na-informatsiyu-voyna-i-svoboda-mneniy-v-rossii/32260434.html">article</a> by <em>Radio Svoboda</em>, the human rights project Network Freedoms <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1RiYPt8dkQAOYW6Yz4cO9LP9oChbVeqSd/view">documented</a> 779 prosecutions for online activity, 149 defendants accused of propagating “military fakes,” more than 600,000 blocked web pages, and forty illegal VPN services over the course of 2022.</p><p>Oculus is not the Kremlin’s first system for controlling and censoring content online. The DFRLab previously <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/data-leak-suggests-crackdown-on-anti-war-social-media-posts-by-russias-telecom-regulator-f2a3d09d6b2f">reported</a> on Roskomnadzor’s “Vepr” project, which according to leaked data identifies “information tension hotspots.”</p><h4><strong>Replacing Google services with domestic equivalents</strong></h4><p>In parallel to the rollout of Oculus, Russia has tightened control over usage of foreign online services. <a href="https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2023/02/10/962439-goskompanii-pitayutsya-borotsya-s-google"><em>Vedomosti</em></a><em> </em>reported that large Russian companies, state corporations and agencies are trying “to wean employees from using Google services.” Russian state agencies are purchasing corporate VPN services, as well as network gateways and firewalls, to block Google products internally and “build a secure tunnel for data exchange between users.” In addition, state-owned companies are using domestic virtual data rooms (VDRs) similar Google Drive to share documents among employees.</p><p>According to the <a href="https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2023/02/10/goskompanii-zakupili-sistemi-filtratsii-trafika-chtobi-otuchit-sotrudnikov-ot-google-a33669"><em>Moscow Times</em></a>, the Russian space agency Roskosmos and defense conglomerate Rostec have already blocked internal employee access to Google products. In addition, when working from personal computers at home, employees also “must install VPN solutions that block the ability to use third-party services.” According to the outlet, other Russian agencies have received similar instructions, including intelligence services and MinTsifry, the ministry for digital development.</p><p>In the spring of 2022, Top10VPN published the <a href="https://www.top10vpn.com/research/russia-vpn-spending/">report</a> on Russian <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1bPxVE9yq_aijYXq2xYnGe6YFs6h5-tfvaFyi022mzhs/edit#gid=0">VPN spending</a> after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The authors found “236 official contracts for VPN technology worth over $9.8 million” made public in Russia. According to the report, most of this money has been spent in Moscow, while “legislative agencies have spent more than any other sector.”</p><p><a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/expert/eto-buziashvili/?fbclid=IwAR0uZSCHorFK3c9x6wCNxZ57rf-LjjMJ1w8QTz0_S6wEWntv7AeEEBp1q_U"><strong><em>Eto Buziashvili</em></strong></a><strong><em> is a DFRLab Research Associate based in Tbilisi, Georgia.</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>Cite this case study:</em></strong></p><p>Eto Buziashvili, “Russia takes next step in domestic internet surveillance,” Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), February 17, 2022, <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/russia-takes-next-step-in-domestic-internet-surveillance-aa3fdbf0120f">https://medium.com/dfrlab/russia-takes-next-step-in-domestic-internet-surveillance-aa3fdbf0120f</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=aa3fdbf0120f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/russia-takes-next-step-in-domestic-internet-surveillance-aa3fdbf0120f">Russia takes next step in domestic internet surveillance</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab">DFRLab</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Data leak suggests crackdown on anti-war social media posts by Russia’s telecom regulator]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/dfrlab/data-leak-suggests-crackdown-on-anti-war-social-media-posts-by-russias-telecom-regulator-f2a3d09d6b2f?source=rss-105bc7078bae------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f2a3d09d6b2f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-media]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leaks-online]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[censorship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[roskomnadzor]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[@DFRLab]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 09 Feb 2023 21:39:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-02-28T13:34:30.274Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Roskomnadzor reportedly deleted 150,000 anti-war posts and intends to deploy bot farms to censor anti-war content</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GmO1V-f4_u-CQYoBUo9uWQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Logo of Russian telecom regulator Roskomnadzor reflected on a laptop screen. (Source: Reuters/Maxim Shemetov)</figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>By Valentin Châtelet</em></strong></p><p>A massive data leak from Russia telecom regulator Roskomnadzor suggests the agency has censored anti-war social media posts and is implementing a bot farm to amplify official Russian narratives. The two-terabyte data archive was retrieved and leaked by the Belarusian activist group <a href="https://t.me/cpartisans/1036">Cyberpartisans</a> in November 2022. It was then shared with investigative journalists and Russian media outlets, including <a href="https://www.agents.media/"><em>Agentsvo</em></a>, which <a href="https://www.agents.media/tsenzura/">called</a> its contents the “biggest leak on Russian censorship.”</p><p>The leaked data, attributed to a Roskomnadzor department called the General Radio Frequency Center (GRFC), contained documents discussing the the deletion of 150,000 social media posts. In the same report, the GRFC claimed to have found 160,000 “fake” posts and 40,000 posts calling for protests against the war. The agency estimated that more than 100 million users of Telegram and Youtube accessed what it referred to as “harmful information.”</p><p>Some of Ukraine and Belarus’ biggest Russian-language Telegram channels were flagged in the archive as “systematically spreading unverified information.” Two Telegram channels, “Ищи своих” (“Look for Your”) and “Легион Свобода” (“Liberty Legion) were cited as harmful because they posted personal information about Russian soldiers and prisoners.</p><p>The archive also contained personal information on journalists working for media outlets considered “foreign agents” and “undesirable organizations” in Russia. According to <em>Agenstvo</em>, Roskomnadzor has blocked access to seventy-two Russian-language media outlets, twenty-three foreign media outlets, and over 630 Ukrainian online resources since the beginning of the war. Leaked GRFC emails also discussed requests to block access to independent media resources <a href="https://www.proekt.media/">Proekt</a> and <a href="https://openmedia.io/">Open Media</a>.</p><p>The archive also mentioned spreadsheets monitoring comments on Youtube, Telegram, and Odnoklassniki criticizing Vladimir Putin’s health. The majority of comments in the spreadsheet contained references to the phrase, “Putin has cancer.”</p><p>The archive also contained spreadsheets monitoring activity surrounding the topic of mobilization. Most of the posts and comments, which numbered around 1,700 in total, were found on Telegram and VK. An additional spreadsheet listed Russian social media accounts blocked as a result of international sanctions. The GRFC was reportedly tasked with contacting the platforms to ask for these accounts to be unblocked.</p><p>Other data from the leak also mentioned a plan by Roskomnadzor and GRFC called “Clean Internet,” which mobilizes bot farms to amplify official Russian media content. The bot farms in question, which would reportedly launch in May 2023, would be able to “solve simple and complex captcha systems,” while also “using the created accounts to fill their feed with content in order to imitate user activity (photos, posts, personal data and others).” According to the documentation, the bot farms would target VK, TikTok, Likee, Kwai, Facebook, Instagram, Telegram, Rutube, Yappy and Twitter.</p><p>According to <em>Agenstvo</em>, the bot farms are part of a bigger project, including a platform dedicated to monitoring social media use by Russian users. The project, named “Vepr” after a model of Kalashnikov rifles, is tasked with finding “information tension hotspots.” Its system is reportedly designed to find these “hotspots” and determine whether members are breaking the law or spreading false information; it would then relay this information to authorities. Vepr would rely on topical tags, including “false information on war”, “financial support to UAF”, “use of VPN”, “LGBT organizations and NGOs”, “independent media” and “insults against the president,” to identified the “information tension hotspots.”</p><p><a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/expert/valentin-chatelet/"><strong><em>Valentin Châtelet</em></strong></a><em> is a DFRLab Research Associate based in Brussels, Belgium.</em></p><p><strong><em>Cite this case study:</em></strong></p><p>Valentin Châtelet, “Data leak suggests crackdown on anti-war social media posts by Russia’s telecom regulator,” Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), February 9, 2022, <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/data-leak-suggests-crackdown-on-anti-war-social-media-posts-by-russias-telecom-regulator-f2a3d09d6b2f">https://medium.com/dfrlab/data-leak-suggests-crackdown-on-anti-war-social-media-posts-by-russias-telecom-regulator-f2a3d09d6b2f</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f2a3d09d6b2f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/data-leak-suggests-crackdown-on-anti-war-social-media-posts-by-russias-telecom-regulator-f2a3d09d6b2f">Data leak suggests crackdown on anti-war social media posts by Russia’s telecom regulator</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab">DFRLab</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How Russian YouTube copycat RUTUBE promotes pro-Kremlin narratives]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/dfrlab/how-russian-youtube-copycat-rutube-promotes-pro-kremlin-narratives-b7a87aee8fcb?source=rss-105bc7078bae------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b7a87aee8fcb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[russia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[propaganda]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-media]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[videos]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[disinformation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[@DFRLab]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2023 00:28:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-01-31T00:28:30.839Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><em>RUTUBE’s mix of Kremlin narratives and entertainment has seen a surge of referral traffic since Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine</em></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SCQEoV8TNvd_6zwH34oWNA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Participants walk past a screen displaying the RUTUBE logo at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in Saint Petersburg, Russia ,June 17, 2022. (Source: Reuters/Anton Vaganov)</figcaption></figure><p><strong><em>By Andrii Umanskyi</em></strong></p><p>The Russian video platform RUTUBE interlaces Russian propaganda with entertainment content to deliver Kremlin narratives to a broader and potentially apolitical audience. RUTUBE supports the Kremlin’s propaganda machine by using entertainment content as a gateway to Kremlin-backed narratives. The platform primarily targets domestic audiences and is of great importance to the Kremlin as it delivers controlled information through arguably the most digestible medium — video.</p><p>RUTUBE first launched in 2006 as YouTube experienced one of its first surges in popularity; the growing name recognition of YouTube inspired the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b6O2K9elbh8">copycat branding</a> choice. RUTUBE’s founders, Mikhail Paulkin and Oleg Volobuyev, also created the video game <a href="http://Dozory.ru">Dozory</a>; they were pushed out of the video game company in a 2007 <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20220906081725/https:/www.kommersant.ru/doc/805282">hostile takeover</a> by Vzglyad publisher Dmitry Itskov. The following year, Gazprom-Media, part of the state-owned energy conglomerate Gazprom, <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/781121?query=Rutube">purchased RUTUBE</a> from the Paulkin and Volobuyev. Gazprom is loyal to the Russian government and provides substantial <a href="https://www.economist.com/business/how-gazprom-helps-the-kremlin-put-the-squeeze-on-europe/21807841">geopolitical leverage</a> for the Kremlin.</p><p>Initially, RUTUBE was not an incredibly effective <a href="https://www.infox.ru/news/18/2956-sozdateli-rutube-usli-iz-kompanii">instrument</a> for Gazprom-Media or the Kremlin. One of the first documented attempts by the Russian government to engage with video blogging can be traced back to a 2010 initiative called “Spasibo, Eva!” (“Thank you, Eva!)”, which <a href="https://istories.media/investigations/2022/02/09/seks-lozh-i-video/">launched on YouTube</a> rather than RUTUBE due to disagreements between the producers and Gazprom-Media. “Spasibo” kickstarted the careers of many Russian influencers that remain popular today, including Ruslan Usachev, Ilya Maddyson, Danila Poperechny, Ilya Prusikin, and others. In 2012, the hacktivist collective Anonymous accessed and leaked a tranche of emails from the initiative revealing it was <a href="https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2012/02/06_a_3990869.shtml">sponsored</a> by the Russian Federal Agency for Youth Affairs, making it one of the Kremlin’s first recorded attempts to influence a video platform. The same year, Gazprom-Media ordered a <a href="http://www.cubancouncil.com/work/project/rutube-identity">rebranding</a> of RUTUBE that appeared to be an attempt to distance the platform from its <a href="https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/8633620/">increasingly popular</a> Western counterpart.</p><p>From 2013 to 2021, RUTUBE made several deals with Russian companies, including search engine <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2827588">Yandex</a>, to increase its user base. However, the platform saw little significant development during this period. The Russian government turned its attention back to RUTUBE after opposition leader Alexei Navalny used YouTube to publish two documentaries in December 2020 and January 2021 uncovering details about his <a href="https://youtu.be/ibqiet6Bg38">assassination attempt</a> and <a href="https://youtu.be/ipAnwilMncI">rampant Kremlin corruption</a>. The YouTube documentaries triggered Navalny’s <a href="https://www.rbc.ru/politics/17/01/2021/600483939a7947e7712499b8">detention</a> and prompted a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/23/the-problem-is-putin-protesters-throng-the-streets-to-support-navalny">series of large-scale protests</a> across <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/23/world/europe/navalny-protests-russia.html">Russia</a>. By the end of 2021, the Kremlin entrenched its control over social media when Gazprom affiliates Gazprombank and Sogaz <a href="https://thebell.io/en/russia-takes-direct-control-of-top-social-media-networks/">purchase</a>d a controlling stake in VK, which owns the two most prominent social networks in Russia, Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki.</p><p>Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine marked a turning point in the development of RUTUBE. The invasion triggered the platform’s rapid growth, with a 161 percent increase in the platform’s monthly audience from March to April 2022, according to state-owned news outlet <a href="https://tass.ru/ekonomika/14649541">TASS</a>. In addition, a DFRLab backlink analysis of RUTUBE’s domain showed that the number of backlinks remained relatively unchanged for more than two years until a spike in March 2022 kicked off a rise in backlink referrals that lasted until October of that year, indicating a surge in popularity of RUTUBE following the invasion of Ukraine.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*NQSrpiNYsEwUKWjSyWa9iA.png" /><figcaption><em>A graph visualizing the numbers of links and domains linking to RUTUBE from January 1, 2020, to October 17, 2022. (Source: DFRLab via </em><a href="https://app.neilpatel.com/en/seo_analyzer/backlinks?domain=rutube.ru&amp;mode=domain)"><em>Neilpatel Backlink Checker</em></a><em>)</em></figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Entwining political narratives and entertainment</strong></h4><p>RUTUBE provides a platform for Russian state-backed television channels <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/youtube-blocks-russian-state-funded-media-channels-globally-2022-03-11/">banned by YouTube</a> in March 2022. The platform directly embeds state-owned TV channels, like Channel One Russia, Rossiya 1, and NTV into the platform’s toolbar, superseding its algorithmic content.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/802/1*okKah87uKJpSf2Ak-p1x4g.png" /><figcaption><em>RUTUBE’s homepage on October 15, 2022. The bar on the left shows how Russian state TV channels are directly integrated into the homepage. (Source: </em><a href="https://rutube.ru/"><em>RUTUBE.Ru</em></a><em>)</em></figcaption></figure><p>Another indicative feature of RUTUBE is the Now Searching section on the homepage, which ostensibly showcases trending searches on RUTUBE, but displays a mix of general-interest content and political messages. For example, on October 1, 2022, the section entwined general topics like “World Animal Day,” “Mushroom Season,” and “How to Get Rid of Stress” with “DNR and LNR [Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics] Joining Russia,” “Partial Mobilization,” and “DNR and LNR Referendums.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*dUDfIlkhOWs3YP0JlyQxXQ.png" /><figcaption><em>A screengrab of RUTUBE’s Now Searching section on October 1, 2022. From left to right, the blocks read: World Animal Day; DNR and LNR Joining Russia; Mushroom Season; Partial Mobilization; How to Get Rid of Stress; DNR and LNR Referendums. (Source: </em><a href="https://rutube.ru/"><em>RUTUBE.Ru</em></a><em>)</em></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*oU7koeY_dzT6hXGCe30aZA.png" /><figcaption><em>A screengrab of RUTUBE’s Now Searching section on October 19, 2022. From left to right, the blocks read: Recipes of Jam; Security Council Meeting; [Food] Preservations for Winter; Plane Crash in Yeysk; Autumn Berries; Putin’s Speech in Astana. (Source: </em><a href="https://rutube.ru/"><em>RUTUBE.Ru</em></a><em>)</em></figcaption></figure><p>A deeper analysis of RUTUBE’s Trending page confirmed that the platform serves as a conduit for Kremlin narratives. The DFRLab scraped videos from RUTUBE’S Trending page on October 12, 2022. Of the thirty videos collected, seventeen dealt with political messaging, including fifteen related to Ukraine. A second scraping conducted on October 14 found that nineteen out of thirty trending videos focused on politics, of which seventeen referencing Ukraine.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/704/1*OCKZQT8Zrvk4OcTjOSOZPw.png" /><figcaption><em>Videos scraped from RUTUBE’s Trending page on October 12, 2022. Political videos are highlighted in orange. (Source: DFRLab via </em><a href="https://rutube.ru/"><em>RUTUBE.Ru</em></a><em>)</em></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/690/1*ON7ZVxn101qUj48DRzpEmQ.png" /><figcaption><em>Videos scraped from RUTUBE’s Trending page on October 14, 2022. Political videos are highlighted in orange. (Source: DFRLab via </em><a href="https://rutube.ru/"><em>RUTUBE.Ru</em></a><em>)</em></figcaption></figure><p>RUTUBE also regularly promotes videos about the Ukraine war on its news pages. The videos are most frequently presented in a daily or weekly <a href="https://rutube.ru/video/ba37f15aa02833af645703fe84f0fb79/">news format</a>. Other formats include talk shows that attempt to analyze the war through a prism favoring Russia, including live streams from the highly jingoistic <a href="https://rutube.ru/video/892803aeddff647ea615822d85734361/">Soloviev Live</a>. For example, when Russia announced a partial mobilization in September 2022, videos ranged from <a href="https://rutube.ru/video/00a13112b5f5f259accaea0e9c97cb8d/">news pieces</a> to <a href="https://rutube.ru/video/0ceefb97b0c772350498cd49d651eb71/">explanatory lectures</a> about the implications for regular citizens.</p><p>This analysis of RUTUBE is indicative of a slow but persistent shift toward homemade Russian internet platforms that has only escalated since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Kremlin <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/03/07/1085025672/russia-social-media-ban">restrictions and crackdowns</a> on Western social media platforms appear to have helped the platform gain traction domestically, but RUTUBE management admits its platform is still far behind YouTube.</p><p>“In the case of YouTube, the initial focus was on the English-speaking audience,” RUTUBE CEO Alexander Moiseev told <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5515273">Kommersant</a> in September 2022. “The focus of RUTUBE is the Russian-speaking audience. And I think that, from her point of view, we will overcome the amount of content of other platforms very soon. There are many people in the world who speak Russian, and this is actually a large community that also wants to offer interesting content. When we achieve perfection in this, then, of course, we will go further.”</p><p><strong><em>Andrii Umanskyi</em></strong><em> was a Fall 2022 Young Global Professional at the DFRLab. He currently attends American University, where he is pursuing a bachelor’s degree in international studies with a minor in applied physics.</em></p><p><strong><em>Cite this case study:</em></strong></p><p>Andrii Umanskyi, “How Russian YouTube copycat RUTUBE promotes pro-Kremlin narratives,” Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), January 30, 2022, <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/how-russian-youtube-copycat-rutube-promotes-pro-kremlin-narratives-b7a87aee8fcb">https://medium.com/dfrlab/how-russian-youtube-copycat-rutube-promotes-pro-kremlin-narratives-b7a87aee8fcb</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b7a87aee8fcb" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/how-russian-youtube-copycat-rutube-promotes-pro-kremlin-narratives-b7a87aee8fcb">How Russian YouTube copycat RUTUBE promotes pro-Kremlin narratives</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab">DFRLab</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>