Survive and Thrive: DW’s experts on digital censorship

Janelle Dumalaon: Welcome to a new year of Survive and Thrive, your global media viability podcast. 

I'm Janelle Dumalaon and in this season, we're examining what it takes for independent public interest media to operate in a turbulent world. 

Across many countries, free media is under strain. Journalists face censorship, repression and direct threats. Funding is shrinking, digital platforms dominate attention and public trust is slipping. 

This season, we look at how media can stay resilient and stay relevant as a cornerstone of democracy. Our goal is clear, to help listeners understand the forces reshaping journalism and to spark real conversations about how to protect and support a free press. 

Today's episode is about digital censorship. It's rising fast. Public interest media are being blocked, monitored and attacked. Journalists fear further digital security threats and their physical safety. They also face constant disinformation and state propaganda. 

Exiled outlets carry the heaviest load. Many have been pushed out of Russia, Belarus, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Eritrea, just to name a few. They still report for their audiences, but survival is hard. 

Our guests today are Oliver Linow and Esther Kleine, both are Internet freedom specialists from Deutsche Welle's IT and Security department. They work on keeping independent media online and safe. To the both of you, thank you so much for being here.

Esther Kleine: Thanks for having us. 

Janelle Dumalaon: Well, perhaps we can start off by you telling us exactly what that entails. What does it mean to be an Internet freedom specialist at Deutsche Welle? 

Oliver Linow: I can start. Our job is to create and to develop solutions to fight censorship and strategies against censorship for Deutsche Welle, for our content creators in 32 languages. Deutsche Welle is blocked in China, in Iran, in Russia, in Belarus and in Burkina Faso so we help the editorial teams to bring the content into these countries. 

Esther Kleine: Right. And for my personal job description as a project manager, not a tech specialist, I would always go to Oliver and ask how does the technical solution look like in detail. What do I have to explain to the newsroom and what do they have to explain to the audience? So that the audience is in the end able to take down these barriers and come to us again via VPN or any other circumvention technique. 

I'm trying to build the bridge between the tech and, in the end, the audience. 

Janelle Dumalaon: I think that's a very good way of putting it. So, on the one hand, you both work on digital censorship strategies and at the same time, it's also your job to communicate these strategies to whoever may find them useful. And unfortunately, with digital censorship being on the rise, lots of outlets will find that useful. 

So maybe you can walk us through scenarios of how exactly governments limit the free flow of information. What does digital censorship actually look like in practice? 

Oliver Linow: This can happen by blocking several websites, like dw.com or other international media. They [the government, editorial note] can block platforms, but sometimes they are only throttling websites so that people access these websites more slowly, and don't really realize that someone is blocking it. But with low performance, they are no longer happy to visit these websites. Governments can create Internet shutdowns so that a country is completely blocked from the Internet. 

This usually happens for a temporary time, not for longer than a few weeks because there's always a big collateral damage for these countries, too. What we saw in Iran in January, they shut down the complete Internet for a few days and then realized there was such a big economic damage, that they slightly opened up the Internet again.  

These are some tactics for blocking websites and censoring the Internet, but there are also more. 

Esther Kleine: One example of a throttling event is YouTube in Russia, when the Kremlin decided not to let the Russians be able to enter YouTube anymore. They slowly began throttling it, and it was harder and harder to use it. And they could just give a statement and say, "Well, it's their fault, it's YouTube's fault, it's Google's fault, it's not our thing, it's not censorship." But in the end, of course, they decided to technically intervene. 

The audience had to find ways to circumvent the throttling, which was, in the end, VPN again. But YouTube is still a popular platform in Russia, so they [the Kremlin, editorial note] didn't succeed I would say.  

Janelle Dumalaon: I think that's a very interesting point you're making. That there are the strategies that governments are employing, like blocking websites, but there are also levels to the strategies they're employing. There's a spectrum between blocking and throttling. 

And that example from Russia was also very interesting, because obviously I'm in the United States, and here there is this current discussion as well around whether TikTok might be suppressing content that is unfavorable to the administration. There have been some users complaining of blocked posts. Now TikTok, of course, blamed it on a power outage, much in the same way that you described in your Russian example there. There are parts of this where we're sure it's the government and sometimes you can't be, you just know that it's happening, right?

You guys also started to talk about circumvention strategies. You talked about VPNs, but I'd like to go a little bit more in detail about that. Let's talk about ways around digital censorship, the circumvention tools and strategies that media outlets could use. 

How can independent media outlets respond to these government strategies of blocking, of throttling and Internet shutdowns, as we've seen in Iran? 

Oliver Linow: Websites are technically blocked. It is possible to use a special VPN that is very robust against detection so that the censors can’t detect that people are using a VPN. There is an obfuscation of the traffic that it doesn’t look like a VPN. For example Psiphon, the Tor browser, are good tools to circumvent blocking. When it comes to Internet shutdowns, it’s much harder but many times there are still some small holes in the firewall that tools can use, that Psiphon can also use, that we saw in Iran in January. 

Then there are also satellite Internet connections via Starlink, for example, and hopefully more competitors in the future, too. And these are much harder to block. And yes, there are always ways around I would say. 

But your example from TikTok: if a platform is banning content so it can’t be restored from independent media because it's banned. If websites are technically blocked, we can circumvent. But banning on platforms we can’t. 

Esther Kleine: When they decide this content is allowed and this is being promoted and the other one is being banned or not even allowed. Of course, there's no technical circumvention. 

But I also want to add the mirrors. I mean I think that is the lowest barrier solution for people who aren't that techie, who just need a proper link. Just a working hyperlink that's leading towards, in our case, dw.com. 

That is a solution if there's a hybrid market, for example. We were blocked in Turkey for three years and that was just us, it wasn't the social platforms and there the mirroring, the proxy links, were really important because it's even harder to explain to an audience that they should use circumvention tools when all the other platforms or a lot of other platforms are still available. Then it would be our intention to convince them to use a VPN just for us. And that's even tougher sometimes. 

Janelle Dumalaon: Yes, I can imagine. So basically, the idea is that it's hard enough to get your content out there, to get eyes in front of your content. And any kind of barrier and extra step that might be required, presents an additional challenge to informing your audiences at least with our content.   

That’s also related to my next question. Outlets obviously need a good relationship with their audiences in order to be viable, to thrive. What does happen to audience relationships when there is that extra step when you need a VPN or you even fear for your safety just to access somebody's reporting that is blocked? 

Esther Kleine: Well, you need trust, you need to build trust, I would even say a network of trust, because one of our users who says this is a good brand, this is a trustworthy brand, needs to tell acquaintances and neighbors “Hey, this is a go-to brand.” That’s in the end, hopefully, a big network of people who trust DW as a brand and come back and use circumvention techniques and overcome the barriers to reach us. 

That is our goal. Therefore, like the editors, the newsrooms need to work on that, work for that community and need to communicate with that community, for example with a newsletter that is written in a very personal way that kind of makes the audience feel at home, articles about the censorship situation that they're all in, a more reflective perspective. 

That also creates transparency about the situation and creates trust in the end. 

And the classic community management on social media – it’s not only technical censorship, it's also defamation and propaganda against our brand. There is, of course, defamation in the commentaries and that’s something where you have to intervene as a newsroom and get in touch with the real people and show them that you're real as well. 

Oliver Linow: Trust is also so important when we recommend tools for the users. We don't want to bring them in danger and we don’t want to bring the trust in our brand in danger. 

For example, if we would recommend tools that people cannot trust because they lock user information, and we don't know what happens with this user information: are they selling this user data from people in authoritarian regimes that are doing something that is prohibited in that country? 

Because of this, we mostly use open-source tools so that people can trust there's a full transparency in these tools from our side and also from the side of the users. 

Esther Kleine: Actually, we only use open-source tools, right? 

Oliver Linow: Yes, now only open-source. Before, it was sometimes different. 

Esther Kleine: Open-source means transparency as well. 

Janelle Dumalaon: So from the perspective of somebody who works in independent media and that person has their content censored in a specific market, what should that person say to their audiences in order to communicate that they are being kept safe when they use tools that are available? 

Esther Kleine: First, this is us. We're real. We're a real brand and we're not being hijacked right now. You might have heard of some of those campaigns that actually look alike famous brands, DW was also used for that. In the end it was a bot – or the Kremlin maybe? 

So we're a real brand. You can trust us. That is why we do good journalism. Explain yourself and explain the way you work and tell your sources, the typical journalistic aspects, and then this is the software you’ve got to use: We recommend it because this is open-source, we trusted it, it was peer-to-peer reviewed, it is accepted and well known in the Internet freedom branch, maybe also some other partners are already using it. Refer to others; refer to BBC, refer to RFE/RL and then it creates a connection. 

Janelle Dumalaon: Sort of under the umbrella of independent media. 

Earlier, we also mentioned exiled media – as the name suggests, media outlets that are outside of the country that they are reporting from because the media in that country is no longer free. 

What kind of additional challenges do media outlets in exile face when it comes to digital censorship, and what opportunities are there for them when it comes to circumvention? 

Oliver Linow: Many times they have a small budget, low funding. I think they shouldn’t put all the money into content creation, but also in the distribution. 

Of course, they can find some advice in the so-called Internet freedom community, where many exile media are part of and are visiting events. There are many NGOs that are helping with tech and I think they can also support exile media in the ways of distribution. 

Janelle Dumalaon: So, there is an entire support ecosystem for exiled media when it comes to the topic of digital censorship circumvention to be aware of.  

Very often we talk about the rise of AI. What does the rise of AI mean for the work of helping media bypass digital censorship? Does it help media managers, or is it more of something that complicates everything? How do you view it? 

Oliver Linow: It's so big, the topic of AI. I can give you the technical perspective when it comes to censorship and circumvention. AI can help to obscure the traffic, as I'd mentioned, that it no longer looks like prohibited traffic, like VPN traffic. There, AI can be very useful so that a VPN connection looks like video streaming or like this podcast, for example. 

But of course, both sides can always use AI and the censors are also using AI for their firewalls. They're spending a lot of money on it and AI can help to detect traffic that is not allowed in the country and to fingerprint this traffic and then block it again. This is especially in China the case, where there is a lot of technical power and resources they can put in. 

Esther Kleine: I think the cat and mouse game just proceeds. It's the same in the AI world: the censors are getting better via AI and those who circumvent it, as well. 

Janelle Dumalaon: That’s a very good point. Basically, the playing field is elevated on both sides of the battlefield, so to say. 

But I do think it's a very interesting point, this idea of AI being able to mask VPN traffic and make it look like something else in countries where VPN traffic would be seen with suspicion. 

Esther Kleine: If I might add quickly, I think AI is also being used on the platforms that you mentioned earlier, like for censoring content. It's detected automatically and banned automatically and it's quite tough to get it back on the stage. So maybe that's a question in return, since I know that you’re a correspondent in Washington and you're dealing with some situation right now over there; the new regime doesn't seem to support all ways of free speech. What do you think about this situation in the US? 

Janelle Dumalaon: This is something that is certainly a topic. I find it interesting that you also mentioned this cat and mouse game. We also know that the administration is a very prolific user of AI. 

We've seen them release so many AI related images that are more towards the promotion of the administration. 

And at the same time, I also talked a little earlier about this controversy around TikTok and of course, TikTok has a new ownership structure in the US, and many would say that ownership structure reflects a closeness to the administration. You have the president's personal friends within that ownership structure as such. 

There was this discussion around whether TikTok was suppressing content that was deemed unfavorable to the administration, whether it's about the sex offender Jeffrey Epstein, who's now deceased, or whether it's about the Minneapolis protests. 

I don't want to over represent ourselves and say that at this moment, we have a very defined strategy about how we're dealing with potential censorship on the platforms, but it is certainly something that we are observing, we are monitoring. With the case of TikTok in particular, we're told it's a power outage. Of course, we don't know for sure how much stock to put in this explanation, but I do think it's necessary to observe that. It's happening and even if this explanation is on the table, enough confusion has already been created and that in itself already has an effect – perhaps a self censoring or a chilling effect. But your job of media is try to work past chilling effects, try to take them into consideration, be aware of them, but not be governed by them as such. 

Esther Kleine: I think it shows that those self-called free speech absolutists and the US for some reason don't see algorithms as a way of censorship. They say if the algorithm works this or that way, this is still free speech, although it might be leading towards one opinion or one direction only. It's just interesting and should be kept observed. 

Janelle Dumalaon: The other thing to consider, talking about free speech and the big platforms, a lot of the arguments you will hear will be around how these platforms are all private companies. In the sense that they can do whatever they want. They can make business decisions and whether that business decision is throttling an algorithm then that's what they might see fit to do. 

This is a discussion that I also want to have with you guys on this topic of digital censorship specifically. What roles do these big platforms play because for many media outlets around the world they are vital for the distribution of content – you kind of can't get past posting your content on YouTube or Facebook or TikTok or X – but there are also, of course, instances where these big platforms cooperate with authoritarian governments. How do you see that dynamic in particular? 

Oliver Linow: At the beginning of the big platforms, it was a big benefit for all media worldwide because they scaled up the audience on a high level and then they drilled down the screw more and more and there were less opportunities for media to use these platforms to get a reach. And so we see this situation now. 

It's very hard to distribute some content on social media platforms when it's through political or whatever, and especially when it comes to countries with strong censorship. They still allow some big platforms, and we can still use them to promote our circumvention tools or our proxy links, because this is always very important that the people know how to use these tools and how to get these tools. For this reason, we can use these platforms, of course. 

Esther Kleine: That's why I mean the fediverse comes into our minds more and more, right? 

Because this is not owned by one or some people. It's also not ruled by an unknown algorithm. It's more a democratic approach. Everyone gets the same chance. Every content gets the same chance but it's also then harder to actually reach many people.  

Oliver Linow: Because it's boring for many people. 

Esther Kleine: Yes, either you stick to the rules that the big platforms give you – make some showering kangaroo content and get some reach – or you want to show the content that is important to you, which might be societal critique. And then it gets kind of banned or not really pushed into the feeds. 

Janelle Dumalaon: Meaning, trying to use these big platforms or trying to get your content on big platforms, you have to understand that there's a price of admission, right? 

There are costs to using them. 

Esther Kleine: Yes, when we use Google to promote our circumvention techniques, we actually had debates whether we use the words censor, censorship, circumvention... 

The words that we actually needed to be promoted were the ones that we debated whether we could use them or rephrase them so that Google still pushes it. That's the reality. 

Janelle Dumalaon: That is so interesting. And once again, it’s a very complex job you have, that’s very clear now.  

We spoke a little bit about authoritarian governments, basically the idea of censorship is that media is made illegal, like in many countries. 

What are the key steps media need to take to ensure both the physical safety and the digital security of their staff – especially if working for media outlets where the media environment is particularly repressive? 

Oliver Linow: I think the staff need training. It's possible that people, journalists or technical staff working in these countries, have a protection that they can protect themselves physically and in a digital way. There are lots of guidelines they can use to make the work safer for them. 

But in some countries, let's say in Russia for example, it's nearly impossible. Especially when we speak about Deutsche Welle, about the status of Deutsche Welle in this country, the people [media workers; editorial note] are absolutely not safe and they bring themselves and their families in danger. 

Esther Kleine: But maybe I could extend the question to you, Oliver. Could you go back to the time when you entered the Internet freedom aspect? I mean, you were like a first mover back then. What did you do first? Did you go to a conference? How did it all start? 

Oliver Linow: The US were very advanced in this field. They started with the OTF, the Open Technology Fund, and this Open Technology Fund has supported and introduced many tech NGOs that are still doing a good job because they are all open-source organizations. 

They don't do all the work as volunteers , they need some funding for maintenance, for providing services. And that was given from the OTF. 

At the beginning there were some small corporations, some VPN providers. 

Esther Kleine: And everyone should do that. Everyone who's affected by censorship should build a network with those VPN providers. 

I think that's our recommendation because without this big Internet freedom network which is acting worldwide and helping each other out worldwide, you don't have the knowledge to intervene or circumvent the censorship that's affecting you. 

Janelle Dumalaon: Do you have a sense that independent media around the world are aware of the risks generally, and are able to take those steps that you suggest? You know, these networking steps, these communication steps to keep themselves safe both in a physical and digital sense? 

Esther Kleine: Not everyone, right? 

Oliver Linow: Yeah, not everyone. Some of them we know very good and they are well protected and they are well connected. 

But there are so many small exile media, independent media, let's say in Latin America and also in Asia and there, I'm not sure about this. 

Esther Kleine: We now also keep reminding editors who stand in front of the camera, for example, or give their names publicly for those kind of things, like campaigns for circumventing censorship or also for public articles, they should be aware that their name is public and their face is public and that might be a threat. That might put them in danger and they should be very aware of that. 

Oliver Linow: And their families, too, that are back in the country. 

Esther Kleine: Yes, because most people who work for a media outlet for a certain market also have a personal relation to that market and they should make sure that their family and they themselves are not affected. 

Janelle Dumalaon: I guess they're looking for points of vulnerability in your life that they could possibly use against you. 

And the more information you release out there to help them do that, perhaps the more likely it then becomes. That's something, as you say, that should be kept in mind. 

Now you mentioned exiled newsrooms and the sort of level of awareness that they have. So just bringing it back to them, because I can also imagine that it's a challenge for exiled newsrooms to gather information safely, but also still stay in touch with the local realities on the ground because they're not there. 

What strategies would help them gather information safely as well as being aware of what's happening in their local market? 

Oliver Linow: I think first of all, they have the good situation that they still have a connection, a relation to these countries because they had worked before from these countries and they still have some people inside. 

And I think they need strategies for communication and to keep the people inside the country safe. 

There are trainings available for this so that they can communicate securely and can exchange files, videos, orders and so on. There are also whistleblower platforms, they are secure. But it's tough. And I think the longer this situation is where they cannot work from inside the country, the harder or the bigger the problem is at the end. 

Janelle Dumalaon: I think that about covers all my questions. This has been a fascinating topic, indeed. 

But I do want to ask one last question of both of you, and it has something to do with this cat and mouse game that you mentioned earlier. 

In this cat and mouse game between authoritarian governments that are repressing media versus media outlets that employ digital censorship circumvention strategies – who is winning that game in your view and why? 

Esther Kleine: There's always a way to enter a market. And that makes me think that the circumventors win in the end. 

Oliver Linow: I think we need to join forces, each media outlet alone is too small, we have to work together. 

When we see the budget China spends on their Great Firewall, it's multiple times higher than the complete DW budget. It's impossible to circumvent blockings only with the resources of Deutsche Welle or from one media outlet. We all have to work together and then we’ll always find a way around the blocking. 

And I think we have also to publish what they do, how much money they're spending on the Great Firewall because also people in these countries, they don't understand or wouldn't understand why a country has put so much money into suppressing free speech, free media. 

Esther Kleine: And that is also adaptable for a corporate strategy. Every media outlet that is affected by censorship needs to prioritize these issues. From the bottom – like the worker for research and in the newsroom – up to the highest director, everyone needs to talk about it and needs to adapt to the situation. That is a whole chain of dependencies that need to be considered there. 

And that is also a budget topic, but a priority aspect as well. 

Janelle Dumalaon: You really can't get around the resources question, of course. 

But I think it is a very good point that you made about how making sure everyone on every level is aware and how it is important to recognize that, in a way, there's safety in numbers. 

As you say, cooperation will be key at the end of the day. 

So that brings us to the end of today's episode. 

We explored how digital censorship is changing, what it means for independent media and why protecting access to information matters more than ever. 

A big thank you to our guests Oliver Linow and Esther Kleine for sharing their insight and experience. 

We learned so much today. Thank you all for listening. 

You'll find links, resources and further reading in the show notes. 

We hope they help you dig deeper into the issues we discussed today. 

We'll be back soon with more on how public interest media can survive and thrive in a rapidly shifting world. 

Take care and thanks for joining us.

This transcript of "Survive and Thrive" has been lightly edited for clarity. 

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This podcast is produced by DW Akademie and is supported by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.