Into the symmetry

Usual Mandatory Disclaimer: IANAC (I am not a cryptographer) so I might likely end up writing a bunch of mistakes in this blog post... tl;dr The OpenSSL 1.0.2 releases suffer from a Key Recovery Attack on DH small subgroups . This issue got assigned CVE-2016-0701 with a severity of High and OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2f. If an application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that are not "safe" or not Lim-Lee (as the one in RFC 5114 ) and either Static DH ciphersuites are used or DHE ciphersuites with the default OpenSSL configuration (in particular SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is not set) then is vulnerable to this attack.  It is believed that many popular applications (e.g. Apache mod_ssl) do set the  SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option and would therefore not be at risk (for DHE ciphersuites), they still might be for Static DH ciphersuites. Introduction So if you are still here it means you wanna know more. And here is the thing. In my last bl...

Mandatory Disclaimer: I ANAC (I am not a cryptographer) so I might likely end up writing a bunch of mistakes in this blog post... I already talked about Diffie–Hellman (DH from now on) in TLS in my previous post: Small subgroup attack in Mozilla NSS . As mentioned FWIW I strongly agree with Google Chrome decision to deprecate DHE . The reason is mainly due to the Weak Diffie-Hellman attack and related paper . If you are interested in this topic there is a really nice presentation about it at 32C3 . This shows a really nice potential attack that anyone with enough computational power (let's say NSA) can perform against DHE 1024 bits (details in the paper). Said that for some reason I have been looking at DHE for a while now and one day I hit RFC 5114 . Now what the heck is this specification about :S ? I found only few references about it. One funny one from here says (emphasis mine): There is a semi-mysterious RFC 5114 – Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups docu...

tl;dr While the TLS servers attacks has been pretty much studied and fixed (see e.g. https://www.secure-resumption.com/ and https://weakdh.org/ ) the situation with the TLS clients is (was) not ideal and can be improved. Here I report a Small subgroup attack for TLS clients that I performed against various browsers and reported. Whoever reads this blog is used to read about OAuth . For once (and maybe more in the future) let's hijack the usual topic and let's talk about my new "passion" : TLS in particular Diffie–Hellman (DH from now on). Now, before to start I need to clarify one thing IANAC (I am not a cryptographer) so I might likely end up writing a bunch of mistakes in this blog post... Diffie-Hellman is used in SSL/TLS, as "ephemeral Diffie-Hellman" (EDH) and it is probably going to be kill soonish (or at least is the intent of Google Chrome ). FWIW I personally agree with this unless EDH implements the Negotiated Finite Field specification ...

Some time ago I posted a blogpost abut  Top 5 OAuth 2 Implementation Vulnerabilities . This week I have extended the list while presenting Top X OAuth 2 Hacks at OWASP Switzerland. This blog post (like the presentation) is just a collection of interesting attack OAuth related. #10 The Postman Always Rings Twice  I have introduced this 'attack' in last year post . This is for provider implementer , it is not extremely severe but, hey, is better to follow the spec. Specifically The client MUST NOT use the authorization code  more than once.  If an authorization code is used more than once, the authorization server MUST deny the request and SHOULD revoke (when possible) all tokens previously issued based on that authorization code. It turned out that even Facebook and Google did it wrong ... :) #9 Match Point To all OAuth Providers be sure to follow section 4.1.3 of the spec in particular ...if the "redirect_uri" parameter was included in the...

tl;dr in this blog post we are going to give a look at modern browsers's protection with some hands on example available at https://github.com/asanso/browsers-security and deployed in Heroku . This blog post is NOT about Same-origin policy Introduction In this blog post we are going to give a look at modern browsers's protection. More specifically if you are designing a REST API where the result response is driven by some user input, then why not have some help from the browser rather than brewing some ad hoc protection? I am going to provide some demo deployed in Heroku . If you prefer running them on your machine you might want to clone  https://github.com/asanso/browsers-security and drill down into the specific example. Mind your content type By definition Content-Type entity-header field indicates the media type of the entity-body sent to the recipient or, in the case of the HEAD method, the media type that would have been sent had the request b...

In a previous blogpost we have already analyzed a token hijack on one OAuth integration between some Microsoft and Google service and seen what went wrong. Now it is time to see yet another integration between Microsoft and xxxx (unluckily I can't disclose the name of the other company due the fact the haven't still fixed a related issue...) and see some fallacy. But before to focus on the attack we might need a bit of introduction. HTTP referrer An HTTP referrer (misspelled as referer in the spec) is a special HTTP header field that browsers (and http clients in general) attach when surfing from a page to another. In this way the new webpage can see where the request originated. One extra thing to point out is that as per section 15.1.3 (Encoding Sensitive Information in URI's) of HTTP RFC [RFC 2616]: Clients SHOULD NOT include a Referer header field in a (non-secure) HTTP request if the referring page was transferred with a secure protocol. This is summarized ...

tl;dr Apple Safari for OS X was prone to URI spoofing vulnerability  (and more general a user interface spoofing). Apple released security updates for Safari 9 on OS X and assigned CVE-2015-5764. Accidentally this vulnerability was also present in iOS. Instant demo In Safari up to 8.0.8 : go to https://asanso.github.io/CVE-2015-5764/file0.html click "click me!" notice the address bar being "data:text/html,%3CH1%3EHi!!%3C/H1%3E" go back using the browser button click "click me!" notice the address bar being http://www.intothesymmetry.com/CVE-2015-5764/file0.php !!!!  Well this looks a clear caching problem to me, right :) ? The Introduction (Oldie but goldie) Several months ago (almost a year!!) I was reading the great book written by lcamtuf (aka Michal Zalewski) named The Tangled Web .  I know, I know I was a bit late for the party :) Said that, this book contained a really interesting Chapter (for the record Chapter 10) that is de...